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“[...] most countries have closed their borders against the influx of Chinese emigrants, in
whole or in part. It is therefore self-evident that the Chinese people strive to evade the emi-
gration laws of the nations surrounding them, and that human smuggling abounds. In this,
members of the large immigrant communities in the Netherlands are only too glad to
assist” (Van Heek, 1936).
“[…] de meeste staten hebben hun grenzen voor den toevloed van Chineesche landverhuizers
geheel of gedeeltelijk gesloten. Het ligt dus voor de hand, dat de Chineezen trachten de emigratie-
wetten der hen omringende landen te ontduiken en dat de menschensmokkelarij welig tiert. Ook
de leden der groote Chineesche immigrantenkolonies in Nederland verleenen gaarne hun mede-
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Although human smuggling is not exclusive to one particular ethnic group, a few
notorious incidents have focused much attention on the smuggling of Chinese
nationals for years. In June 1993, for example, the cargo ship “Golden Venture”
ran aground off the US coast near New York. It carried 286 Chinese illegal immi-
grants on board. Several drowned when they tried to swim ashore but were over-
come by the cold water. The ensuing investigation revealed that conditions on
board were abominable and accounts of the horrors the passengers suffered dur-
ing the journey found their way to the media. In later years similar transports
were discovered (Wang, 1996). This drew attention to the smuggling of Chinese
people in particular in the United States. The so-called Dover tragedy caused a
similar uproar in Europe. On 19 June 2000 a cargo truck was found in Dover
containing the bodies of 58 Chinese nationals who had died of suffocation. Only
two survived the journey. The investigations and prosecutions that followed
exposed a large group of human smugglers in the Netherlands.
In addition to such notorious incidents, Chinese human smuggling is also
connected with several alarming observations. Early 2004, 21 illegal Chinese
cockle-pickers drowned near Morecambe in Great Britain. According to media
reports, they were being grossly exploited. There were allegations of gang masters
forcing these illegal immigrants to do dangerous work under appalling condi-
tions for very low wages to earn back the money they owed for being smuggled
out of China (BBC, 2004). If we limit the scope to the Netherlands, which in the
following chapters will become the focus of this study, exploitation ensuing from
Chinese human smuggling is also considered a problem. Bovenkerk and Fijnaut,
for example, states that some of the people smuggled into the country are
recruited by the criminal organizations that bring them here (Bovenkerk &
Fijnaut, 1996). Vogels et al. also report that illegal migrants are forced to extort,
threaten and kidnap people in their own Chinese community in order to pay off
their debts (Vogels, Geense, & Martens, 1999: 124). These debts are estimated at
tens of thousands of euros per person, which is the cost of smuggling them from
China (Godfroid & Vinckx, 1999: 37, 63, 233; Vogels et al., 1999: 123). Further-
more there are suspicions that underage female Chinese asylum seekers are
forced into prostitution (Hoogendoorn, 1999; Venicz & Vanwesenbeeck, 1998).
The Dutch authorities also assume that human smugglers are to a great extent
responsible for the influx of asylum seekers (Tweede Kamer, 1995: 1; Van der
Molen-Maesen, 1996; 1999). As a result, therefore, “the criminal prosecution of
human smugglers [has become] an essential element in managing migration
flows” (Tweede Kamer, 1995: 1).
However, cracking down on human smugglers is no simple affair. Apart
from difficulties arising investigating and prosecution, repressive government
action can also have perverse effects. It might inflate smuggling prices and raise
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the risk for small-time smugglers and thereby give rise to professional large-scale
smuggling organizations (Akinbingöl, 2003; Florin, 1996).
1.2 Objective
In the media, the literature and even police investigations, Chinese people who
are somehow involved in human smuggling on the wrong side of the law are
often nicknamed shetou. This is a Chinese word that literally means ‘snakehead’,
and is never applied to other nationalities. It alludes to the head of a snake, which
cunningly leads the rest of the body to its destination.
Such a term can be distracting however. It clearly focuses on ethnic Chinese
smugglers although the smuggling of Chinese people is not always a purely Chi-
nese issue. Reports on the investigation of the Dover tragedy for example, show
that Dutch and Turkish individuals were also involved. Furthermore, the term
shetou says very little about what such a person actually does nor how he cooper-
ates with others. It is these two latter questions that in particular have been
addressed in some landmark studies (Chin, 1999; Kwong, 1997, 2001; Wang,
1996; Zhang & Chin, 2002; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996).
However, these studies of Chinese human smuggling originate in the
United States and hardly pay attention to Europe, let alone the Netherlands. That
begs the question to what extent the American findings apply to the Netherlands.
The difference in geographical position alone suggests there will be differences in
smuggling methods. Furthermore, US society has different laws, a different
social security system and a more open labor market than the Netherlands. This
can affect the sort of smugglers involved, the choice of destination and perhaps
the type of migrant. Another important difference is that the Netherlands is regu-
larly used as a transit country (IAM 2005). The US, the land of unlimited oppor-
tunity with its ‘golden mountains’, is unlikely to be used for that purpose. Only a
few Chinese would want to be smuggled into another country once they had
reached America. This has certain consequences. A tight labor market in the
Netherlands may prompt migrants to seek better conditions elsewhere. However,
if the US employment situation took a turn for the worse, migrants may tighten
their belt a little more, work harder or even turn to crime to survive.
Little is known about how smuggling to or through the Netherlands is
organized. Information from the Netherlands indicates only the global travel
routes, the means of transport used or the length of time a smuggling operation
takes (Buitenhuis, 2000; INDIAC, 2000). The Dutch authorities report the
involvement of triads and groups of major organized criminals, but give no
details about how these groups actually function (IAM, 2001a: 64; 2002; Boven-
kerk & Fijnaut, 1996). Occasionally, a few members of the Chinese community
are interviewed. This produces anecdotal information that suggests a streamlined
organisation is involved, but still provides little insight into precisely how the
smuggling is organized (Braam, 2003; Godfroid & Vinckx, 1999; Husken &
Kagie, 2002). Although the smuggling of Chinese nationals is considered a classic
example of major organized crime, there is little empirical evidence to support this
assumption.
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The lack of knowledge about Chinese human smuggling in the Netherlands
is all the more remarkable considering the fact that several studies of the Chinese
community have been conducted since the Second World War. However, the
focus of these studies was their position in society, how they experience their eth-
nicity and the related problems (ACB/LFCON, 1994; Benton & Vermeulen, 1987;
Blaak, Engelhard, de Frenne, & Sproet, 2004; Hira, 1997; Li, 1999a, 1999b;
Pieke, 1988; Tseng, 1983; Vellinga & Wolters, 1966; Vellinga & Wolters, 1973;
Vermeulen, 1984). Other recurring themes in studies of Chinese people in the
Netherlands are childrearing and the education of children in Chinese families,
the position of elderly Chinese and ethnic entrepreneurship (Geense & Pels,
1998; Rijkschroeff, 1998; Sciortino, Wessels, & Teng, 1993). The fact that most of
the researchers have a sociological or anthropological background probably
explains to some extent why these studies focus on analyzing the position that the
Chinese have in society. Another important factor is the debate at government
level about minorities in the Netherlands that began in the early 1980s. The Chi-
nese themselves were interested in the question whether they as a group should
be included in the special minorities policy of the Dutch government. For exam-
ple, Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants already had official minority
status. Inclusion in the minorities policy would make the Chinese eligible for
minority grants.1
Human smuggling and illegality are not dealt with in such studies. At most,
these studies acknowledge the presence of illegal Chinese aliens or that illegal
entry of the Netherlands occurred (Benton & Vermeulen, 1987: 9; Groenendijk,
1987: 87, 88; Vellinga & Wolters, 1966: ii, 66; Vermeulen, 1984: 115; Vogels et al.,
1999; Willems & Cottaar, 1989: 125). The way these people got into the country is
virtually ignored. It could be that some researchers were afraid to delve into ille-
gality or illicit behavior for fear of stigmatizing migrant communities (Kyle &
Koslowski, 2001: 11,12).
Two exceptions emerged recently. Pieke et al. conducted specific research in
Europe on the transnational Chinese community from Fujian province (Pieke,
Nyíri, Thuno, & Ceccagno, 2004). Their field interviews provided some informa-
tion about illegal migration, too. The organization of human smuggling was
shown to be relatively simple. The study was limited, however, because it focused
only on Chinese from Fujian province, while Europe has many migrants from
Zhejiang province as well. The second study was carried out by Staring et al.
(Staring et al., 2005). They were commissioned by the Rotterdam police to exam-
ine human smuggling involving the port of Rotterdam. They analyzed 11 police
investigations and identified two model types of smuggling organizations on a
sliding scale from poorly organized to well organized. The Chinese were found to
be well organized. However, as the researchers themselves point out, the cases
selected for this study were limited geographically to Rotterdam. Furthermore,
only three human smuggling cases involved Chinese. Those three cases are, in
fact, closely related to each other and are therefore not necessarily representative
of Chinese human smuggling in the rest of the Netherlands.
1. After receiving ‘observer’ status in 2002, the Chinese community was finally granted official
minority status in 2004.
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In summary, therefore, no extensive research has been conducted into the
specific phenomenon of Chinese human smuggling in the Dutch context. The
aim of this thesis is to provide more information about this issue through system-
atic empirical research. The focus is not so much on the smuggling routes that
migrants take or how migrants survive in Dutch society, but on the organizers of
the smuggling process. Who are they? How do they work together? Can specific
characteristics be identified? For example, are they involved in other types of
criminality as well?
The main research question is: Who are the smugglers of Chinese people and
how is Chinese human smuggling organized in the Netherlands? The next chapter
elaborates further on this general question.
2 Theoretical framework and question
2.1 Introduction
The transport of illegal migrants can be viewed as a logistics process in which dif-
ferent actions must be undertaken to get them to their destination. Several roles
in the smuggling process can be distinguished, such as organizers, recruiters,
transporters, document forgers, local guides, enforcers, money launderers and
other personnel.
However, there is less consensus about how these people work together.
Because the main aim of this research project is to identify how the smuggling of
Chinese people is organized in the Netherlands, some background information
about this discussion is very important. From a criminological perspective, two
concepts can be distinguished. The first assumes strong hierarchical structures,
whereas the second assumes a much looser organization through social net-
works. A market-oriented strategy is often incorporated in both nowadays. That
means that smugglers are out to maximize their profits, but are bound to the lim-
itations inherent in operating in an illegal market sector. These ideas originate
from the debate that has been running for decades regarding the concept of
‘organized crime’.2
It is not necessary, however, to approach human smuggling from a purely
criminological angle. It can also be considered part of the migration process (Kyle
& Liang, 2001; Salt & Stein, 1997). Smugglers are able to provide illegal transport
for a fee to people who are unable to migrate by legal means. Terms such as
“migration merchants”, “migration broker” and “migration facilitator” are alter-
native designations for smugglers (Kyle & Liang, 2001; Pieke et al., 2004). These
terms show that migration might be an important piece of the human smuggling
puzzle. The fields of economics, sociology, anthropology, history and political
science – among others – have formulated different ideas regarding migration
that can serve as general explanatory models for migration. Yet, knowledge about
migration is infrequently applied to the (Chinese) human smuggling setting
(Soudijn, 2004). This is probably because human smuggling, of Chinese nation-
als in particular, quickly evokes associations with organized crime. In contrast,
migration is primarily associated with family ties. But the two do not have to be
mutually exclusive.
A theoretical framework for answering the question how Chinese human
smuggling is organized in the Netherlands is laid out in the following sections. In
the first section, the functions involved in human smuggling are set out and
described. In the second part, after a brief discussion of organized crime and
migration, a number of focal points are then identified. After the definition of
2. ‘Organized crime’ is difficult to define. See also (Beare, 2003; P. Van Duyne, 2003). To confuse
matters, the term organized crime has come to refer to both an actor/group and an activity
(Albanese, Das, & Verma, 2003; Levi, 2003; Paoli, 2002). 
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human smuggling used in this research is given in the third section, these focal
points are grouped schematically.
2.1.1 Functions
People smugglers come in all shapes and sizes. For instance, there are major
snakeheads (da shetou) and minor snakeheads (xiao shetou). Da shetou are the
important figures and principles who remain in the background. Xiao shetou are
the workers who carry out the various small tasks. Kwong also calls the latter
“snaketails” (Kwong, 1997). Since these terms provide no information about pre-
cisely what the major and minor snakeheads do, various authors distinguish
between the ‘functions’ and ‘roles’ that are necessary in human smuggling
(Aronowitz, 2001; Futo & Jandl, 2004; ICMPD, 1999; Klinchenko, 2000; Salt &
Stein, 1997; Schloenhardt, 1999; Zhang & Chin, 2002; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996).
Regardless of the variations in terminology, there is a distinction between individ-
uals who organize smuggling operations, recruit illegal migrants, provide guid-
ance en route, provide certain facilities (accommodation, transport, food, travel
documents, local guides, money laundering services etc.) and, in some cases,
assist the migrants in the country of destination. Brief descriptions of each func-
tion are given below.
The organizer, also sometimes called the arranger or investor, is seen as the
key figure in the smuggling process. He plans the operation, supervises (certain
parts of) the execution and invests money in the operation.
Potential illegal migrants contact the smugglers through recruiters. The
organizer pays the recruiter a certain fee for every individual he brings in.
Recruitment takes place in China, along the smuggling route or even in the coun-
try of destination. In the first case, potential migrants are sought out in China
and encouraged to attempt the journey. In the second case, migrants encountered
along the way are enticed to change their destination. The smuggler can try to
‘sell’ the migrant a country that is further away than his original choice. It is also
possible for a competing smuggler to try and persuade the migrant to switch serv-
ices. In the third case, a migrant who has reached his destination can be per-
suaded to move on to another, better, country. Recruiters often have the same
background as the potential migrants and come from the same region. Wang
points out that the recruiters’ job is not even that difficult. Many people in China
want to leave the country because they believe they can earn a lot of money
abroad and are therefore not very critical (Wang, 1996: 53).
The transporter or escort is responsible for transporting the migrants. His pri-
mary task is to get them across the border. In the case of a legal border crossing,
he guides them through the border controls, makes sure everyone has good docu-
mentation and instructs them on how to act. In a secret border crossing, pass-
ports are unnecessary. In such cases, the transporter drives the migrants over the
border hidden in a lorry, for example. More than one transporter will often be
involved in the journey from China to the West, each of them taking responsibil-
ity for a different leg of the journey.
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Local guides can be used in an illegal border crossing to secrete migrants over
the ‘green border’, i.e. walking through the woods, or the ‘blue border’, i.e. wad-
ing across a river. Guides are local residents who know the local border area like
the back of their hand. They can be deployed only for the area where they live.
They are usually also of a different nationality than the people being smuggled.
Using local guides is not entirely free of risk. Besides the risk of the smuggled
persons being shot by border guards or dying of extreme weather conditions,
local guides sometimes turn out to be unreliable. There have been several reports
of people being told they had entered Germany, while they had actually only been
walking in circles in the Czech forest. In other incidents, smuggled persons were
left behind by their guides when discovery by patrolling border guards was immi-
nent or when they could not meet the guide’s demand for more money.
When a journey or part of a journey is undertaken using the normal infra-
structure, e.g. by airplane, good identity papers are essential. That is where pass-
port forgers come in. As the name implies, they forge documents.
Safe houses are used for journeys across several countries over a long period.
These are houses or apartments where the smuggled persons can stay temporar-
ily during their journey. Smuggled persons sometimes have to wait in a safe
house for months before resuming their journey. When it is necessary for a lot of
people to wait in a small place for a long time, enforcers are on hand to keep every-
thing under control. They supervise and make sure that the smuggled persons
stay calm, using physical violence if necessary. With smaller groups, the escort
automatically takes on the role of enforcer during the journey. With larger
groups, one of the smuggled persons might be asked to act as an enforcer in
exchange for a discount on his travel fee.
Debt collectors ensure that the smuggling fee is paid and pass it on to the
organizer. Debt collectors are located in both the homeland and the country of
destination. They collect the money from the smuggled person or from his/her
friends or family. When smuggled persons fail to pay, debt collectors will bring
pressure to bear. Smuggled persons may be given assignments to carry out to
repay their debts. These assignments may be of a criminal nature.
Occasionally, corrupt public officials provide support. The literature notes that
corruption occurs not only in China, but is sometimes a major factor in foreign
countries where the smuggling of Chinese nationals is involved. (Chin, 1999: 42-
46; Ghosh, 1998: 92; Wang, 1996: 54). Corrupt officials make the journey easier
by issuing the required documents or neglecting to carry out border controls.
Various other categories of support staff. The profits from smuggling operations
are invested in legitimate enterprises by money launderers. They are financial
experts and have no other connection with the execution of the smuggling opera-
tion. Other individuals put houses, boats or vehicles in their name. Informants
provide smugglers with information about border controls, police investigations,
migration policy and asylum procedures. The smugglers are then able to adapt
their activities and make use of differences in the law and border control policy.
Not every smuggling operation involves all of these functions. For example,
when a smuggled person flies directly to Amsterdam from China, there is no
need for local guides. However, it is unclear which of these functions are carried
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out in the Netherlands, let alone how the individuals involved work together.
From a criminology standpoint, there are two predominant theories about how
the parties cooperate, i.e. within hierarchical structures or looser organizations
through social networks.
2.1.2 Hierarchical approach
Human smuggling can be described as an operation carried out by a criminal
organisation that maintains a strict hierarchy. The hierarchic (traditional) view of
organized crime is often traced back to the findings from several American con-
gressional committees on organized crime, such as Cressey’s report for the 1967
Task Force on Organized Crime for the President’s Crime Commission. In the lit-
erature about organized crime, this commission is presented as effectively paint-
ing a picture of the Italian Mafia (Cosa Nostra) as a criminal bureaucratic model
(Cressey, 1969). In this model large-scale, ethnically homogeneous, hierarchical
entities participate in various highly lucrative criminal activities in a systematic
(i.e. bureaucratic) way.
There is also a Chinese equivalent of the Italian Mafia, called the triads
(Bresler, 1981; He, 2003).3 Or as Galeotti formulates it: “The only real global
rivals to the [Italian] Mafia in terms of breadth, organization and discipline are
the Chinese [triads]” (Galeotti, 2000: 51). Descriptions of triads like this one share
many similarities, in organizational terms, with the Italian Cosa Nostra in the US
described by Cressey. Orders are passed down from the top through a chain of
command to lower-ranking members. As in a bureaucracy, all the positions are
filled by replaceable members to ensure the continuity of the organization. The
individual in charge is assisted by specialists, such as accountants and lawyers.
Full membership in the organization is reserved for a select group and involves
an initiation rite in which the individual swears allegiance to the organization.
There is an internal sanction system to keep the members in line. Corruption as
well as intimidation and violence are used in dealing with the outside world. The
organization is involved in various forms of crime and strives to occupy a position
of power in certain types of crime or geographical areas. Although this can some-
times trigger conflicts between criminal organizations, they often make agree-
ments to facilitate peaceful coexistence.
It is sometimes also suggested that economic principles apply to hierarchical
organizations. When a market-based approach is incorporated, similarities
between legal and illegal economies are brought to the fore. For instance, the
criminal organization benefits from economies of scale. Because transnational
criminal organizations are seen as the illegal counterparts of legitimate multina-
tional corporations, criminal enterprises are often looking for new market oppor-
3. Triads are sometimes called hongmen (Hong leagues), sanhehui or samhopwui (three unities soci-
ety), sandianhui (three dots society) and tiandihui (heaven and earth society). In an American
context, the terms tongs and gangs are also used (Kaufman, 1986; Kelly, 1999; PSI, 1992; Ryan,
1995; Tracy, 1993). The Chinese themselves more commonly use the term ‘black society’ (hei
shehui) to refer to organized crime. The crimes are then called ‘black society crimes’ (Zhang,
2001).  For a detailed report on the emergence of triads, see (Ter Haar, 1998). 
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tunities (Di Nicola, 2000: 75, 76). They can therefore develop strategic alliances,
joint ventures, tactical alliances or contract relationships with other criminal
organizations (Williams, 2002: 326, 327). Sterling even speaks of a global pax
mafiosa between criminal oligarchies, such as the American Cosa Nostra, the
Sicilian Mafia, the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, the Russian Mafia and
the Colombians (ICMPD, 1999; Sterling, 1994).
Through this lens of organized crime, the smuggling of Chinese people is
seen as a highly organized criminal activity, carried out (of course) by triadic
organizations (Bolz, 1995; Godfroid & Vinckx, 1999; Minthe, 2002; Schmid,
1994). Attendants at a Dutch meeting of asylum and migration experts in May
1999 concluded that “[…] Chinese triads have the entire process under control
from beginning to end” (Bijleveld & Taselaar, 2000: 21). Sometimes the triad
organizations or gangs involved in human smuggling are given specific names.
For example, in America the Fuk Ching is said to be involved (Yiu, 2000: 117). In
the Netherlands the involvement of triads with names like the 14K, the Ah Kong
and the Tai Huen Chai (also known as the Big Circle Boys) is reported (Bovenkerk
& Fijnaut, 1996).
If one assumes that such large criminal organizations are responsible for
human smuggling, the individual migrant is in no position to argue. Thus vari-
ous abuses are easily explained. The smuggled persons are required to repay the
high smuggling fees with interest. As a result, they can end up becoming victims
if they are forced into prostitution or slavery. They can also be forced to commit
criminal acts by the smuggling organization. Examples of such acts include trans-
porting drugs and robbing wealthy restaurant owners. The profits generated by
these activities go into the coffers of the organization (Adamoli, Di Nicola,
Savona, & Zoffi, 1998; Morse, 2001; Plywaczewski, 2002; Schloenhardt, 2001).
The literature on human smuggling also mentions criminal diversification.
Schloenhardt writes that organizations use their tried and tested drug smuggling
routes for human smuggling because they offer “new market opportunities”
(Schloenhardt, 2001: 340). Both forms of smuggling can also occur at the same
time. “It appears that especially Asian organized crime groups use routes, means
and methods of transportation for the simultaneous trafficking of people and nar-
cotics” (Schloenhardt, 1999: 216). Bovenkerk and Fijnaut also concludes that the
different Chinese criminal groups “are just as likely to [engage in] heroin traffick-
ing as human smuggling, and will engage in robbery and extortion as easily as in
loan-sharking” (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996: 144).
Several authors also mention that increasing the fight against human smug-
glers is not without risks. There is a possibility more government repression ulti-
mately plays into the hands of the large-scale (hierarchic) criminal organizations.
Their professionalism allows them to survive while small-scale smugglers are
forced out of the market. This will in turn lead to higher smuggling prices and a
further criminalization of the smuggling business (Albrecht, 2002: 17; Di Nicola,
2000: 74; Heckmann, 2003: 152, 153; Koslowski, 2001: 338, 353; Nadig, 2002: 1;
Schloenhardt, 2001).
‘Pop crime’ literature and newspaper reporting in particular focus on the
hierarchical and bureaucratic nature of triads (Booth, 2000; Bresler, 1981; Faligot,
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1996). Cressey, however, appears to have built in some nuances in his original
theme. In 1969 Cressey stated in the chapter “Shifting Patterns of Authority and
Recruitment” that a hierarchical structure based purely on complete subordina-
tion to the welfare of the organization should perhaps be linked to the spirit of the
time. In other words, organizations change. He refers in this context to changes
within, for example, the army and the police. In the past, a member of such an
organization was “required to obey whatever commands his superior gave. In
legitimate governmental organizations, this system of rank authority is rapidly
giving way to authority based on expertise […]” (Cressey, 1969: 235). According to
Paoli, the Italian Mafia is allowed to flourish in Italy because people are very
socially conditioned to tolerate such organizations. Only recently has there been a
shift away from that (Paoli, 2003). From that perspective, the structure of a crimi-
nal organization could be seen to reflect the society in which it is rooted. There is
no harm in considering that a large part of contemporary literature that paints a
hierarchical picture of triads is actually, although often unknowingly, based on
antiquated data (Morgan, 1960; Schlegel, 1866; Ward & Stirling, 1925). Chinese
crime groups are not static entities. They are subject to changes and may very
well have evolved into smaller-scale, less tightly controlled organizations. It is also
possible that a new, different type of criminal subculture has emerged (Zhang &
Chin, 2003: 485). Without formal ties to traditional triads or the need for a strict
organization, some entrepreneurs are just looking for profit, even it is on the
shady side of the law.
2.1.3 Social network approach
From a different perspective, organized crime is seen as occurring through crimi-
nal ‘action sets’. From this perspective, organized crime is not about large,
bureaucratic structures, but rather loosely connected networks of individuals
(Albini, 1997; Ianni, 1971; Ianni, 1973). The Mafia may exist, but it functions
more like a traditional social system, facilitated by the extended family and kin-
ship-based relationships.
Although rigid hierarchical relationships like those in the organization
model described above appear to be uncommon, relationships characterized by
unequal dependence do exist. In this regard, social capital and social network the-
ories are used as tools for analyzing criminal partnerships (Bruinsma & Ber-
nasco, 2004; Kleemans, Brienen, & Van de Bunt, 2002; Klerks, 2000). Not every-
one is by definition equal. Some individuals have scarce commodities (money,
knowledge, contacts) at their disposal that others do not have. People who are
able to bridge social and geographic gaps are therefore very important in a net-
work. Following on from Burt, such nodes in criminal networks can be referred
to as structural holes (Kleemans et al., 2002). Certain service providers (money
changers, document forgers, etc.) are also important (Kleemans et al., 2002).
However, criminals are not necessarily always dependent on one particular node.
They usually know someone who knows someone who can provide a solution.
Many roads lead to Rome (Van Calster, 2002). This means that networks are usu-
ally flexible and fluid in nature. People get involved in criminal groups through
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their social connections. After some time they leave the old group, draw other
individuals from their social circle into a new criminal enterprise and the cycle
begins again (Kleemans et al., 2002; Southerland & Potter, 1993).
Apart from flexible networks, there are also strongly cohesive networks.
Examples include ethnically homogeneous groups with affective (family) rela-
tionships (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004). It is precisely because they are not
purely instrumental that these latter networks are durable.
The network concept has also been applied to Chinese crime. Since the
1990s it even uses its own term: guanxi. The Chinese word guanxi roughly
means relationships, networks or patron-client relationships. Attention was
drawn to this in part by the publications of a small number of (former) govern-
ment investigators and other public officials who are ‘old China hands’, see for
example (Hart, 1998; Myers, 1995; Myers, 1997). The term guanxi is now fairly
common among researchers who study Chinese crime (Beare, 1999; Blaak et al.,
2004; Gaylord & Fu, 1999; Kwong, 1997; McIllwain, 2004; Robinson, 2000;
Zhang & Chin, 2002; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996). Nevertheless, the term guanxi is
not used in this study but sticks with social capital. As Ping remarked: “the disad-
vantage of this [term] is to assume that a cultural essence is involved which in
itself accounts for its specificity” (Ping, 2002: 27).
From a market-oriented approach in a network setting, it is preferable to
speak of disorganized crime instead of organized crime. This is due to the restric-
tive effect that legislation and public control can have on a certain market area
(the offering of prohibited goods or services). A successful illicit enterprise must
first and foremost ensure that it is not discovered, so that it can continue its activ-
ities. To avoid arrest and confiscation, the illegal entrepreneur has to run his busi-
ness with that in mind. This means, for example, putting as little information as
possible on paper, being cautious on the telephone, not using banking services,
etc. All these factors inhibit the growth of one big criminal enterprise but gives
rise to many small criminal groups (Besozzi, 2001; Reuter, 1983; Van Duyne,
Kouwenberg, & Romeijn, 1990).
Seen through a set of network-oriented lenses, human smuggling is less rig-
idly structured. There is no central organization that controls the entire smug-
gling process (Zhang & Chin, 2002; Zhang & Chin, 2003; Zhang, 1997). For
example, when debt collecting is necessary, the job is outsourced to others. In the
US, smugglers ask local gangs to act as collection agencies (Chin, 1996: 159, 160;
Wang, 1996: 57). A field study of ninety smugglers in the US and China shows
that their backgrounds vary tremendously. They are housewives, bricklayers, res-
taurant owners, taxi drivers and even government officials. There is no clear
structure or hierarchy. They consider each other “friends”, each with a different
role. Only three of the individuals interviewed admitted to having ties with Chi-
nese organized crime groups, but those ties were not connected to smuggling
(Chin, 2001).
Although human smuggling may be seen as a business, it is unclear how far
the analogy goes (Salt & Hogarth, 2000: 49). Long-term planning and long-term
profits are far from certain in human smuggling. “Unlike gambling and prostitu-
tion where client recruitment and business promotion are tied to specific individu-
12 Chapter 2
als and locations for long-term profits, human smuggling mostly involves one-time
transactions due to limited eligible as well as geographically scattered clientele”
(Zhang & Chin, 2003: 481). Building a group identity by swearing oaths and prac-
ticing rituals is therefore also irrelevant for smugglers (Zhang & Chin, 2003: 483).
Paradoxically enough, sometimes a completely different conclusion is tied to
the interaction between networks and the market. Membership in, for example, a
triad may no longer be of definitive importance, but some believe criminal entre-
preneurs pose the next global threat due to their flexible and widespread network
(Godson, 1997; Myers, 1995; PSI, 1992). Paoli remarks that this will have
brought us full circle (Paoli, 2002: 56, 57). The networks are seen more as autono-
mous structures. A criminal network has thus become a modern synonym for the
‘old-fashioned’ criminal organizations. “In these cases, the bureaucratic approach
to organized crime is not challenged: flexibility is incorporated into the ‘criminal
organization’ paradigm as just another attribute of the structure. Social relations do
not form the base of networks: they are the networks” (Zaitch, 2002: 22).
In short, the human smuggling literature presumes that if hierarchical
organizations are responsible for smuggling Chinese nationals, the central steer-
ing and control throughout the smuggling process is greater than in networks.
Such organizations can also be expected to be involved in heterogeneous criminal
activity, while smuggling networks are more likely to rely on outsourcing.
2.1.4 Migratory approach
A pure market approach to illicit activities has a specific point of departure. The
central point is the opinion that in the pursuit of profit the demand for certain
goods and services will always be met. Even if a government disapproves of a cer-
tain market and takes action against it, that market will never be entirely disman-
tled. It, or parts of it, will become an illegal market. Human smuggling should
therefore not be viewed as a separate entity, but as the illegitimate little brother of
legal migration. But what is migration exactly?
Thinking in terms of push and pull factors is a common dichotomy used in
models explaining migration. In this respect, the differences between countries
are considered important. For example, differences in income level will make
labor markets either attractive or repulsive. Attractive areas are those with rela-
tively high employment, better incomes, a higher standard of living and eco-
nomic growth. These areas draw people from places with high unemployment,
low wages, a lower standard of living and slow economic growth, i.e. the repul-
sion areas. Economic reasons are usually dominant, but religious and political
motives (asylum) are also mentioned. However, various obstacles, sometimes
referred to as “intervening obstacles”, can interfere with the attraction and repul-
sion factors. Examples include distances or lack of familiarity with the other
country (Lucassen & Penninx, 1994: 67). A country’s restrictive admission or
determent policy is an example of an intervening obstacle put in place by political
or legal authorities. In this regard, various authors point out that it is often not
the poorest people who migrate across long distances, apart from any other rea-
son because those individuals do not have the financial resources to pay for the
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journey (Goldstone, 1997; Li, 1997; Sowell, 1996). A study by Liang and Ye of
migration from Fujian confirms this (Liang & Ye, 2001). However, relative depri-
vation can be a motive. Or as Entzinger and Carter put it: “Even though many
migrants generally do not come from the poorest strata in their own countries,
many perceive being relatively poor in a rich country as more enviable than being
relatively rich in a poor country” (Entzinger & Carter, 1989: 4).
In order to understand migration flows better at a macro level, it is impor-
tant to look for possible links between countries of origin and destination. These
links, which are also referred to as intermediate structures, can lead to underlying
factors actually causing migration (Sassen, 1999). Examples of such links include
colonial connections, economic relations, past or current recruitment of guest
workers, ethnic connections, military alliances and trade relations. For example,
the Chinese community in the Netherlands was established on 17 June 1911, due
in part to the recruitment policy of the Dutch shipping industry.4 On that date,
twenty Chinese seamen were brought over to Rotterdam from Britain by Dutch
shipping companies to break a strike (Van Heek, 1936; Wubben, 1986: 9). War
ties were also an intermediate structure in the establishment of the Chinese com-
munity in Europe. For example, during the First World War France deployed a
labour army of over 100,000 Chinese coolies behind the front lines for tasks
such as transporting munitions.5 These were people from Shandong and the area
of Qingtian (Zhejiang province). After the war, many were repatriated, but several
managed to remain in Paris. They made their living traveling through Europe
(therefore also the Netherlands) peddling wares such as tooled ‘Qingtian stone’
(soap stone) from their home region.
It is also important that modern communication and transport have made it
easier for migrants to maintain relationships with those who remain behind. In a
study of Mexican migrants, Smith states that modern technology not only enables
migrants to keep in better contact with the home front, but also to expand their
social and political role in their home region in Mexico while living a life in the
US (Smith, 1997: 201-202). This phenomenon is described as living in two
worlds. Transnational bonds like these are nevertheless not new. On the basis of his
field work on the Hong Kong San Tin community in England in the early 1970s,
Watson stated that “[…] the contemporary emigrants are able to exercise a direct,
active and important influence on their home community” (Watson, 1977: 348).
In terms of transnationalism in particular, attention is focused on the social
fields within which migrants are active that transcend geographical, political and
cultural boundaries. Some researchers believe that concepts such as citizenship
and sovereignty need to be re-examined because the state no longer has the abso-
lute sovereignty it once had (Sassen, 1996; Sassen, 1999). For example, the state
has had to give way to supranational public authorities and NGOs when it comes
to controlling flows of goods and capital. Jacobson suggests that in the US and
4. A small number of Chinese are known to have lived in the Netherlands in the 19th century. In
1862, for example, a certain Noni of Suatow lived in Amsterdam temporarily. As a ship’s doctor,
he had accompanied several Chinese laborers from Hong Kong to Havana, and was returning to
China via Amsterdam (Beets, 1862: 6, 7).
5. See also Lucassen for other dates and references (Lucassen, 1998: 56).
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Western Europe the concept of citizenship has been devalued because foreign
nationals can derive certain social, civil, economic and even political rights from
residency alone (Jacobson, 1996). For example, former guest laborers in the
Netherlands have the opportunity to exercise the right of family reunification.
This allows them to bring their immediate family over to the Netherlands. The
right to asylum is another example. Potential migrants who would otherwise not
qualify for a long-term stay in the West have the opportunity to obtain a residence
permit by exercising their right to apply for asylum. In the 1990s persons of Chi-
nese descent successfully misused the US asylum procedure by claiming hard-
ship under the one-child rule in China (Kung, 2000; Wang, 1996: 60).
In short, the state occasionally erects barriers that inhibit it from effectively
pursuing a restrictive migration policy (Muus, 1993), creating intervening oppor-
tunities rather than intervening obstacles (Müller-Schneider, 2000: 119). How-
ever, Hollifield points out that it is the liberal states themselves that have facilitated
these (civil, political and social) rights (Hollifield, 2000). For this reason alone
neither the state nor government can be simply written off as a concept. Further-
more, Ping states that the emphasis on transnationalism and the decline of the
nation state may be inspired by a very Western perspective (Ping, 2002). For
example, in China and Malaysia the role of the nation state is certainly not in
decline. Yet, these governments are also susceptible to change. By way of illustra-
tion, only now do potential migrants have the opportunity to leave en masse
because their own governments are (gradually) lifting the restrictions on leaving
(Müller-Schneider, 2000). In other words, more and more Chinese citizens are
able to obtain passports.
In addition, it is important to note the ‘family and friends effect’. In the early
20th century, Siu already wrote: “No one would think of coming to America with-
out having someone here such as his father, uncle, brother, cousin, clansman,
kinsman, or friend” (Siu, 1987: 79). This principle is commonly referred to as
chain migration (ACB/LFCON, 1994; Pieke, 1988; Sciortino et al., 1993; Vogels et
al., 1999; Wieringa & Hu, 1990; Willems & Cottaar, 1989). It is emphasized that
individual decisions can only really be understood when they are seen in the light
of the network or community to which the individual belongs. Individuals do not
make choices in a social vacuum, but are actively involved in a social network
across different levels, from the household via the family all the way to the com-
munity overseas (Portes & Fernández Kelly, 1989). Migration of a single family
member usually causes change in the rest of the family (Hoerder, 1997: 79). The
most visible changes are the remittances that migrants tend to send home to
maintain their family (Romellón, 1999).6
As in the theories on criminal networks, there is wide scope in this approach
for the functioning of social capital. See for example (Engbersen, 1999; Espinosa
& Massey, 1997; Faist, 1997, 2000; Massey, 1986; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993;
Van der Leun, 2001). Potential migrants ask family members, friends and
acquaintances who have already migrated to provide support in the form of
6. See, for example, the table ‘remittance’ on the website of the Department for Economic and
Social Information and Policy Analysis Population Division of the United Nations: 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/pubsarchive/migpol95/timp.htm.
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knowledge, capital or other assistance in arranging the journey, the stay or a job.
For Italian migrants, the help of family, friends and acquaintances in finding
housing led to the establishment of ‘Little Italies’ – areas with high concentra-
tions of Italian migrants – in the US. The same principle led to the creation of
‘Chinatowns’. By the same token, assistance in finding work also led to ‘chain
occupations’. These are specific employment niches “to which successive immi-
grants directed their fellows on the basis of their own experience” (MacDonald &
MacDonald, 1974: 232).
Dutch research into illegal immigrants in large cities showed that Porte’s
and Sensenbrenner’s subdivision into types of social capital ties has analytical
value (Burgers & Engbersen, 1999; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Van der Leun,
2001). For instance, reciprocity exchanges take place when a form of assistance is
given without the promise of direct monetary repayment. A social, rather than
financial, debt is accumulated. For example, migrants help family members and
friends to migrate without expecting payment. However, some new arrivals might
be asked to help around the house or assist in the restaurant kitchen. Value intro-
jection is socialization of people into consensually established beliefs, leading to
principled action. It creates room for apparently less rational reasons for migra-
tion. People who grow up in a culture in which migration is commonplace or
even attractive will be motivated to migrate. When certain families receive remit-
tances and then display their relative financial prosperity in the homeland (vary-
ing from color televisions to multistory houses), that may be sufficient incentive
for the families left behind to also send family members abroad. Fujian province
is one of the wealthiest areas in China, but many residents believe that “those
who migrate do better than do those who stay behind” (Wang, 2001: 347). A fam-
ily that has a migrant abroad can gain pride and respect if that individual sends
money home (Wang, 1996: 59). Visits by successful migrants and their displays
of wealth stimulate those who stayed behind to seek their fortune abroad as well
(Liang & Ye, 2001). In some Chinese villages, the majority of the men have there-
fore left and the women work the fields (Kwong, 1997: 31, 53). In China in the
1990s chu qu (going outside, i.e. going abroad) became a favorite career plan.
Pieke speaks of a “culture of migration” (Pieke, 2002: 32).7 Indeed, migrants
today come from a broad social spectrum. More and more students, business-
men, women and redundant urban workers are coming to Europe in all kinds of
ways (Pieke, 2002).
Social capital takes the positive effects of relationship networks into account,
but also offers scope for the negative effects (Portes & Landolt, 1996). A simple
rule is that those who are not part of the network are excluded. That means that
new migrants without connections find it more difficult to find a job in their own
ethnic community. However, negative consequences can also arise within the net-
work. For example, a family in the host country is expected to take in a newcomer
even if the situation is completely unsuitable. There is occasionally even a risk of
exploitation. The newcomer does not know the language and customs, so he is
7. There are actually old records of this phenomenon. In 1936 it was noted that Guangdong and
Fujian exercised such a socio-psychological effect that they had been known as centers of migra-
tion for a long time (Van Heek, 1936). 
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reliant on the more experienced members of the network. In addition, newcom-
ers feel indebted to the family members who mediated their journey. Newcomers
might be obliged to repay this debt and will therefore accept poor working condi-
tions in, for example, the family restaurant.
In short, ideas about migration enable us to understand the process. If, from
a totally different perspective, human smuggling is added to the equation, it is
plausible that, in terms of family and friendship ties, the legal Chinese commu-
nity in the Netherlands is involved to a certain degree in the illegal entry or stay of
new migrants. Entry can be arranged simply by using intervening opportunities
such as tourist visas. Furthermore, the pressures of social ties likely ensure that
an illegal family member is given shelter and work. No criminal organization is
needed for this kind of involvement. Nevertheless, migrants with sufficient social
capital are not the only ones who go to the West. Or as Staring remarks, with the
rise of professional smugglers, migration is now also within reach of those who
have no social network in the Netherlands (Staring, 2001; Staring, 2003).
2.2 Definition and elaboration of research questions
Although this study examines the organization of the smuggling of Chinese peo-
ple, the term ‘human smuggling’ has not yet been defined. Including certain ele-
ments in a definition of the act of human smuggling automatically leads to those
elements being emphasized in the subsequent empirical research. Different
descriptions can thus lead to different outcomes. For example, does a specified
amount of money have to be paid for a journey before the process is considered
smuggling? It would then be obvious not to take certain cases into account, for
example when an uncle covertly smuggles his nephew into the Netherlands in
the boot of his car. Or should profit be defined more broadly? The nephew might,
for instance, work in his uncle’s restaurant in the Netherlands for less than the
minimum wage. The nephew may feel obliged to repay a debt of honor to his
uncle by working in the kitchen for a few years. The uncle therefore gains finan-
cially from his nephew’s illegal migration. Is illegal (or covert) border crossing
then an essential element? Imagine that the members of a naturalized Dutch
family were to lend their passports for a large sum to people from their home
country, who are then able to enter the Netherlands and stay illegally. This can be
viewed as smuggling with the aid of legal resources. Or is it better to define
smuggling as a repetitive action? Is a smuggler someone who makes a ‘career or
habit’ of it?
Although legalistic definitions are not always entirely appropriate in social
science research, Dutch law on human smuggling is useful for this study.8
During the research period, Article 197a.1 of the Dutch Penal Code read:
8. Article 197a of the Dutch Penal Code is commonly referred to as the human smuggling article,
but the term ‘human smuggling’ does not actually occur in the text of the Act. 
Theoretical framework and question 17
“Anyone who, for profit, helps another to enter or stay in the Netherlands or any state
that is obliged to carry out border controls for the benefit of the Netherlands or who, for
profit, gives another the opportunity, resources or information to enter or stay in the
Netherlands while knowing or having serious cause to suspect that that entry or stay is
unlawful […]”.9
The examples given at the beginning of this section could therefore all fall within
the scope of this criminal law. Notice that Dutch law distinguishes between
human smuggling (art. 197a of the Penal Code) and trafficking in human beings
(see art. 273a and the old 250a and 250ter of the Dutch Penal Code).10 Human
trafficking has an element of exploitation, whereas human smuggling does not.
The difference can also be derived from the chapters in which these articles are
placed in the Penal Code. Human smuggling is a public order violation whereas
human trafficking is a personal freedom violation. The transported people
involved in human smuggling are not usually considered victims because they
want to be smuggled. They make a conscious choice to go abroad and upon
arrival are free to go their own way. This is not altered by the fact that some are
persuaded to go or travel under poor conditions. However, a complicating factor
is that smuggled persons are sometimes forced to do certain work against their
will after arrival. If the work involves prostitution, smuggling clearly becomes
trafficking. However, people can also be forced to work other than in prostitution.
For example, the United Nations, the European Union and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) indicate that people are sometimes forced to
work in the catering or garment making industries. This can be termed socio-eco-
nomic exploitation (NRM, 2002).11 Since 1 January 2005, this type of exploitation
has also been covered by the human trafficking article in Dutch law (art. 274 of
the Dutch Penal Code).
Although this study examines the organization of human smuggling on the
basis of the definition used in article 197a of the Dutch Penal Code as represented
above, prostitution and other socio-economic exploitative practices (which for-
mally fall under another article of law) will not be ignored. This is because in
instances where Chinese people are exploited (in any way), the victims are very
likely to be people who have been smuggled into the country. It is precisely those
who are responsible for their illicit entry that we are interested in.
Now that the activity being studied has been defined as in article 197a of the
Dutch Penal Code, a number of questions and hypotheses will be distinguished
as regards the smuggling of Chinese nationals to or via the Netherlands. As in the
foregoing sections, the organization of Chinese human smuggling can be viewed
from three different angles: the hierarchical, network and migratory perspectives.
9. Article 197a has been amended since then. As of 1 January 2005, the text on, for example, the
pursuit of profit in relation to illegal border crossing was deleted. 
10. However, outside of legislation, this difference is not always strictly adhered to. Salt found sev-
eral terms for smuggling, including alien smuggling, trafficking of aliens, illegal immigrant
smuggling, human trafficking, trade of human beings and human commodity trafficking (Salt,
2000: 33). 
11. Also see the classifications on human smuggling and trafficking by the United Nations and the
International Organization for Migration (United Nations, 2000a, 2000b). 
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This is not to say that the smuggling of Chinese nationals is carried out by one
particular form of organization. The diversity of people wanting to leave is great
and there are many legal and illegal means of entering the West (Zhang & Gay-
lord, 1996: 4). It is probable that different forms occur simultaneously. The ques-
tion is what is the best way to describe the Dutch situation. One way to start is to
distinguish between types of smugglers:
• Who is involved in smuggling Chinese and what are their characteristics?
• To what extent do these people have different functions in the smuggling
process?
The next task is to identify the relationships between the smugglers and smug-
gling functions. If they are hierarchically arranged (according to the human
smuggling literature), the following is plausible:
• Smugglers work together in fixed combinations for long periods.
• The entire smuggling operation from China to the West is centrally managed
and monitored.
• Criminal activity is heterogeneous. Groups engage not only in human smug-
gling, but also in the narcotics trade or extortion, for example.
• Smuggled individuals are at great risk of being exploited by the organization.
• There are few or no family members or fellow villagers among the smugglers’
clients.
• Government suppression causes smuggling organizations to develop their
professionalism, which involves streamlining the organization and the
deployment of violence against witnesses and victims.
When smuggling organizations are seen as looser organizations through social
networks rather than hierarchical organizations, the following aspects can be dis-
tinguished:
• Various combinations of smugglers can be recognized in smuggling opera-
tions.
• There is no central management or monitoring of the entire process. A high
degree of cooperation between groups without one group being in charge is
inherent in the network approach.
• If there is criminal heterogeneity, it cannot be attributed to a smuggling group
but arises from the conduct of a few individuals.
• The smuggled individual is not put to work or otherwise exploited by the
smugglers. If exploitation occurs, third parties are responsible.
• The smuggler’s clients include family members and fellow villagers.
• Government suppression reinforces the network effect, resulting in more
small-scale operations and outsourcing between groups.
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Notice that the extent to which violence is used or corruption occurs is not used
as a distinguishing factor, because they can occur in both types of organization.
A migratory approach is a third alternative. When the operation is effected
primarily through the direct mediation of friends or family members, the follow-
ing statements are plausible:
• Individual smugglers are most likely involved.
• There is little organization involved in the operation because intervening
opportunities can be used.
• There are no connections to the narcotics trade, burglary, violence, etc.
• Exploitation, if it occurs, can be placed within the (negative) framework of
social capital.
• The smuggler’s clients are restricted to family members or fellow villagers.
• It is difficult to determine the effects of government suppression. Greater pur-
suit of existing criminal groups will have little effect on people who smuggle
family members. By contrast, a broader focus on those who violate the letter
of Article 197a would bring more non-criminal people to the attention of the
police.
2.3 Section structure
A number of steps must be taken before any conclusion can be drawn about the
foregoing suppositions. Chapter three starts with addressing the research meth-
ods and empirical data used in the study.
Chapter four gives detailed information about when, where and how many
police investigations into human smuggling in the Netherlands have been carried
out. A list of the number of suspects is also provided. Age, sex, nationality, ethnic-
ity and criminal record are also discussed.
A number of functions in the smuggling process can be distinguished on
the basis of the literature on human smuggling (see paragraph 2.2.1). Chapter
five discusses whether they also occur in the Dutch context. To that end the activ-
ities of the suspects are analyzed on the basis of empirical data. This also clarifies
how Chinese people are smuggled to (or via) the Netherlands.
After the types of suspects and functions are classified, chapter six looks at
how these individuals are connected to each other. The initial hypotheses regard-
ing hierarchical and network-like organizations are studied. Do the smugglers
work together for long periods in fixed combinations or in looser cooperatives? Is
the operation centrally coordinated from the start in China to the final destination
in the West or not?
Chapter seven explores another hypothesis, namely whether heterogeneity
can be seen in the criminal activities of the research subjects. Do they, for exam-
ple, systematically engage in the narcotics trade, extortion or burglary? Do the
smugglers exploit smuggled persons? Are there links with forced prostitution or
other forms of socio-economic exploitation?
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Chapter eight looks at whether there are interactions between the organiza-
tion of smuggling operations and the actions of the Dutch government in this
area. Actual practice, rather than official policy, is the predominant focal point.
Additional information from municipal records, interviews and literature is also
used to determine whether changes in smuggling organizations are apparent
over the long term.
Finally, chapter nine sets out the findings. On the basis of the hypotheses
addressed, an assessment is made about the type of cooperation that is most suit-
able to describe the smuggling of Chinese nationals to or via the Netherlands and
whether there are specific implications for theoretical organized crime literature
and official policy. This in turn leads to some discussion on the findings and a
few policy recommendations.
3 Research methods and data
3.1 Introduction
The various sources used for this study are some interviews in the Chinese com-
munity, court files, interviews with Dutch and foreign police investigators and
municipal archives, in that order. This chapter examines in more detail their
advantages and disadvantages and the extent to which those sources might lead to
valid answers to the research questions.
3.2 Sources
Initially, two strategies were available for finding the empirical data needed for
this study, i.e. fieldwork or a study of investigation files.
Fieldwork entails interviewing smuggled persons or, better yet, the smug-
glers themselves. In the Netherlands, Staring successfully applied this method to
his study of migration processes involving illegal Turkish nationals (Staring,
2001). Various American researchers used this method in previous studies of
Chinese human smuggling (Chin, 1997, 2001; Hood, 1997; Kwong, 1997).
Zhang and Chin were even able to interview 87 snakeheads in New York and
China (Zhang & Chin, 2002).
The advantages of fieldwork are clear. The researcher obtains first-hand
information. If the interviewer is able to work without interpreters, the respond-
ents can have direct contact with the researcher. With a sensitive subject like
human smuggling, this can remove at least one potential barrier. However, there
are also disadvantages to this method. It is never clear how representative those
individuals who want to talk are of the research group. There is also another prob-
lem of a different order. Smuggled persons usually have a limited view of the
efforts their smugglers have had to make to get them across the border. To answer
this question, the researcher needs to talk to the smugglers themselves. However,
doing fieldwork among Chinese smugglers is not the same as doing fieldwork
among illegal and legal Chinese migrants. Imagine, for instance, that illegal activ-
ity takes place in the presence of the researcher, or that the researcher learns of
such activity. The chance of this happening is quite considerable. Should the
researcher keep silent? Should he report it? All kinds of ethical and integrity prob-
lems can thus rear their heads.
Information about human smuggling can also be obtained by means other
than field interviews. The public authorities have the required information at
their disposal, most of which comes from police investigations. Statements by
perpetrators, police observations and conversations recorded on tapped telephone
lines can provide information about how smugglers work together. In court cases,
public prosecutors have to provide conclusive evidence of smuggling activity. To
support their arguments, they submit a number of official records for the judge
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to consider. Analyses of court files can therefore produce more insight into the
organizational aspects of human smuggling.
Nevertheless, a researcher who employs this method needs to take a number
of limitations into account (see for example Bruinsma, 1996a). First, as with field
interviews, it is not clear how representative the suspects are of the research
group. The smarter smugglers may operate differently from those who get cap-
tured and are therefore not included. Secondly, police observations can be incom-
plete and therefore produce a slanted view. Those on top try to cover their tracks
so relationship charts tend to be inaccurate. For example, if one person places a
lot of calls to different criminals, and his line is tapped, a more important role
may be attributed to him than he actually has (Klerks, 2000: 231). What is more,
if a leading player takes good precautionary measures, such as never having tele-
phone conversations, it may be that he will not be mentioned in a criminal case.
Thirdly, data are collected for specific purposes, namely for investigation and
criminal prosecution, and not for scientific research. Therefore, a lot of data that
is relevant to social science research will be absent, such as suspects’ back-
grounds or motives. Fourthly, investigative research is often linked to a certain
place (and time). Although the initial aim of an investigation may be to round up
an ‘entire organization’ or ‘entire network’, it is an exception rather than the rule
for criminal investigations to cross national boundaries, even when it is certain
that there are people in other countries who are involved. Most of the information
in the case files therefore pertains to activities and persons within the national
borders. In addition, the Dutch government takes the position that police infor-
mation may not be shared with countries that have a doubtful record on human
rights. One example of a country that fits that description is the People’s Republic
of China.
Fieldwork and case file research are also difficult to combine. An interviewer
who talks to smugglers and police investigators at the same time, may find that
he is distrusted by both parties. In both cases, the researcher will have sensitive
information at his disposal about one party that the other party would like to
have. For example, a smuggler with whom contact has been established could
simultaneously turn up in an ongoing police investigation. If the smuggler were
to be arrested, he could suspect the researcher of betraying him. By the same
token, the police could suspect the researcher of corruption and providing the
smuggler with information.
3.2.1 Field interviews in the Chinese community
At the start of the study, a decision was made to hold field interviews. A number
of exploratory talks and interviews were therefore held with Chinese respondents
(N=12). The researcher is a sinologist, speaks Mandarin Chinese and therefore
did not need to use interpreters during the interviews, which had the effect of
lowering the barrier level. The interviews quickly quelled the stereotype image of
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a closed Chinese community.12 In a roundabout way, various individuals were
found who had recently been smuggled into the country or migrated legally and
who were willing to provide information. Although their stories were useful from
the perspective of migration, they knew few details about how larger smuggling
operations were organized. When family was not involved as smugglers, they did
not know what had been set in motion to get them across the border. This made it
difficult to answer the basic research question, identifying who is involved in
Dutch smuggling of Chinese nationals and how these smugglers work together.
That kind of information would be more easily obtained from the smugglers
themselves. One Chinese respondent suggested asking around in the Chinese
community pretending to want his (non-existent) sister smuggled into the Neth-
erlands. I quickly quenched this suggestion. It would not only be unethical, but
because the Dutch police funded my research, such actions would naturally lead
to problems. This was explained in detail to interviewees at the beginning of each
conversation, but did not seem to have much effect. Taking into account my
involvement with the police and all the practical objections ensuing from that,
ultimately led to the decision not to continue with fieldwork. Nevertheless, the
results from the initial discussions that took place with Chinese respondents
early in 2002 have been included in the study. These conversations are coded
with the letter A, followed by a number indicating a particular individual, e.g. A1,
A2 etc. For the record, they do not include interviews with smugglers.
3.2.2 Case files
As the field interviews were of limits, the logical choice was to base the empirical
data on closed criminal investigations. Previous scientific studies of organized
crime in the Netherlands show that case file analysis can have definite added
value (Huisman, et al., 2003; Kleemans et al., 2002; Klerks, 2000; Bovenkerk &
Fijnaut, 1996; Van Duyne, 1995). There is also a practical advantage. The Dutch
authorities allow scientists relatively open access to police case files. Researchers
in other countries do not always have that advantage. Furthermore, there are
fewer ethical dilemmas connected with Dutch police data than with police data in
other countries. For example, the American plea bargaining strategy, i.e. defen-
dants’ pleading guilty and naming accomplices in exchange for a quicker trial and
a reduced sentence, does not exist in Dutch human smuggling cases. The exten-
sive use of telephone taps in Dutch investigations also makes for quite objective
material. Because most smugglers were too careless in their telephone conversa-
tions, a ‘bug on the phone line’ acted as the next best thing to the ‘fly on the wall’
perspective.
The case file research was conducted as follows. Because human smuggling
has been a punishable offence in the Netherlands only since 1 January 1994, that
date was chosen as the start date of the research collection. The end date was 31
12. Time after time, a common background, the ability to speak the same language, an investment
of time and a large dose of common sense refute the stereotype that certain population groups
or categories are impenetrable. See also (Staring, 2001; Zaitch, 2002).
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December 2003. Most of the cases dated later were still under adjudication (in
the court of first instance or the court of appeal). Consequently, the outcome of
those cases was as yet undecided and applying for permission to view the files
and publish the results was potentially problematic.
As the definition of human smuggling used in this study is based on Article
197a of the Dutch Penal Code, the Board of Procurators General was asked to pro-
vide a list of all registered cases in the Netherlands pertaining to this article. The
list was available from OM-data, the national database of the Public Prosecutions
Department. OM-data contains all criminal proceedings in the Netherlands regis-
tered by i.e. public prosecutor’s office number, public prosecutors office, year of
birth, country of birth, article, sentence and settlement in the court of first
instance. The substantive facts of the cases are not recorded in the database and
must be read at the relevant office of the public prosecutor.
In order to be thorough, information on several types of offences was
retrieved from OM-data, namely (of course) the offence described in Article 197a
(human smuggling), but also the offences described in Articles 197b (profits
from illegal labor), 197c (professional or habitual illegal labor) and 197d (corrup-
tion by civil servants in connection with 197b or 197c). Article 197 (undesirable
alien) was also used initially, because the files on Chinese illegal aliens who have
been declared undesirable might have contained background information about
their methods of entry and the circumstances in which they lived. However, after
perusing several files of this nature (N=14), it became clear that they contained no
concrete information about human smuggling. The selection criterion ‘undesira-
ble alien’ was therefore eliminated. In addition to Articles 197a, b, c and d, the
‘human trafficking article’, 250a (and its predecessor 250ter), were also included,
for the reason explained in section 2.3. Whether smuggled Chinese nationals end
up being involved in prostitution (commonly known as human trafficking) or not
(human smuggling) is no important distinction for the purposes of this study. In
both cases, the individuals involved will most likely have been brought into the
Netherlands unlawfully and the focus of our attention is on how this came about.
A wide net was therefore cast to obtain the best possible selection.
A further query was made on the basis of country of birth from the data
obtained from OM-data regarding the period between 1 January 1994 and 1 Janu-
ary 2004. Since the study is about the smuggling of Chinese, the most obvious
nationalities were People’s Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Hong
Kong and Macao. However, only four Chinese were prosecuted under Article
197a between 1994 and 1996. They were all discovered at Schiphol Airport in
1995. Only from 1996 onward, more and more Chinese persons were prosecuted
for human smuggling in different parts of the country. One reason is that the
human smuggling provision in Dutch law was tightened in 1996. The maximum
prison sentence was raised from one year to eight years. Consequently, investiga-
tive agencies were allowed more investigative powers and thereby willing to
invest more time in the criminal prosecution of human smuggling cases. Subse-
quently, dozens of criminal cases came to trial. To avoid distorting the results, the
start date of the study was shifted from 1 January 1994 to 1 January 1996. The
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period covered by this research project therefore runs from 1 January 1996 to
31 December 2003, eight consecutive years in total.
In that eight-year period there were over one hundred Chinese suspects in
OM-data. Further study of their cases reveals that they cooperated with suspects
of other nationalities. The data concerning these individuals were therefore also
added, resulting in several Dutch, Yugoslav, British and Turkish suspects being
included in the selection. The analysis of the case files also showed that many of
the smugglers from Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia have an ethnic Chinese
background. All the cases of human smuggling involving these four nationalities
were therefore filtered out of the OM-data information and added to the list of
requested files in an attempt to limit the chance of potentially relevant files being
missed. Furthermore, a separate list was requested from the Office of Migration
Crime (Bureau Migratie Criminaliteit – BMC) of the Royal Marechaussee of all
cases involving smugglers of Chinese migrants.13 However, due to computer lim-
itations, only information concerning the period from 1 January 2000 to 31
December 2003 could be obtained. Seven cases were found with only a German
or a Czech suspect that would otherwise have been missed. Finally, information
was also obtained from newspaper articles describing incidents or reports of
court proceedings concerning Chinese human smuggling. This produced two
additional cases. One was a murder case involving a charge of human smuggling,
but which had not been registered as such in OM-data due to an entry error. The
other case involved an alleged corruption scandal involving only Dutch suspects.
The OM-data information was requested and revised most recently on 1 Novem-
ber 2004.
Although both human smuggling and human trafficking were initially
selected, the examination of the files revealed that a correction was necessary.
Despite clear references in the international literature and Dutch press about
human trafficking and sexual abuse of minor and adult Chinese illegal migrants,
the OM-data paints another picture. Only three individuals from the research
group were charged with human trafficking (as well as human smuggling) and all
three were acquitted. Furthermore, closer examination of the case files revealed
that only one person had anything to do with Chinese prostitution. The other two
individuals were a Vietnamese and a Malaysian man who were involved in the
alleged trafficking of Romanian prostitutes or Malaysian and Eastern European
women, respectively. These two men had nothing to do with Chinese people and
were therefore removed from the research group. This study therefore effectively
addresses human smuggling, and not human trafficking.
The total number of cases studied in which there was a possible link to the
smuggling of Chinese people was 106. These cases were handled by various pub-
lic prosecutors around the country. During 2003 and 2004, the court hearings in
13. In the Netherlands the Royal Marechaussee (Koninklijke Marechaussee - KMAR) is comparable to
the French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the German Bundesgrenzschutz or the Spanish
Guardia Civil. These types of organizations are a kind of police force with military characteris-
tics (military police). Because of changing priorities in the post-Cold War period and their mili-
tary structure and discipline, it is argued that they are ideally suited to combat transnational
organized crime, like human smuggling. See also (Lutterbeck, 2004).
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three cases (involving a total of 15 suspects) were also attended. Requests to view
files were submitted to the public prosecutor’s offices in ’s-Hertogenbosch,
Breda, Roermond, Arnhem, Zutphen, Zwolle, Almelo, ’s-Gravenhage, Rotterdam,
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht and Assen. An important criterion for consent
was that the researcher guaranteed anonymity in the publication of the research.
It should not be possible to determine the identity of the individuals in the files.
Therefore neither the names of defendants nor the case names used by the inves-
tigating officers are mentioned in this study. Instead the cases are designated
with the word ‘case’, followed by a number, for example ‘case 5’. The case num-
bers are randomly chosen.
After obtaining the consent of the Board of Procurators General, the case
files were analyzed at the relevant public prosecutor’s offices in 2004 and early
2005. Upon further study, a few of the cases were found to bear no relation to
Chinese human smuggling and were therefore omitted from further analysis.
Apart from the aforementioned cases of (alleged) human trafficking of Eastern
European and Malaysian prostitutes (cases 88 and 89), examples of other cases
include a marriage of convenience between Vietnamese nationals (case 91) and
the smuggling of Tamils by persons from Singapore (cases 54 and 67). In total,
the final research database comprised 88 investigation cases in which 178 defend-
ants were brought to trial. However, a number of defendants are counted twice in
this figure. Four men were each tried twice in different years. One woman was
even tried three times in three different years. This brings the total number of
unique defendants to 172. Of these 172 persons, five were not found in the
records because the case files were missing or empty (cases 10, 34, 35, 37 and 66).
These cases probably involved minor incidents, considering the lack of other sus-
pects, the minor sentences and the decisions not to prosecute. These five individ-
uals are registered with three different public prosecutor’s offices in various
years. Two other cases were still in appeal, and as a result one public prosecutor’s
office would not allow inspection of the file (case 99), and the other permitted
only limited inspection (case 98).
Although the cases were chosen on the basis of the legal definition of human
smuggling, this study gives equal weight to those found guilty, dismissed or
acquitted. Critics might argue that this would result in a faulty sample. Only
those found guilty of human smuggling offences should be studied. But this
study is not concerned with the application or an interpretation of the law, but in
smuggling methods, interaction between smugglers or in other words, the organ-
ization of human smuggling in the Netherlands. Somebody could be found not
guilty because underlying evidence had been judged as inadmissible. That does
not mean he was not involved. In other words, there is no reason for this study to
dismiss information from such case files.14
A checklist was drawn up to guide the process of analyzing the case files (see
appendix one). This list was primarily based on the checklist used by the
Research and Documentation Center of the Dutch Ministry of Justice (WODC) to
examine closed investigations into organized crime for the “organized crime
14. As a matter of fact, analysis of the court files show that all defendants in the sample were some-
how or other involved in human smuggling.
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monitor” series and in other criminological research (Bruinsma, 1999; Kleemans
et al., 2002; Kleemans et al., 1998). The WODC checklist is based in turn on the
criminological research of the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee on Police Inves-
tigation (Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden). The Checklist was
tested by means of a pilot study of four small to medium-scale human smuggling
investigations (including two non-Chinese cases selected randomly). It was then
altered somewhat to adapt it specifically to human smuggling rather than a
broader spectrum of organized crime.
The case files were of varying sizes and contained different kinds of investi-
gative data. Some were very extensive and contained a large number of tapped
conversations, police observations and interviews with suspects, witnesses and
smuggled persons. These case files consisted of dozens of binders. These are the
so-called ‘large-scale investigations’ that involved months of investigative work. At
the other side of the spectrum are files that contain less than a hundred pages.
These are cases in which an individual smuggler was caught by coincidence dur-
ing a border control.
The cases vary not only in size, but also in quality. Some cases were recorded
in great detail. This is done primarily in the bigger cases. Because of the amount
of time allowed for hearing the suspects in major cases some of the statements
are very detailed. The suspects are interviewed several times (e.g. 16 times in a
matter of weeks). Each time their statements are compared and crosschecked.
Searches of premises also produce incriminating evidence. A suspect in one
large-scale investigation had kept a diary. It described his background in China,
his arrival in the Netherlands and his later involvement in smuggling. The diary
was fully translated and included in the case documents. By contrast, the more
minor cases are likely severely hampered by pressure of time. Everything has to
be dealt with quickly, because the next case is waiting in the wings. Suspects are
therefore rarely heard more than once, evidence of involvement by others is not
investigated and little contact is made with other agencies. Nevertheless, such
cases should not be underestimated. Various suspects wanted to come clean and
volunteered information about their actions. In addition, these minor cases
sometimes produce unexpected findings. During body searches some smugglers
are found to be carrying their expense statements or travel timetables. This is
unique material.
Wiretaps were used in all the investigations except the in flagrante delicto
cases. The extent of listening in and the amount of time spent listening in on con-
versations varied according to the size of the investigation. This produced a great
deal of usable material for this study. Although not every conversation was tran-
scribed verbatim, most of those that were clearly about human smuggling were.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the information in the files concerns the
smugglers, and not the background of smuggled persons. Due to the use of the
case file method, there is little information about the reasons why people
arranged to be smuggled into the Netherlands and their socio-economic back-
grounds. This made it difficult to study the social relationship, if there is one,
between the smuggler and the smuggled person. If the smuggled persons filed
applications for asylum those files could potentially contain this type of informa-
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tion. However, a conscious decision was made not to use the related Immigration
and Naturalization Service (Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst – IND) interviews
(which contain all kinds of information about the asylum seeker’s history). The
reason is simple. These interviews cannot be used to generate reliable back-
ground information. Generally speaking, the registered statements and data, pri-
marily those concerning smuggling and smuggling organizations, are highly
dubious. Their accounts are too general, uniform, lacking in detail or simply
implausible. The lack of information about smuggling is not surprising in itself,
because the application is ultimately an application for asylum. The aim of the
interview is to determine the reason for the asylum request, not the persons who
helped the individual reach the Netherlands. It should also not be forgotten that it
could be to the asylum seeker’s advantage to say he used the services of a smug-
gler because it can make his story more plausible. Would the refugee not have to
make use of smugglers to obtain legal documents and arrange the journey due to
the hostility of the authorities in the country of origin towards the refugee (Brink
& Hildebrand, 1996: 89)? When an asylum seeker is able to apply for and acquire
a passport in the country of origin, this may give the appearance that the persecu-
tion is not so serious (Sopf, 2002). Furthermore, by admitting to entering the
Netherlands with a smuggler an asylum seeker can avoid difficult questions or
expulsion. In account after account, the asylum seeker does not know which
countries he or she traveled through during the journey because everything was
arranged by the smuggler. Consequently, it is impossible to check the account of
the journey and a Dublin claim cannot be submitted. Under the Dublin claim, an
illegal person asking asylum in the Netherlands may be returned to other Euro-
pean countries when he traveled through such a country without applying for asy-
lum over there. Under the Act on Undocumented Persons of 1 February 1999, an
application for asylum may also be rejected if the applicant cannot produce travel
documents. An exception is made if the applicant has a good explanation of why
he has no such documents in his possession (any longer). A good argument is
that ‘a smuggler’ confiscated them. Moreover, by claiming refugee status a person
can avoid causing trouble for family members already living here who helped
him enter the country (Van Wijk, 2003).
3.2.3 Interviews with investigators
In addition to the case file analysis, interviews were conducted with several Dutch
government officials (N=22) working on human smuggling. The interviewees
were government officials from the former Human smuggling Information and
Analysis Center (Informatie– en Analysecentrum Mensensmokkel – IAM), the
former Human Trafficking Information Unit (Informatie Eenheid Mensenhandel –
IEM), the Human smuggling Unit (Unit Mensensmokkel - UMS), the former Syn-
thetic Drugs Unit (Unit Synthetische Drugs – USD), various team leaders of closed
investigations into Chinese human smuggling, staff of the Aliens Police, detec-
tives from the Criminal Intelligence Unit (Criminele Inlichtingen Eenheid – CIE)
with contacts in the Chinese field and a civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs in China. Interviews were also held with foreign police officials from the
UK and Germany who worked closely with the Dutch authorities in past human
smuggling investigations. Two police officials working for the Illegal Immigra-
tion Group under the Serious Crime Department of Europol were also inter-
viewed. In addition, several retired investigators were interviewed to get a better
picture of the situation in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.
The civil servants interviewed are designated with the letter B, followed by a
number, e.g. B2, B16 etc. The interviews were based to a certain extent on the
focal points in section 2.3. Additionally, the interviewees who were involved in rel-
evant investigations were asked about these cases as well.
General background knowledge on Asian crime in the Netherlands was
obtained from my earlier work and contact with members of the Southeast Asia
team of the criminal investigation service of Rotterdam-Rijnmond from 1999 to
2001. This police team, which has since been disbanded, was established in 1998
for the specific purpose of mapping Southeast Asian crime in the Netherlands. It
emerged that most of the criminality involved ethnic Chinese people. The sub-
jects that repeatedly came up were drugs, extortion, burglary, credit card fraud,
underground banking, murder and, of course, human smuggling. Human smug-
gling was considered the connecting thread in numerous crimes in the Chinese
community (Bureau Evaluatie, 2000: 21).
3.2.4 Municipal archives
The ‘Case files’ section states that the entry into force of the ‘human smuggling
article’ (Art. 197a of the Dutch Penal Code) was an important point in 1994 for
the delineation of the empirical material. Since then a stricter approach has been
taken to human smuggling, partly as a result of the article being toughened up
significantly in 1996. Before 1994, however, there was no penal framework. The
primary source material therefore deals with a fairly recent period. Block remarks
that “much of the social scientific literature dealing with organized crime suffers
from a particular kind of a-historicism that critically weakens arguments about
the nature of organized crime” (Block, 1994: ix). There is a potential risk of event-
based historiography (Braudel, 1979). The here and now seems to predominate;
attention is focused exclusively on events that occur within a short period of time.
For example, conventional knowledge has it that Chinese organized crime is a rel-
atively recent development in the United States. However, by researching various
documents in New York City area archives and libraries, McIllwain was able to
show that Chinese organized crime was already well entrenched in 19th century
New York (McIllwain, 2004).
In order to understand human smuggling in a longer time span, not only
were retired investigators interviewed about their past experiences but informa-
tion was also gleaned from municipal archives. Consent had to be obtained from
a local privacy officer to view the information. The cities of Rotterdam, The
Hague and Amsterdam, in particular, have historically been home to a relatively
large concentration of Chinese people. The municipal archives still contain a few
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old police files related to the old Chinese community. Those files were searched
specifically for information on human smuggling and illegal migration. The
municipal archives concerned go back to the establishment of the Chinese com-
munity in the Netherlands in 1911. A great deal of information is available in
Rotterdam and Amsterdam regarding the period before the Second World War.
In The Hague there is more data on the 1960s and 1970s. The information com-
prises, for example, reports drafted by investigators of the Aliens Police specializ-
ing in the Chinese community, or whistleblower letters from within the Chinese
community. There is also correspondence between chief constables and Minis-
tries regarding the ‘Chinese problem’. These municipal records provided some
information that was useful for answering the research question regarding the
connections between the investigation and the organization of human smug-
gling.
3.3 Conclusion
Information from field interviews, case file study, interviews with investigators
and  historical municipal archives will be used to try to answer the research ques-
tions. Each of the sources has advantages and limitations. When it became clear
that an extensive field interview procedure was not feasible for this study, a case
file analysis was chosen. This produced some unique material, such as wire taps
and police observations. The disadvantage, however, is that police data is inher-
ently biased and can cause distortion (but then again, so are field interviews).
Anyone involved in smuggling is automatically regarded as a criminal. The
underlying motives are often disregarded. Furthermore, the use of Dutch court
files generates specific limitations. First, the criminal cases focus on what hap-
pens in the Netherlands, and not what happens abroad. In some cases, the Dutch
police shared information with neighboring countries. Tips were given to foreign
investigative agencies about persons in other countries who had been identified
by means of wiretaps. Often the Dutch court files contain little or no information
about the subsequent findings of foreign investigations of such suspects. That
information would have to be obtained from the files in the relevant countries.
This was not feasible for this study, due to a lack of time. A few foreign investiga-
tors were interviewed in an attempt to fill this gap.
Second, the court files contain only limited information about the relation-
ship between smuggler and smuggled persons. As the investigation focuses on
perpetrators and their crimes, other information is irrelevant for the prosecution.
Because migrants are not seen as criminals, there is not a lot of information
about them available.
Third, it is theoretically possible that successful smugglers (i.e. those who
have not been caught) differ from those in OM-data. Successful smugglers may
operate in a completely different way from those who get arrested. The empirical
data might therefore be distorted.
Nevertheless, the distortion will most likely be limited in practice because
the files studied are highly diverse. As will be shown, there is great diversity in the
Research methods and data 31
smuggling routes, legal and illegal channels and group sizes. The choice to use
all the files that are related to the research topic still results in an extensive pic-
ture. For the purposes of this study, the advantages of a file analysis therefore ulti-
mately outweighed the disadvantages. The files contain objective ‘hard’ data.
Police observations and wiretaps serve as reliable indicators of the suspects’
smuggling activities. It thus gives a specific view into the world of people smug-
glers operating in the Netherlands.

4 Case File Analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we take a closer look at who the Dutch authorities suspect of
smuggling Chinese and what their characteristics are. As stated in the chapter on
research methods, most of the empirical data used in this study was extracted
from court records. An overview is given below of the number of cases, their
relative scope, the year, the location of events, the full charges and the ensuing
judgments.
In the second half of this chapter, an overview is also given of the sex, age,
nationality, ethnicity, status and criminal record, if any, of the defendants
suspected of involvement in Chinese human smuggling.
4.2 Case files
The research period covers eight consecutive years, from 1 January 1996 to 31
December 2003. For this period, 88 cases of Chinese human smuggling were
found and examined. As stated in the chapter on research methods and data, it is
thought this provides the best comprehensive representation of all court cases
relating to Chinese human smuggling in the Netherlands during that period.
These 88 cases can be categorized by year of registration at a public prosecutor’s
office or by perpetration date. However, an overview based on perpetration date is
less practical because it can lead to confusion. For example, a single investigation
can involve various perpetration dates. In case 98, the earliest perpetration dates
of the different defendants vary from 1997 to 2002. Yet the defendants, and thus
the case, were not registered at the Public Prosecutor’s Office until 2002. At that
time, the investigating authorities discovered that the defendants were involved
in human smuggling and traced their activities back to the first instance of
involvement according to the available evidence. However, this method of back-
tracking is somewhat random and is somewhat based on best guesses.
Categorization by year of registration with a public prosecutor’s office is less
ambiguous. The year of registration is the same as the year in which the defend-
ant first became the subject of an investigation. In other words, it is certain that
he was suspected of human smuggling from that year. The only distortion that
can occur is when an investigation involves several defendants who are not regis-
tered in the same year. This happens when the police investigation goes on to
turn up new suspects, who are then also registered with the Public Prosecution
Service. For example, an investigation of three suspects was launched at the end
of 1997, but two new suspects were added in early 1998 (case 6). In such
instances, the case is dated to the earliest year of registration of a suspect, which
in this case was 1997. Table 1 gives the number of cases by year of registration.
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Table 1 Year of registration
Source: OM-data
The courts handled an average of 11 cases a year during the research period.
There were minor fluctuations from year to year. No reason for the fluctuations
was identified during the research, which is not surprising considering the small
numbers of cases involved. In 2001, one year after the failed Dover transport in
which 58 Chinese people perished, there was a small dip in the number of Chi-
nese human smuggling cases. The following year (2002) saw the highest number
of cases (N=19) in the entire research period. However, the figure dropped again
to just 12 cases in 2003.
Nevertheless, these figures should not be taken to mean that an average of 11
smuggling organizations are ‘rounded up’ each year. Simply counting the
number of cases does not provide a true picture of the number of smuggling
organizations or the scope of the crime (Kleemans et al., 1998: 22). Various cases
may have been connected. Some major investigations are broken down into
smaller cases in accordance with a specific investigation strategy. Furthermore,
information from one case might provide sufficient evidence to start a new case.
Two cases are then in fact built in conjunction with each another. Moreover, there
are major differences between cases in terms of quantity (and quality).
4.2.1 Number of defendants
In the entire spectrum of cases, some could be considered small-scale because
the file consists of no more than a few hundred pages and the number of sus-
pects is limited to one or two. This type of case commonly results from suspects
being caught in the act. There are various reasons for this. For example, airline
and travel agency staff sometimes alert the police when they have suspicions.
Smugglers also get caught during routine passport or vehicle checks at border
crossings. Although it is often clear that several individuals had to have been
involved in the operation, only the smugglers caught in the act are arrested and
prosecuted in such cases. For example, at Schiphol Airport the Marechaussee
observed a Chinese man giving a passport to another person. The passport
turned out to have been doctored with a photograph of the recipient, a Chinese
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illegal alien. The migrant claimed he had no idea how his photograph came to be
in the passport, but that he had given six passport photographs to a certain smug-
gler in China (case 48). Since the Dutch authorities are prohibited from exchang-
ing information with the Chinese authorities, the investigators were unable to
pursue the case. It is sometimes clear that other smugglers have been involved,
not only in China, but also en route. Some smugglers manage to escape the long
arm of the law even closer to home. Lack of resources (funds and manpower),
time and connecting evidence or simply other priorities make it impossible to
investigate a case exhaustively. They are therefore not prosecuted in the Nether-
lands either.
At the other end of the spectrum are the cases on which a great deal of
resources, manpower and investigation time is spent. In contrast to small-scale
cases, these investigations are carried out by multidisciplinary teams. The police
and the Marechaussee often work together for between several months and more
than a year on such cases. These investigations result in case files containing
thousands of pages presenting dozens of individuals (suspects, involved parties
and witnesses). Investigations of this nature can have various triggers. Some-
times police information from abroad provides the impetus for starting a major
investigation (case 9). In another case, a double murder triggered an extensive
investigation (case 23). But even in major cases, not all those involved are bound
to be prosecuted. For example, in a case in which the investigation team originally
had 20 suspects, only nine people ended up in court (case 98). The Public Prose-
cutor decided not to prosecute those who had played only a minor role in the
smuggling or against whom there was little evidence. The table below gives the
number of defendants per year.









X1 9 6 3 7 5 7 11 6 54 people
X2 2 2 2 3 3 1 6 2 42 people
X3 1 1 1 9 people
X4 1 1 8 people
X5 1 5 people
X6 1 1 12 people
X7 1 7 people
X8 0
X9 1 1 18 people
X10 1 10 people
X11 0
X12 0
X13 1 13 people
Total 16 22 11 13 39 9 36 32 178 people
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Generally speaking, the more defendants prosecuted in a single case, the more
extensive the investigation. The seven cases involving six or more defendants
accounted for 60 defendants in total, which is nearly the same number as the 58
cases in which just one defendant was tried. The remaining cases fall between
these two extremes.
4.2.2 Distribution of cases
There are also major differences between the 19 public prosecutor’s offices in the
Netherlands in terms of numbers of cases and numbers of defendants. On the
whole, the public prosecutor’s office in the region where the investigation is car-
ried out handles the case. This gives an indication in which regions in the Nether-
lands the smuggling of Chinese people is discovered and investigated.  Table 3
illustrates the situation as it applies to investigations of Chinese human smug-
gling.
Table 3 Number of cases and defendants by Public Prosecutor’s Office
Source: OM-data
Public Prosecutor’s Office
Total number of 
cases
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Table 3 shows that the number of cases that a Public Prosecutor’s Office handles
is not proportional to the number of defendants. For example, the Haarlem office
dealt with 41 cases with a total of 53 defendants, while Rotterdam had only eight
cases but a total of 51 defendants.
One reason for these differences is the location of the offices and the gravity
of the criminal acts investigated. Haarlem handled all the relatively small cases
that arise at Schiphol Airport. These are often cases in which the suspect was
caught in the act (and often left little time for extensive investigation). The same
is true of the offices near the border (Roermond, Almelo, Breda and Zutphen).
The offices in Rotterdam, Den Bosch, The Hague and Arnhem handled the
larger cases. It should be mentioned here that the Rotterdam office frequently coop-
erated with the office in Zwolle on human smuggling investigations, because
Zwolle had a special Unit Human Smuggling (UMS) from 1998 to 2003. As its
name suggests, the UMS unit was responsible for prosecuting cases of human
smuggling. Several joint investigations in the Chinese community in Rotterdam
were conducted in cooperation with the Marechaussee, the Rotterdam police and
the harbor police. The suspects were registered with the district court of Rotterdam.
Also note that 7 of the 19 Public Prosecutor’s Offices in the Netherlands had
no Chinese human smuggling cases: Maastricht, Dordrecht, Middelburg,
Amsterdam, Alkmaar, Groningen and Assen. It is possible that there were no
cases to prosecute if smuggling of Chinese nationals did not take place in these
regions. However, there may also be other reasons. For example, Amsterdam is
one of the few cities in the Netherlands with a Chinatown (the others are in The
Hague and Rotterdam). Yet, not a single case of Chinese human smuggling came
before the Amsterdam court during the research period. According to the investi-
gators who were interviewed, this was not because there are no Chinese smug-
glers in Amsterdam, but because human smuggling is a low priority for the local
government (B4, B6).
4.2.3 Indictment and judgment
Obviously the defendants in each case were indicted for human smuggling. How-
ever, prosecutors also brought charges for other offences. For the sake of conven-
ience, this research considers human smuggling to be not only violations of Arti-
cle 197a, which is the working definition of human smuggling used in this
research (see section 2.3), but also violations of two related articles, 197a(3) and
197b. Article 197a(3) addresses making a business or habit of human smuggling,
or committing the offence of human smuggling in association with others. This
article was invoked 16 times. In addition, ten charges of using illegal labor were
brought (Article 197b). Remarkably, no one was indicted for making a business or
habit out of the use of illegal labor (197c). Nor was anyone prosecuted under Arti-
cle 197d, which covers violations of Article 197b or 197c in the performance of an
office or the practice of a profession.15
15. Articles 197c and 197d are in fact very rarely applied. Of the more than 1600 suspects of all
nationalities registered in OM-data during the research period in connection with human
smuggling, Article 197c was invoked only ten times and Article 197d was never applied.
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The table below lists all the charges on which the defendants were tried.
Table 4 Offences
Source: Criminal Records System (JDS)
Only one individual was charged with both human smuggling and human traf-
ficking (Article 250ter). This is a remarkably low figure for a group of offenders
that is associated in the general literature and the press with trafficking in women
and underage asylum seekers (see also section 7.2.1).
Although the charge of human smuggling under Article 197a was brought in
every case, there were differences in the number and type of additional charges.
In several cases with just one or two defendants, subsidiary articles of the law
relating to fraudulent use of identification documents were invoked. Forty-eight
people were charged under Article 231 (falsification) and 8 under Article 225 (for-
gery/document fraud). Interviews with investigators (B7, B9) revealed that smug-
glers who purchased forged or falsified documents were sometimes charged with
receiving stolen goods (Article 416) as well. Six individuals were charged under
this article.
Although charges under the articles relating to document fraud were also
brought in the larger cases with more defendants, the difference was that Article
140 (involvement in a criminal organization) was usually invoked as well. The
combination of Article 197a and Article 140 was found in 63 times.
In contrast to the cases involving only one or two defendants, the cases with
several defendants involved a number of articles of law that are classified under
the heading of ‘violence’ for the purposes of this study. In six cases individuals
were charged with possession of firearms (WWM26). Three times unlawful dep-
rivation of liberty (Article 282.1) was charged, and in two of those cases the
defendants were also charged with grievous bodily harm (Article 302.1). Remark-
ably, no less than ten charges of manslaughter, eight murder charges and three
charges of involuntary manslaughter were found in the research group. Two addi-
tional charges were also levied for the unlawful disposing of a human body.
The list also includes one extortion charge. Again, this is a remarkably low
figure for a group of offenders that is associated in the general literature and the
press with all kinds of crime (see also section 7.2.2).
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 Most of the acts classified in the ‘other’ category involved violations of the
Commodities Act or the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act, i.e. minor offences.
The majority of the cases were ultimately tried for a full bench criminal
judge. Table 5 gives an overview of the bodies that ultimately handled the cases.
Table 5 Deciding body16
Source: JDS
The data available on final court judgments can be classified in five categories. In
cases in which the verdict was ‘guilty’, the court found the defendants guilty of
the charges. Some cases were dismissed by reason of ‘technical dismissal’, which
means that the Public Prosecutions Service decided against prosecution because
the case could not be proven, e.g. due to lack of evidence. In some cases, the Pub-
lic Prosecutions Service was not allowed to prosecute or an act was ultimately
found not to be punishable. If a defendant was not prosecuted for a particular
offence because his role was insignificant, the period of limitation had lapsed, the
offence was insignificant or the circumstances had altered, there was a ‘policy-
related decision not to prosecute’. If the defendants were ‘acquitted’, the court
ruled that the charges against the defendants had not been proven. The cases in
which defendants lodged an appeal and no final judgment had been delivered by
the end of the research period are classified as ‘verdict not yet known’. 
Although the final verdict in 17% of the charges (for 66 offences) was as yet
unknown, it can be concluded that a guilty verdict was handed down for slightly
more than half (52%) of the offences. Also, all the cases that are pending before
the court of appeal had guilty verdicts in the court of first instance. However, with
respect to nearly one third (30%) of the charges, the defendant was acquitted or
the charges were dismissed due to likely nonconviction or for reasons of policy.
This percentage may rise even further as the appeal court verdicts become
known. Table 6 summarizes this data.
Deciding body Number of offences
Appeal court
Full bench criminal division
Public prosecutor
Police court







16. “If the public prosecutor considers the case to be a comparatively minor one, he can prosecute
before the police judge, a single judge chamber of the district court. The police court may not
impose prison sentences exceeding twelve months. The police court is entitled to refer a case to
the full bench criminal division if he is of the opinion that a full bench would be more appropri-




The sentences are also known for the cases in which a guilty verdict was handed
down. Table 7 contains data on the 83 individuals concerned.
Table 7 Sentences
Source: JDS
Seven people in three cases were each given a non-suspended prison sentence of
over ten years. These cases were not limited to human smuggling offences, but
each and every time also involved murder or involuntary manslaughter. In one
case, four people were each sentenced to 12 to 15 years in prison (case 23). In
another case, two people were each given 11 years (case 32). The seventh person –
who was sentenced to 11 years as well – was also given a non-suspended fine of
45,000 euros.
The sentences in cases not involving lethal violence were considerably
shorter. The longest was a non-suspended sentence of five years. The shortest
was one month in jail or a mere fine. The rest were in between, with a few minor
exceptions.
An additional fine was also imposed in thirteen cases. 45,000 euros was the
highest fine and 180 euro the lowest. Fines were imposed for employing an ille-
gal worker in six cases, using false documents in three cases and purely for
human smuggling itself in just four cases. However, this is not the complete
financial picture. A Public Prosecutor can initiate separate confiscation proceed-
ings to take away the financial gain that a suspect acquired from his crime. These





















































Total 199 43 35 39 66 382
Number of 
defendants Number of years
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two years longer. The tax authorities can also initiate proceedings to recoup lost
revenues (e.g. from illegal labor). However, the results of such proceedings are
not registered in OM-data or the Criminal Records System (JDS). For example, in
addition to a prosecution under criminal law, one defendant was also the subject
of separate confiscation proceedings (case 9). The final judgment was still
unknown at the time of writing, but the court of first instance ordered her to pay
the state eight million euros. Nevertheless, there is no list of confiscations or tax
assessments of all defendants because that data has to be requested separately
and approval was not obtained in time.
4.2.4 Number of people smuggled
Because we are dealing with a dark number, it is actually impossible to state how
many Chinese nationals are smuggled into the Netherlands each year. Inciden-
tally, this applies not only to Chinese nationals, but also to all other nationalities
(Brink & Hildebrand, 1996: 87, 91). Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Inquiry
Committee on Police Investigation did make an attempt to come up with a
number in 1996 in estimating that a few hundred Chinese nationals are smug-
gled into the Netherlands each year (Bovenkerk. & Fijnaut, 1996: 140).
In order to have at least something to go by, various public authorities
assume that two-thirds to 80% of all asylum seekers are smuggled (Buitenhuis,
2000: 9; IAM, 2001a: 62; 2005). The percentage could even be higher for Chi-
nese nationals. Table 8 on page 42 contains statistics regarding the total number
of registered asylum applications by people of all nationalities and those submit-
ted by Chinese nationals.17
If it is true that almost every Chinese asylum seeker was smuggled, there
were some 6,700 smuggled Chinese people during the 8 year research period.
But table 8 does not necessarily mean that very few were smuggled before 1989,
as will be made clear in Chapter 8. Nor do these figures indicate that Chinese
human smuggling passed its high point in 2000. It is more likely that changes in
the asylum procedure in 2000 make it potentially less attractive to apply then
before.
At any rate, the accuracy of an estimate based on asylum applications is very
questionable. From criminal investigations it is clear that the Netherlands func-
tions as a transit country for Chinese migrants. Individuals who are smuggled
through the Netherlands to Britain may therefore not appear in the asylum statis-
tics. Interviews with investigators revealed applications are also subject to trends
(B6, B7). In the late 1990s illegal Chinese nationals who were caught by the
authorities (for example, in a failed smuggling operation or as the result of a
labor inspectorate investigation) often applied for asylum soon after in an attempt
to obtain legal status. However, in later years illegal Chinese who were discovered
made less use of the asylum procedure, probably because the asylum regulations
17. Please note that these figures refer to asylum applications, and not the number of people. The
actual number of asylum seekers will therefore be slightly lower as individuals may have applied
for asylum more than once.
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had been tightened. The drop in the number of Chinese asylum applications
therefore does not necessarily bear any relation whatsoever to the number of
smuggled Chinese. Furthermore, the main objection to this method of estimat-
ing is explained in the chapter 3 on research methods and data, namely that it is
impossible to verify the claims of asylum seekers who say they used ‘travel agents’
at a given time.
Table 8 Asylum applications
Source: INDIS 31-8-2004
However, the estimation method based on asylum applications cannot be refuted
with court files for two reasons. First, the files often contain incomplete informa-
tion about the number of smuggled people. Second, even if the number of
migrants is known, it is impossible to discover which of them applied for asylum
simply because the personal data of the smuggled people is not always adequately
recorded in the investigation files.
In view of all these objections, it is not possible to give more than a rough
estimate as regards the number of migrants smuggled by the defendants in the
period between 1996 and 2003. In the cases with just one defendant, the smug-
gling attempts usually involved small groups of one to five migrants. There were
a few notable exceptions, including two cases involving 30 migrants (cases 51 and
101). This raised the average number of migrants per smuggler to five.
Of the 21 investigations involving two defendants, in five cases the defend-
ants reported smuggling 10 or more migrants a year (cases 17, 28, 31, 40 and 60).
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The average number of smuggled people in cases in which two defendants were
arrested is thereby put at 8 people a year.
When more than two defendants were involved, several smuggling attempts
were usually made and therefore several smuggled migrants were discovered.
Groups of three to five defendants on average were involved in the smuggling of 10
people a year. Groups of six to eight people on average were involved in the smug-
gling of 100 people a year. For example, two attempts to smuggle migrants by lorry
were discovered in a case involving six defendants. In each attempt, some 20
migrants were smuggled. The defendants confessed to having successfully com-
pleted two transports, but they were suspected of even more transports (case 15).
The number of smuggled people is much higher in the remaining groups of
nine or more people. In one case involving nine defendants, it was alleged that
the group successfully smuggled 16 people a month on average. Moreover,
according to the Public Prosecutor, they were active for at least three years (case
9). The fact that large numbers of illegal migrants were actually found in these
cases proves that these were not merely estimates and derivations. For instance,
video observation of two safe houses in a case involving 13 defendants (case 29)
revealed that an average of 44 Chinese nationals was housed on the premises
each month. At a certain point the police entered a safe house and arrested 45 ille-
gal aliens. In another case involving nine defendants, 50 Chinese illegal aliens
were picked up in safe houses (case 98). A liberal estimate is therefore that
groups of nine or more suspects transported an average of 300 migrants a year.
The total number of people smuggled by the defendants can therefore be formu-
lated as follows.
Table 9 Calculation of the number of smuggled people
Source: OM-data
According to this calculation method, the smugglers in the selection therefore
smuggled approximately 250 migrants a year over an 8 year period. This figure is
probably a minimum, because the larger smuggling groups are known to have
been in operation for more than a year. The same is true of an unknown number
of individual smugglers. Several admitted that they had been involved in earlier
smuggling attempts that were not discovered. It should also be noted that it is not


















































whether the same migrant was caught more than once). As stated above, there is
insufficient information about the intercepted migrants to check this. These
numbers should therefore be seen as nothing more than cautious ‘guesstimates’.
Nevertheless, some conclusions from table 9 can be drawn.
Although the large smuggling groups are responsible for a very large share
of the smuggling of migrants, the small-scale cases are also important. Together
the individuals and smuggling groups consisting of two people were responsible
for 22% of the total number of migrants.
There is another noticeable piece of information in table 9. Considering the
average number of migrants per smuggler, it appears that individual smugglers
are more economical than smuggling groups of three to five people. The number
of migrants per smuggler only increases significantly when the smuggling
groups consist of more than six people. It should be noted, though, that an
unknown number of smugglers that are deemed to be individuals or small
groups in this research could belong to larger smuggling groups. Furthermore,
the group size should not be considered an entirely pure demarcation. As stated
above in the ‘case files’ section, some suspects are not prosecuted. The Public
Prosecutor selects those who are most involved. The files show that the higher
the number of defendants, the greater the chance is that other involved parties
will not be prosecuted. That means, for example, that a group of 13 defendants
could actually come from an original group of 20 supsects who were involved.
Finally, the total number of smuggled migrants says nothing about the
number of Chinese nationals who are smuggled to the Netherlands. The figure
merely reflects the number of Chinese migrants with whom the defendants in
the Netherlands were involved. It must be taken into account that in many cases
the smugglers were trying to smuggle the migrants out of the Netherlands. The
vast majority of intercepted migrants at Schiphol Airport were about to fly to
another destination. In nearly every case involving three or more defendants, they
were involved in arranging travel to Britain. The Dutch authorities became aware
of these defendants due to a failed crossing and subsequently started an investi-
gation. Even in those cases in which migrants were discovered hidden in a lorry
near the German-Dutch border it cannot simply be assumed that the Netherlands
was the final destination. The migrants might just as well have been en route to
Britain.
4.3 Individual characteristics of the defendants
This section looks in more detail at the type of people involved in the smuggling
of Chinese nationals to and through the Netherlands. The specific characteristics
examined are sex, age, country and city of birth, ethnicity, profession, residence
status and criminal record.
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4.3.1 Sex
Previous research by Zhang and Chin showed that women are activly involved in
Chinese human smuggling. Of the 90 snakeheads they interviewed in the course
of their field study, 16 (18%) were women (Zhang & Chin, 2002: 746).
The research group shows that there are women smugglers in the Nether-
lands too. Table 10 shows the male-female ratio in absolute numbers per year for
Chinese human smuggling defendants. By way of comparison, an overview is
given of the ratio of men to women amongst everyone prosecuted for involve-




Of the 178 times that a person was suspected of involvement in human smug-
gling, 86% were men and 14% were women. Compared with the total number of
defendants of all nationalities who appeared in court in the same period, this per-
centage is therefore slightly under the average of 17%. The actual percentage of
women involved in Chinese smuggling cases is slightly lower if the calculation is
based on the individual rather than on the year of perpetration because one
woman appeared three times (four men appeared twice). The total number of
unique women was therefore 22 and the total number of unique men 151, which
gives a percentage of 12.8%.
Sex of persons in 
research group  
Sex of all 
defendants  

























































Total 154 24 178 1391 276 1667
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4.3.2 Nationality and ethnicity
The following table shows the country of birth of all defendants per year.
Table 11 Country of birth
Source: OM-data
As expected, Chinese defendants were the largest group. They were also the only
category in which people were counted more than once. Of the 108 times that a
Chinese national was arrested, four men were arrested twice and one woman was
even arrested three times. Therefore, the total number of unique perpetrators
born in the People’s Republic of China was 102. 
There is insufficient data to indicate accurately which Chinese province or
city they came from. Some files merely state ‘China’ under place of birth. The fol-
lowing can be derived from the files that contain more details. Most Chinese
defendants originated from Zhejiang Province (N=43). Wenzhou and Rui’An are
mentioned specifically. Eighteen people came from Fujian Province. Guangdong
was next with seven and then Shanghai with six. However, no place of birth is
known for the remaining Chinese defendants. It is therefore possible that more
defendants originated from e.g. Fujian than can be determined from this data.
It is striking that there were also defendants of many other nationalities in
addition to those of Chinese nationality. The largest category consisted of people
born in the Netherlands (N=20). The data for the year 2000 indicates why there
were so many Dutch nationals: the files show that in that year two large-scale
Country of birth Perpetration year 
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Total number of 
defendants 16 22 11 13 39 9 40 28 178
Case File Analysis 47
investigations of human smugglers of Dutch nationality were concluded (cases
30 and 32), resulting in an over-representation of Dutch defendants in 2000.
Vietnam and Hong Kong accounted for 12 defendants each, spread fairly
evenly over the years. The number of people from Hong Kong was actually quite
low relative to the size of the legal community of Hong Kong nationals in the
Netherlands. E.g. in 2002 a total of 18,000 people were determined to come (or
have at least one parent) from Hong Kong (CBS, 2003: 33).18 In comparison, the
size of the community from the People’s Republic of China was determined to be
twice as large in 2002 at 36,000 people (CBS, 2003: 33). The Vietnamese (N=12)
were actually over-represented relative to the size of the ethnic Chinese Vietnam-
ese population group in the Netherlands, which was generally estimated at fewer
than 1000 (Harmsen, 1998). However, the Chinese-Vietnamese Refugee Associa-
tion claimed that there were 5,000 in the Netherlands (ACB/LFCON, 1994: 20).
Singapore (N=5), Malaysia (N=2) and Taiwan (N=2) were also over-represented.
According to Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek - CBS) esti-
mates, the ethnic Chinese Singaporean population group numbered 3,000, the
Malaysian group 1,000 and the Taiwanese group 1,000 (Harmsen, 1998).
It is striking that the group of Chinese who originated from Surinam and are
also part of the Sino-Dutch community are not represented in the list at all. The
CBS estimated the size of this group in the Netherlands to be approximately
5,000 (Harmsen, 1998). Yet, there was not a single case involving a Chinese
defendant from Surinam.
Other nationalities are encountered sporadically. From interviews with inves-
tigators, it can be concluded that Poles, Germans and Czechs were actually under-
represented. Nearly every year, people of these nationalities would be caught in the
act of smuggling at the border, but they were not always brought to trial. There
were two reasons for this. The first reason was that it is difficult to prove the
profit motive.19 Rather than prosecuting these cases, the Public Prosecutor sim-
ply sent the suspects back to their country of origin (B4, B7). The second reason
was that some suspects were handed over directly to the neighboring country. For
example, possession of a German train ticket or a Belgian sales receipt could be
sufficient reason to justify transferring the case to the German or Belgian author-
ities. Consequently, these cases never reached the Dutch courts.
Furthermore, the files contain evidence that nationalities not listed in table
11 were also involved in the smuggling of Chinese nationals into the Netherlands.
Chinese smugglers and local residents cooperated with each other outside the
Netherlands (in transit countries). For example, in their statements to Dutch
police intercepted illegal migrants give account of a ‘foreign devil’ (anyone who is
of a different nationality from a Chinese perspective) guiding them over the
Czech border (case 18). In Belgium, Albanians smuggled Chinese people to Brit-
ain (case 29). Because these incidents took place abroad, the people involved
never appeared in the Dutch courts.
18. A person who has one parent born abroad is deemed to be of that nationality (CBS, 2003).
19. The profit motive in the case of illegal border crossings is omitted in the new human smuggling
provision dating from 2005. It is therefore possible that in the future more Poles, Germans and
Czechs will be prosecuted for human smuggling offences in the Dutch courts.
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Finally, OM-data states nationality only and not ethnicity. It is therefore pos-
sible that there were more defendants with a Chinese background than table 11
shows. The court files corroborate this. For example, there are tapped telephone
conversations in which the defendants from Malaysia communicated in a particu-
lar Chinese dialect. In addition, suspects are known to have told each other that
some particular person is actually ethnic Chinese. Such evidence enabled the
authorities to establish that two Dutch citizens, nine Vietnamese, one Singapo-
rean and two persons from Malaysia were ethnic Chinese. Conversely, one indi-
vidual from Singapore turned out to be a ethnic Dutchman. One other person
born in Indonesia, turned out to be half Dutch and half Asian. He was presumed
not to have any roots in Chinese culture. He spoke Dutch or English and no Chi-
nese dialects. This meant that the ratio of ethnic Chinese to other Asians to Western-
ers was 128:12:32. Incidentally, al 22 female defendants were ethnic Chinese: there
were nineteen women from China, two from Singapore and one from Vietnam.
4.3.3 Place of residence and residence status
Despite the fact that 172 different smugglers were arrested in the Netherlands, it
is not necessarily a given that the smuggling operation had organizational links
with the Netherlands. For example, some smugglers arrive at Schiphol Airport on
a direct flight from China. At Schiphol they attempt to board a flight to London
but are intercepted by Dutch security at the gate. In such cases, because the Neth-
erlands is merely the country of transfer, there is not necessarily a link to a smug-
gling organization in the Netherlands. However, if the defendants’ country of res-
idence is the Netherlands, chances are there is a link. Table 12 on page 49 lists the
various countries of residence encountered in the files.
This shows that some 70% of the defendants gave the Netherlands as their
country of residence. However, this also means that 30% indicated another coun-
try (or remained unknown). The analysis of the case files also show that some of
the defendants in the latter category genuinely had no connection with Dutch
smuggling organizations. For example, two Vietnamese Chinese transporters
lived in England. They were intercepted in the port of Rotterdam when they tried
to take the ferry to England in a minivan (case 31). During a routine border check
the officials noticed that the back doors of the van could not be opened, which
raised their suspicions. When they tried to break the lock, the doors flew open
and 23 illegal Chinese jumped out. In the investigation that followed, it was dis-
covered that in England the Vietnamese had agreed with some Chinese people to
picking up several Chinese nationals in France. Because the Vietnamese thought
checks at the Channel Tunnel in France would be stringent, they decided to try
crossing via Rotterdam. They had absolutely no connections with smugglers in
the Netherlands. Another case involved a Vietnamese smuggler residing in the
United States. He accompanied a Chinese illegal alien on a flight to the United
States.
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Table 12 Country of residence
Source: OM-data
Both individuals came from a direct flight from China and attempted to transfer
at Schiphol Airport (case 33). In this case, too, no link with smugglers in the Neth-
erlands was found. Four other Vietnamese smugglers who brought Chinese
migrants into the Netherlands were living in Germany (cases 19 and 34). It is not
known whether they had had any contact with Dutch suspects because one of the
files was missing at the public prosecutor’s office and the other involved too
minor an investigation. Two other cases involving Vietnamese residing in the
Netherlands were also small-scale (cases 18 and 85). At the time, the investigators
did not examine whether there was any relationship with Dutch Chinese smug-
glers. All in all, only three Vietnamese were found to have connections with
Dutch smuggling groups and the three were actually ethnic Chinese.
Of the 11 people who indicated Hong Kong as their country of birth, two
lived in Hungary, where they were students at a music school. They were
approached there and offered the opportunity to smuggle Chinese nationals from
Hungary to England to make some extra money (case 40). They took on the job
but were coincidentally arrested while transferring at Schiphol Airport. They had
no connection with smugglers in the Netherlands. The country of residence of
five other people born in Hong Kong is unknown, but is thought to be Hong
Kong. They indicated only that they were ordered to accompany people to the
Netherlands on a flight from Asia to Schiphol Airport. It is therefore plausible
that there is a link with smugglers residing in the Netherlands in these cases,
although further details are absent. The remaining four smugglers residing in
Hong Kong had connections with other smugglers in the Netherlands.
Of the four ethnic Chinese from Singapore, two were actually living in
Singapore. There was no evidence that those two had connections with Dutch

































Chinese smugglers. The other two did have such connections. They had been liv-
ing legally in the Netherlands for 10 years. Moreover, the file research revealed
that they still had strong connections with China. For example, their grandpar-
ents lived in the same village as the migrants they were smuggling and the sus-
pects spoke the same local dialect as the migrants.
The file concerning one Taiwanese individual could not be found. OM-data
showed only that he was intercepted at Schiphol and lived in Taiwan. Because no
other information was available, it was unclear whether this person had contact
with smugglers in the Netherlands (case 35). Another Taiwanese individual had
been a legal resident of the Netherlands since the 1960s. It was clear in this case
that he had contacts. He was friends with several Chinese smugglers living in the
Netherlands.
The Korean defendant in table 11 had a US passport and was living in the
United States. He was arrested at Schiphol with two Chinese migrants while
attempting to transfer from a flight from China to a flight to the United States.20
He had no connections with smugglers in the Netherlands.
The Czechs and Germans each lived in their country of origin. The three
Turks, two Britons and one Yugoslav were residing legally in the Netherlands. In
all these cases, a connection was found between the suspects and ethnic Chinese
smugglers in the Netherlands.
Two of the 102 Chinese defendants were found to have no connection with
the Netherlands. Both were discovered during passport checks while attempting
to transfer at Schiphol Airport. Dutch based smuggling groups were involved in
all the other cases. It is worth noting that of the Chinese defendants, five were liv-
ing in Italy (cases 41, 42, 44, 45 and 80), four in Spain (cases 21, 53, 56 and 76),
two in Germany (cases 13 and 22), two in the Netherlands Antilles (case 68), one
in France (case 39) and one in Hong Kong (case 73). Only one Chinese defendant
lived in China. The country of residence of eight Chinese people was unknown.
They were residing illegally in the Netherlands. The remaining 84 Chinese
defendants all lived in the Netherlands. Of these remaining defendants, 28 were
ultimately declared illegal or undesirable aliens (reference date: 12 May 2005).
In short, of all 172 defendants it can be stated with certainty that 155 were
involved with smugglers or smuggling groups operating from the Netherlands.
Chapter 6 addresses the type of cooperation in detail.
4.3.4 Age
No significant links were found between age and nationality or ethnicity. The
table below gives the ages of the defendants at the time of registration with the
public prosecutor’s office.
20. From a migration perspective, it is probably no coincidence that of all the smuggled people dis-
covered these migrants were the only ones to originate from the Korean minority in China. 
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Table 13 Age
Source: OM-data
Because unaccompanied asylum seekers in the Netherlands who are under the
age of 18 are deemed minors, this age group was included as a distinct category.
Of the 172 defendants, seven were minors (4%). One was 15 years old, one was 16
and five were 17. All seven were Chinese nationals. However, there are serious
doubts as to whether they really were minors, or adults attempting to qualify for a
more favorable asylum status (as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking minor). For
example, evidence of the latter scenario was obtained from an intercepted tele-
phone call by an individual claiming to be an underage orphan. He called his par-
ents in China and laughed while telling them that he and his girlfriend, also an
underage suspect, were pretending to be ten years younger than they actually
were.
4.3.5 Criminal records
The criminal records of all the defendants were retrieved from the Dutch Crimi-
nal records Office (Justitiële Dienst). The results varied considerably. Many of the
32 defendants who could be characterized as ‘Westerners’ had extensive records
of minor and major offences. They had come into contact with the judicial
authorities from an early age for offences such as destruction of property, break-
ing and entering, theft or fraud. Three had been arrested in the past for violating
the Opium Act. Two others had been suspected of membership of a criminal
organization. In addition, they all had a record of traffic offences from excessive
speeding to drunk driving, driving while disqualified and driving without insur-
ance.
The ethnic Chinese category and the category of ‘other Asians’ stand out for
a different reason, namely their lack of criminal history (except for some speed-
ing offenses). Of these 140 defendants, two men from China and one man from
Hong Kong had been arrested in the past for violating the Opium Act. None of
the defendants had ever been charged with membership of a criminal organiza-
tion. There had also been very few cases of destruction of property, breaking and
entering, theft or fraud (N=3). Eight individuals had been convicted of human



















smuggling before. In addition, there were several specific antecedents that proba-
bly related to their employment history in Chinese catering establishments.
These include 34 violations of the Commodities Act and 15 violations of the For-
eign Nationals (Employment) Act.
Therefore the data did not show the Asian group of defendants to be typical
career criminals. However, one thing must be taken into account and that is that
this conclusion is based on the antecedents that the Dutch authorities knew
about. In one case, convictions in other European countries were discovered. At
least four Chinese defendants had human smuggling convictions in France or
Belgium. This does not mean that the other Asian defendants had no convictions
outside the Netherlands, but rather that it is not standard practice for the JDS to
receive information about foreign convictions. Furthermore, the Dutch authori-
ties do not exchange information with China. Therefore, it was not known
whether the individuals in the Asian group had criminal records in the respective
countries where they were born.
4.4 Conclusion
In the Netherlands, 88 investigations into Chinese human smuggling were con-
ducted over a period of eight years, resulting in the arrest and prosecution of 172
people. Four men and one woman were arrested more than once. In one case, no
less than 13 people were brought to trial simultaneously. At the opposite end of
the scale, 54 cases involved just one person. However, these numbers do not indi-
cate anything about the general level of organization. If they did, the fact that the
majority of cases involved only a single suspect would suggest that smuggling in
the Netherlands has a low level of organization or is not organized at all. The case
file study shows, however, that several people were certainly involved in the small-
scale cases. It was only that those individuals could not be tried in the Dutch
courts for a number of different reasons. The importance of small cases is also
evident from the fact that often several migrants were intercepted at the same
time. The small-scale cases (one or two defendants) accounted for nearly a quar-
ter of the total number of intercepted illegal migrants.
Some 63 people have been charged with ‘participation in a criminal organi-
zation’. However, charging someone with the participation in a criminal organiza-
tion (Article 140 Dutch Penal Code) is often used by a prosecutor as a way to
obtain special investigation powers like e.g. wiretapping. Article 140 by itself is
therefore also insufficient to deduce the existence of some form of ‘organized
crime’ (P. C. Van Duyne, 2003: 298).
In government sources, the number of smuggled Chinese nationals is usu-
ally estimated to account for some 80% of all asylum seekers. That would mean
that of the 6,730 times a Chinese national applied for asylum during the research
period some 5,400 individuals were smuggled. Sometimes it is even thought that
all Chinese asylum seekers have been smuggled. However, the court records
would seem to suggest that smugglers were responsible for some 250 migrants a
year, i.e. a total of 2,000 individuals over the research period. This figure is far
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lower than the official number of asylum seekers. What is more, the majority of
these 2,000 people were smuggled out of the Netherlands and (insofar as it could
be determined) they did not apply for asylum. The estimates based on asylum fig-
ures are therefore very difficult to substantiate. There are two possible explana-
tions for the difference between the numbers based on asylum applications and
the numbers derived from the case file study. Either the majority of asylum seek-
ers were not smuggled in but entered the Netherlands by different means, or a
very large number of those who smuggled Chinese people remained hidden from
the Dutch authorities.
This chapter also delved into several general characteristics of human smug-
glers, such as sex, age, nationality, ethnicity and country of residence. Notice
there is a significant limitation inherent in the empirical material used for this
research. The issue is the crime, and not the social background of the defendants.
Aspects such as education, marital status and employment status remain
unknown. Information of this nature is better obtained from field interviews.
Limitations also ensue from the Dutch perspective. The Dutch authorities are
unwilling to exchange information with the Chinese authorities. Consequently,
certain conclusions may not be completely accurate. For example, information
retrieved from the Dutch Criminal records Office indicates that smugglers from
China in the Netherlands have very few criminal antecedents. The number of
drug-related crimes is very low, for example. However, this reflects the situation
in the Netherlands only. There is a possibility that the defendants have e.g. drug-
smuggling convictions in China.
The majority of the defendants originated from the People’s Republic of
China. This was to be expected, as the Chinese who are smuggled all come from
Mainland China. But there were also several ethnic Chinese individuals from
other countries. The share of defendants from Hong Kong (N=12) who were liv-
ing in the Netherlands was quite low relative to the size of this population group
in the Netherlands. This could be due to a lack of connections with the smuggled
people who solely come from mainland China. Although the literature some-
times attributes a prominent role to the Taiwanese in human smuggling to the
United States (Yiu, 2000; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996), there were very few Taiwan-
ese in the research group (only two Taiwanese men were suspected of human
smuggling).
By contrast the share of Vietnamese is much higher than would be expected
on the basis of the small size of this population group in the Netherlands. Of the
twelve individuals, seven were resident outside the Netherlands, but the other five
were living in the Netherlands. They were all ethnic Chinese, which could explain
their involvement in the smuggling of Chinese people up to some point. Never-
theless, their share is still fairly large considering the size of the ethnic-Chinese
Vietnamese population group relative to the total Chinese community. No expla-
nation was found for this.
However, focusing only on Asian suspects would be insufficient. Nearly 20%
of the defendants involved in smuggling Chinese people were non-Asian. They
came from Germany, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Great Britain, Yugoslavia and
the Netherlands. A reason may lie in the specific practices common to Chinese




In Mandarin Chinese, human smuggling is called toudu, which literally means
‘steal passage’. A smuggled person is a touduke, ‘someone who stole passage’. In
Wenzhounese, using the services of smugglers is called huang niubei, or
‘traveling on the back of the yellow ox’ (Pieke, 2002: 11). However, illegal
migrants are able to ‘steal passage’ or ‘ride a yellow ox’ only because of the
involvement of others, the snakeheads (shetou). As smuggled people are not pun-
ishable under Dutch law (as long as they have not committed any offences, such
as passport fraud), very little information is available about them. In this study,
very little can therefore be said about the smuggled people themselves because
the source material is insufficient.
Smugglers, however, are liable for punishment under the law, and conse-
quently a great deal of information is available about them. Chapter 2 provided a
brief theoretical overview of the distinct functions of the people involved in the
process, namely the organizer, recruiter, transporter, local guide, passport falsi-
fier, enforcer, debt collector, corrupt officials and support personnel. There is gen-
eral consensus regarding these functions among researchers who take the more
hierarchical approach and those who take the network-oriented approach. Before
addressing the possible forms of cooperation, it is important to determine
whether these functions actually exist in the Dutch context. This chapter there-
fore looks at whether the defendants tried for human smuggling in the Dutch
courts as discussed in chapter 4 fulfilled specific roles. It also examines whether
categories of smugglers share certain characteristics. Connecting the smugglers
to particular functions also serves to explain how Chinese people are smuggled
into or through the Netherlands in practice.
5.2 Overview
The court records show that the defendants performed specific tasks and func-
tions in the smuggling process. There are nine different functions, as already
listed in chapter 2. Table 14 shows the number of defendants according to their
primary function. Each suspect is attributed only a core activity, although many
played more than one role. In some cases, for example, the organizer also per-
formed a support function.
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Table 14 Primary smuggling functions
Source: case files
The table includes the category “unknown”. The functions of ten individuals are
unknown because the files were lost or because consent to view the files was not
granted as the cases were still pending. Each of the smuggling functions is
described in detail in the sections below.
5.2.1 Organizer
In total 22 people were identified as organizers. The files revealed specific charac-
teristics that typify this function. For example, organizers always manage the
finances. They determine how much the other smugglers are paid and when.
They coordinate the smuggling process and have a lot of contacts at home and
abroad for that purpose. They turn out to be no distant masterminds but are usu-
ally also directly involved in the execution. For instance, they often assist in the
daily activities by purchasing food for groups of illegal migrants, selling passports
or picking up and driving the migrants around in the Netherlands. Multiple tele-
phone calls are placed every day, sometimes until deep in the night due to time
differences.
Twelve of the 22 organizers were involved in the large-scale transport of
migrants from the Netherlands to Great Britain or the United States. These
organizers were relatively young (in their thirties or forties). Nine were ethnic
Chinese from the People’s Republic of China, and were recent migrants who had
come to the Netherlands (legally) in the 1980s or 1990s. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service data shows that they were granted Dutch residency status in the
1990s. Three organizers had prior convictions for human smuggling and the rest
had no criminal record. It was also striking that five of the organizers, who were
responsible for smuggling hundreds of migrants, were (ethnic) Chinese women
(cases 9, 17, 28, 29 and 98). Some of them worked with their husbands. It was
unclear who was the first to get involved in smuggling. One woman claimed to be
the brains behind the organization. She complained to a girlfriend that her hus-























band was wasting money on gambling or impossible smuggling plans. According
to her, it was due solely to her common sense and attention to detail that the cou-
ple were able to make a profit from smuggling (case 17).
The other ethnic-Chinese organizers were involved in smaller-scale forms of
smuggling. They also assisted directly in the day-to-day execution. Only one
organizer attempted to smuggle migrants into the Netherlands alone (case 27).
He was not very successful. He managed to get just one or two migrants into the
country a year.
Non-Chinese organizers were identified in three large-scale investigations
(cases 15, 30 and 32). One smuggler was Turkish and another British. Both had
been living in the Netherlands for a long time. The third person was born in
Indonesia, but was not ethnic Chinese. All three were male. In contrast to the
Chinese organizers, these three can best be described as ‘resourceful’ business-
men, who were engaged in several different businesses. Some of their busi-
nesses, e.g. goods shipment, were legitimate. However, they did not shy away
from illicit deals that came their way. They were involved, for example, in ciga-
rette smuggling, tax evasion and the transport of migrants. All three had a crimi-
nal record.
5.2.2 Recruiters
None of the suspects acted as recruiters in China, en route or in the Netherlands.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the migrants who were smuggled to
or through the Netherlands were never recruited. It bears mentioning once again
that the drawback of this data set is that it provides limited information on the
smuggled people themselves. In some cases, migrants said that a person had
come to their village and asked them if they were interested in going abroad.
However, the identity of the recruiters abroad remains unknown.
In some cases, a form of deception was unearthed. For example, a number of
migrants said they were promised that they would have legal identity papers for
the journey. However, this proved to be a lie because later they found themselves
completing some legs of the journey on foot in secret and in the back of lorries.
Still, most of the migrants who provided information about the start of their
journey gave the impression that they were not persuaded by recruiters to leave
but, in line with ideas on social capital in a migration setting, left on their own
and/or their family’s initiative. Some illegal migrants told how their father in
China arranged for a smuggler (cases 33 and 51). In one case, a wiretap recorded a
mother contacting an organizer. She specified that her son had to be smuggled
out of China on a tourist visa. She gave a description of her son, probably to
ensure that the smuggler would issue him with the correct papers (case 60). In
another example, a man living illegally in the Netherlands enlisted the aid of a
smuggler to bring over his wife and children (case 28). He later decided to try his
luck in America. Not because a smuggler enticed him, but because his cousins
living there (illegally) had told him that life as an illegal migrant was much easier
in the United States and there were very good opportunities to make money.
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Because of this suggestion, he sought out a smuggler and went to America.21 An
unidentified woman in Frankfurt asked a Dutch-based organizer if she could be
smuggled to the United States. The smuggler replied that he was quitting the
smuggling business. Her disappointed response was: “Oh, so you don’t do that
anymore …” (case 28). Another organizer received several calls from people in the
United States, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, etc. All of them wanted their fam-
ily members smuggled from Europe to the United States (case 9). In one tele-
phone conversation an organizer even advised against smuggling. In this case an
illegal migrant complained that his wife in China wanted him to leave the Nether-
lands. Because she thought her husband was not sending enough money home,
she wanted him to go to England like her brothers or, better yet, to go to the
United States. It was the organizer who told the illegal migrant that his wife
should not complain and advised him against moving. The smuggler remarked
that people back in China had no idea of the hardships involved in illegal life in
the West: “She [the wife] should go to England herself; that will make her stop
whining” (case 17).
Relatives or friends also help would-be migrants get into contact with smug-
glers. For instance, one person was brought into contact with a smuggler in
China through his grandmother (case 18). One person knew her classmate had
family involved in the smuggling business and asked to be put in contact with
them (case 3).
As successful smuggling attempts create positive feedback, more people
seek the help of the successful smuggler. An investigating officer interviewing an
organizer asked why he did not use recruiters. He replied that it was unnecessary.
People came to him because of his good reputation (case 28).
5.2.3 Transporters
The most common function seen in Dutch cases is that of transporter. All the
cases at Schiphol Airport, for example, and nearly all cases in the border regions
are triggered by the interception of a transporter. Transporters are always discov-
ered in larger cases, too. In fact, there were only six cases in which no transporter
was found. In those six cases, individuals were convicted of human smuggling
for providing the opportunity or the means to stay illegally in the Netherlands (by
arranging work and housing).
Although transporters are therefore involved in virtually every case, differ-
ences can be identified. There is a significant distinction between road and air
transport. Several different means of land transport are used. Lorries are
deployed to smuggle groups of 15 to 60 people. Smaller groups of 5 to 20 people
are hidden in vans. Groups of up to 7 people are transported more openly in the
passenger seats of private automobiles or even on public trains. When illegal
migrants are smuggled by airplane, the transporter uses commercial airlines.
21. A daughter who remained behind later told the investigating officers that her family had found
work in a sweatshop. They indeed earned more than in the Netherlands, but only by working
day and night.
Actors 59
Note that none of the transporters in the research data was of the seafaring
type.22 While incidents of smuggling by freighter from China all the way to the
US have occurred (Chu, 1994; Wang, 1996), this method has not (yet) been dis-
covered in relation to Europe. Transport by water comes into play only when a
truck driver takes the ferry from the Netherlands to England.
Some nationalities, such as the Vietnamese, Dutch, Germans, Polish and
Czechs, act only in a transporting capacity. Although none of them transport ille-
gal migrants all the way from the People’s Republic of China to Europe, they take
care of certain parts of the journey. Vietnamese drivers are especially active on the
route between the Czech Republic and Germany or Germany and the Nether-
lands. They earn 100 to 200 euros per smuggled person. In the police statements
made by intercepted Chinese migrants, it is not uncommon to find references to
Vietnamese drivers on stretches from places as far away as Moscow (cases 6, 18,
23 and 28).
The Dutch defendants were also prominently involved in transportation.
Three large cases were sufficiently detailed to provide a better understanding of
their methods (cases 15, 30 and 32). In two of these cases, British men were also
involved in a transporting capacity. The Dutch (and British) typically use lorries
and are only active between the Netherlands and Great Britain. All of them had
years of experience hauling freight across Europe, so the route between the Neth-
erlands and Britain was very familiar to them. When these drivers agreed to
transport illegal migrants, the smuggling operation was of a fairly ad hoc nature.
The drivers would continue their daily business of hauling regular cargo loads to
their assigned destinations. When a shipment for Britain came up, they would
assess the space required for the regular consignment. If there was enough room
left for a number of illegal aliens, they informed their smuggling contacts that an
opportunity had presented itself. This was usually at short notice because the
drivers would only know on the morning of the day of departure or a few days
beforehand what they were going to be transporting. After informing his contact
that a smuggling opportunity is available, the driver is instructed to proceed to a
certain location. Shortly thereafter the illegal migrants are brought to this location
in small vans or private cars driven by Chinese men. When no one is looking, the
migrants board the lorries. This can happen at a car park near a petrol station or
restaurant next to a motorway. Sometimes the first meeting point turns out to be
unsuitable. Noisy children or too many passers-by make it necessary to find a qui-
eter place elsewhere. Large-scale transports of this kind are often secretly accom-
panied by the Chinese contact without the drivers’ knowledge. They follow the
same route in a car and observe whether everything goes well. Another possibility
is that they cross over to Britain earlier and wait for the transport to arrive.
If the journey succeeds, that is, if the driver arrives undetected in Britain, he
telephones his contacts. Once more he is directed to a certain place, where the
procedure is repeated in reverse order. The illegal aliens climb out in a quiet car
park and are taken away in cars or vans driven once again – according to the
drivers’ statements – by Chinese men. No further information is available on
22. There is one anecdotal story that a Dutch owner of a small pleasure yacht used his boat to smug-
gle Chinese migrants to England (B7).
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these Chinese men because they were not investigated by the Dutch police. The
driver continues his journey in Britain to make the delivery and then returns
home, where he gets in touch with his original contact. They agree to meet at a
certain time in order for the transporter to receive payment. Lorry drivers earn
approximately USD 1000 per smuggled illegal migrant (cases 15, 30 and 32).
With several individuals being smuggled in each transport, this is a lucrative
business. A driver can earn USD 15,000 or more on a single trip to Britain.
Although Western lorry drivers can make a lot of quick money by transport-
ing illegal migrants, the risks are also very high. First of all, the journey is no easy
ride. Bad weather and stormy seas make most migrants violently seasick.
Although they are given plastic bags to vomit into, some are unable to find their
bag in time. This happened when a group of about 30 Chinese migrants was
transported to England. Due to unhygienic conditions, the lorry’s regular load of
Yogurt bottles was ruined. What is more, the migrants had opened several boxes
and drunk the contents of the bottles. It was obvious that the lorry had trans-
ported illegal migrants. This led to civil lawsuits between the transporter and the
commissioner. An additional complicating factor is that certain foodstuffs and
produce have to be transported at low temperatures and lorries with special cool-
ing installations are sealed to make them airtight. A 15-hour journey in subzero
temperatures without sufficient oxygen is not viable. When transporting
migrants, the driver has to turn off the freezer and open the doors from time to
time to let in fresh (warm) air. Because large groups of people generate additional
body heat, delicate cargos are susceptible to spoiling, as in the case when 20
Chinese migrants were transported with a load of frozen pizzas (case 32). The
worst case occurred when migrants were transported in a lorry with insufficient
oxygen. Although the driver had opened the doors before boarding the ferry, the
boarding procedure and boat trip simply took too long. Probably out of fear of
detection, the driver had closed the only remaining air vent. As a result, 58 people
out of a group of 60 illegal Chinese migrants suffocated on that hot summer day
in June 2000.
Secondly, the police and customs are much more likely to detect a trip from
the Netherlands to Britain than a trip from Germany to the Netherlands. Under
the Schengen Agreement, the borders between Germany and the Netherlands are
completely open and inspections are only done at random. Great Britain is not a
party to the agreement, so checks are much more systematic.23 The files indicate
that at least four of the Dutch and British drivers had previously been detected
transporting Chinese migrants. All of the interceptions took place in England. 
23. To make matters complicated, Article 197a (strangely enough) did not make smuggling from
the Netherlands to non-Schengen countries (e.g. the UK and the US) punishable under Dutch
law prior to 2005. However, with a bit of legal manoeuvring this was easily addressed. Investiga-
tions showed that after arrival in the Netherlands, the migrants were practically never smuggled
immediately through to the US, for example. The smugglers would provide their clients with
accommodation pending further travel arrangements. This made them punishable under the
law because they provided the opportunity for an illegal stay in the Netherlands, which is one of
the terms of Article 197a.
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The transporters were heavily fined under British regulations, at a rate of about
USD 3000 per alien. As an additional measure, the lorry was confiscated (tempo-
rarily) and the driver barred from any future travel to Britain. In addition, the
transport company is also vulnerable to lawsuits by their commissioners for dam-
ages in the event of a failed delivery, as in the case of the Yoghurt bottles.
The fine, the confiscation and the lawsuit usually prove to be too much for
small transport companies. They go bankrupt and the driver is left without work
and income. In order to solve their money problems, a Dutch and a British trans-
porter decided to go illegitimate. They established a new transport company,
solely for the purpose of smuggling illegal aliens. In contrast to their earlier trans-
ports, the regular cargo was unimportant and only used to disguise the true pur-
pose of the journey. Commissioners were no longer important and the transport-
ers started buying fake cargo themselves. All they needed was enough goods to
create a false impression of a fully loaded lorry. In one case, cheap secondhand
furniture was used. In another, a few pallets of tomatoes. Behind this front, the
transporter made sure there was plenty of room for illegal aliens. They tried to
transport as many migrants as possible to quickly get out of financial trouble.
Rail travel is another method of land-based transport. Some illegal migrants
are transported between different countries in Europe in international trains,
usually under the guidance of a minder (cases 9, 16, 18, 22, 60 and 75). Except for
one Vietnamese woman, all such transporters were Chinese men. In some
instances, the migrants were not physically accompanied by a transporter. They
were told to board the train in Paris and were picked up from the train station in
Amsterdam (case 28). A number of migrants also told of their journey by train
from Beijing to Moscow, but these stories could not be verified.
Air travel is a last category of transportation. Most smuggling by air only
involves small groups of Chinese migrants. One to five migrants is the norm. The
largest group intercepted, however, numbered 30 (case 51). The investigation
showed this was not the transporter’s first trip. In the previous five months, the
man, who was from Hong Kong, had rented a tour bus 16 times upon arrival in
the Netherlands. The bona fide Dutch tour bus drivers told investigators that each
time they drove a group of about 20 Chinese people from Schiphol Airport to a
certain hotel. The hotel staff subsequently told the police that the Chinese never
left their rooms. After a few days they were picked up in private cars and driven
away.
Smuggling migrants by air leads to two types of activity. In one scenario, the
transporter accompanies the illegal migrants throughout the flight. The trans-
porter keeps the migrants’ passports in his possession for most of the journey
and gives them back just before Customs. The transporter also tells the migrants
which line to stand in, how to behave, which passport to present, etc. Once
through Customs, the transporter recollects the passports. It is not always clear if
real or fake passports are used. Sometimes both are used. Some migrants leave
China on their own passports, but halfway through the trip assume other identi-
ties and use fake or falsified passports. This job earns the transporter a few hun-
dred euros for each person smuggled or 500 to 1000 euros for a group (cases 38
and 40). The fee is paid after the migrant safely crosses the border. On a few occa-
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sions the migrant was carrying the cash with him. In such cases the migrants told
the police that the organizer in China had given them the money to hand over to
their minder upon arrival (cases 38 and 65).
In the second type of airborne smuggling activity, the transporter is not on
the flight from China, but waits for the migrant to arrive at the international air-
port (Schiphol, in the Dutch case). In this scenario, the transporter does not wait
for the migrant to arrive at the main reception area, but picks him up airside, in
the transit lounge. This is accomplished in the following fashion. Suppose a Chi-
nese migrant wants to go to England but can not obtain a visa. The organizer
books the Chinese migrant on a flight to a destination outside Europe that does
not impose visa restrictions on Chinese visitors, e.g. an African country. The
smuggler knows there is no direct connection from China to this country, so the
migrant has to make a stopover at Schiphol to change flights. At this stage of the
journey, the migrant gets his chance to go to England, his real destination.
Arrangements are made in advance for a smuggler, based in the Netherlands, to
meet the migrant at Schiphol Airport. At Schiphol arrivals and departures are
channeled through the same area, so the transporter simply books any outgoing
flight. It is agreed beforehand where they will meet, e.g. at a specific shop or pier.
One migrant told the police that the Dutch-based transporter asked him to send a
picture of himself. He was to wear the same clothes so the smuggler could easily
recognize him (case 64). In the transit area, the transporter supplies his client
with a new identity and a ticket for a flight to the UK. Because the migrant is
already in the transit area, he is able to avoid the strict customs checks on the UK
flight. Equipped with a new identity, the migrant boards the flight to the UK.
Sometimes the transporter will accompany the migrant to the new destination,
but this is unnecessary if the migrant is competent enough to fly by himself. In
that case, the transporter returns home. Money-conscious as he is, he is likely to
try to get a refund for the ticket he needed to gain access to the transit area. In the
meantime, the original flight to the African country leaves with an empty seat.
When a migrant assumes a new identity by switching passports at the air-
port, the police often refer to this as the look-a-like method. The transporter
involved ensures that the original passports are returned to the smuggling group
for re-use. After exchanging passports with the migrant, the transporter keeps the
original passports. Transporters sometimes use mailboxes before they go through
Customs. For instance, immediately after exchanging passports with three
migrants, one transporter put the passports in an envelope that was stamped and
addressed to a Chinese man in the Netherlands (case 65). In another case, the
address was one in China. It is not known whether this was the address of an
organizer or a family member of the migrant (case 49).
When migrants are transported by air, it is sometimes a complicated busi-
ness providing them with a new identity. A different set of papers is not always
enough. Changes in appearance are also provided. Some transporters who
accompany their migrants throughout the journey have been known to take them
shopping first in Beijing or Hong Kong to give them a more modern look. Their
hairstyle is changed (and sometimes dyed with red or blue streaks to give the
impression of being trendy and urban) and their old clothes are thrown away. In
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preparation for the journey, the transporter or others teach the migrants the false
names that correspond to the falsified passports they are going to present. Some
migrants in a group admitted that they were instructed by their transporter to tell
the same story: they worked for a certain company and were on a business trip
(case 51). Some are taught to tell asylum stories. In other examples, a transporter
at Schiphol Airport was seen giving reading glasses to a group of newly arrived
Chinese migrants so they would match the photographs in their authentic, but
stolen, Japanese passports. The preparations were not so extensive that the
glasses had the correct prescriptions, which led to some of the migrants com-
plaining of dizziness (case 42).
It is a transporter’s function to accompany migrants and/or provide them
with passports, but he also tries to maintain some distance between himself and
the migrants. He does not want to become a suspect if something goes wrong.
On the flight, the transporter therefore does not usually sit next to the migrant.
During the customs check, the transporter often stands in another line or waits
until the migrant is cleared. When documents are swapped in the look-a-like
method, prying eyes need to be avoided. Toilets are ideal places to make the
exchange (cases 43, 53, 64 and 76). In one case, a smuggler and three migrants
left on the same plane from China, but split up on arrival at Schiphol. The smug-
gler got off the plane early and went to a restaurant in the airport lounge. The
three migrants did not follow him, but phoned an unknown organizer in China.
The man in China then contacted the transporter who was waiting at the restau-
rant. The transporter told him where he was, after which the man in China con-
tacted the migrants again and told them where to meet up with the transporter
(case 38). In another case, a migrant phoned from Beijing to the Netherlands that
he was about to board his flight. The migrant was instructed to call the number
again once he had arrived. He followed these instructions and had to wait several
hours for someone to come and guide him through Customs (case 65). In unre-
lated but similar incidents, four migrants were told in China to call a Dutch tele-
phone number once they arrived at Schiphol. Again, a transporter then arrived to
hand over false identity papers (cases 58 and 53). In one extreme case, the
migrant contacted a mobile phone number in the Netherlands and had to wait
three days in the departure lounge before his Dutch-based transporter arrived.
During this delay, he met several other Chinese nationals who had called the
same number and were also waiting. Police observation confirmed that the trans-
porter made contact with all the migrants and handed over identity papers for dif-
ferent destinations (case 43).
Although it would be going too far to describe the transporters connected
with air travel as sophisticated, all had flown before and knew how to get around.
In contrast to large-scale road transports in which there is no need for communi-
cation between transporter and migrants once they are underway, interaction is
essential for transporters who use regular air routes. The smuggler and the
migrant have to be able to communicate in order to avoid making mistakes. A
Western transporter traveling with a Chinese migrant might be conspicuous.
That is why so many transporters are Asian (read: Chinese speakers). Of those
arrested at Schiphol Airport, 32 men and six women were born in China, nine
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men were from Hong Kong, one man and one woman were from Singapore, one
man was from Taiwan and two men were from Vietnam. This is not to say that
only Asians act as transporters at Schiphol Airport. One large-scale investigation
established that two non-Asian transporters accompanied Chinese migrants on a
flight from Amsterdam to the US. The migrants were carefully instructed before-
hand and knew how to respond to the transporters because they had practiced a
role-playing game on how to respond to border patrols and learned to use hand
signals (case 9).
Some transporters also had previous smuggling charges or were suspected
of smuggling (cases 36, 43, 49, 59 and 64). Other transporters admitted that,
although this was their first interception, they had been successful a couple of
times in the past (cases 40, 51, 57 and 73). One investigation uncovered a smug-
gling group that was responsible for at least ten incidents in which several people
were smuggled through Schiphol Airport on each occasion (case 60). Another
investigation turned up evidence that several transporters belonging to a single
smuggling group had used Schiphol and other airports on a monthly basis for
four years running (case 9).
The arrested transporters who lived abroad were all found to have accompa-
nied the migrants at the start of the journey by air in China or Hong Kong. The
transporters residing in the Netherlands had used the look-a-like method. They
presented migrants with a different identity at Schiphol Airport and then left, in
most cases. Only when the smuggling journey originated in the Netherlands did
the Dutch transporters accompany the migrants throughout the trip. For exam-
ple, there was a case of a group of smugglers who concentrated solely on smug-
gling migrants between the Netherlands and America (case 9).
5.2.4 Local guides
No local guides were found among the defendants. This is not surprising, consid-
ering the Dutch borders are relatively easy to cross. There are no large impenetra-
ble forests, extensive plains or raging rivers where border controls are at a mini-
mum. In the research, none of the 172 individuals in the research group were
found to have had contact with local guides in other countries. Some smuggled
persons stated that at an early stage in their journey ‘white devils’ had guided
them across rivers or secreted them through forests and hills. This probably took
place in the border regions of Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria and
former Yugoslavia. However, the Dutch police were unable to verify these
accounts.
5.2.5 Passport forgers
False or falsified passports were discovered in nearly every attempt at Chinese
human smuggling through Schiphol. Forged documents were also found in all
the major investigations in which the police searched premises. It was only in
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cases where the smuggling was done by road that it was unusual to find docu-
ments, but that does not mean that forged documents were not used somewhere
en route. Many migrants state that they crossed the border legally when they left
China, but that during the journey the transporter confiscated their passports.
The last leg of the journey is then done in secret, without papers. It should be
noted that not every legal border crossing involves false or falsified documents.
An unknown number of illegal migrants leave China using their own passports.
For example, one migrant told the police that his smuggler instructed him to
obtain a passport with a visa for Thailand through regular procedures. The smug-
gler became involved only after the migrant arrived in Thailand (case 53). In
another case, a migrant left China on her own passport. In the Netherlands, the
smugglers wanted her to hand over her passport. She refused because it was hers
(case 6). Another migrant was given a falsified passport only after reaching
Schiphol Airport (case 56). The major advantage for illegal migrants in leaving
China legally is that they will not be subject to punishment if they return. Even if
they go back years later and their original passport has expired, they can obtain a
new Chinese passport for a fee. Conversely, illegal departure is frowned upon by
the Chinese authorities and will cause the migrant problems if he returns to his
homeland.
The biggest document vendors appear to be based abroad. They are able to
get Netherlands-based smuggling groups ten, twenty or even more passports of
different nationalities at the same time. Sometimes the passports are made to
order. For instance, in France a smuggler took small groups of Chinese illegal
migrants to a local commercial photographer to have their pictures taken. The
pictures were then sent to a man in Thailand, who used them to doctor the neces-
sary passports and sent them back to the smuggler (case 9). Documents were
usually dispatched through regular courier services such as DHL, Fedex, UPS,
etc. Each shipment would contain several passports. One that was intercepted
contained ten Japanese passports and one Chinese passport sent from China
(case 17). However, because these vendors live abroad, not much is known about
them. A police analysis of certain telltale ‘signatures’ in the falsified documents
that could be used to establish the involvement of a particular document vendor
has not been carried out. The Dutch police catch only traces of these vendors
through intercepted telephone communications and, of course, receive their
handiwork when a smuggling attempt fails. Only a few characteristics are known.
First, they are all male. Second, they all live in Asia, notably China and Thailand.
Third, they probably have connections with local authorities (which would proba-
bly ensure excellent documents).
The most popular documents that foreign vendors use are those of Asian
nationalities that are exempt from visa restrictions in travel to the West. For
example, Japanese, Taiwanese and South Korean documents are among the most
frequent found in the possession of Chinese illegal migrants. Some are com-
pletely false whereas others are falsified. When they are falsified, it usually turns
out that they were reported lost or stolen by Japanese or Korean individuals on
holiday or at home. Whether they were actually stolen or sold by the legitimate
holder remains unknown.
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None of the people in the research could be identified as someone whose
sole occupation was falsifying or fabricating documents. In one case, a Chinese
person was discovered in possession of material for falsifying passports, namely
official stamps, ink, a UV light and several doctored passports. But he was also
involved in the operation as a transporter and organizer (case 60).
Most smugglers based in the Netherlands appear to go ‘shopping’ for docu-
ments. Some buy the passports from local, non-Chinese vendors. This carries
some risks. The promised goods sometimes fail to materialize or are below stand-
ard (case 3). A passport of a naturalized Dutch Chinese person is also a much
sought after commodity. One main suspect was recorded on the phone asking
around among acquaintances if they had a passport to let, either their own or
their spouse’s or children’s passport (case 28). In one case, a friend was tricked.
He was told that an illegal migrant wanted a passport as a backup when he went
shopping in Paris. In actual fact, the illegal alien traveled to the Czech Republic and
sent the original passport back by post. The official holder was furious (case 23).
In some cases, the smugglers in the Netherlands obtained a passport, and
then began looking around for a matching face in China. For instance, an organ-
izer had the passport of a 77-year-old Chinese woman with Dutch citizenship.
The smuggler stressed the importance of appearance. The illegal migrant in
China should not look too young because then there would be “a chance of fail-
ure” (case 28). In such instances, the original passport is used without alterations.
In some cases, though, the date or the photograph is changed. Photographs are
occasionally replaced with a degree of audacity. A careful investigation showed
how this practice works (case 28). A Chinese person with Dutch nationality was
asked by a Chinese friend of his (who had been contacted by the organizer) if he
would like to make some money. Because he had debts, he was game. The friend
advised him to wash his passport at 90 degrees to ruin it. Then he could apply for
a new one. During the application, the friend gave him a set of pictures of
another Chinese man, the person to be smuggled. He was to present these pic-
tures to the local administration. Although these pictures did not look like him, it
was supposedly not a problem. As one counterfeiter was told: “because all Chi-
nese look alike and they [the police] would never find out” (case 28).
Someone who is willing to use this method of photo substitution can earn
about 5,000 euro per passport (case 28). Some passport holders manage to lose
their passports several times during the course of a few years. This appears to be
relatively risk free. For example, an illegal woman tried to gain entry to the Neth-
erlands at Schiphol using the passport of another Chinese woman with Dutch cit-
izenship, who happened to have lost her passport four times in two years (case
78). It was not until the last incident that she was suspected of involvement in
human smuggling, but nothing could be proven. She was never brought to court.
Several smugglers probably used their own passports (or their family’s) at
one time or another. Again, this is relatively risk free. Even if an applicant came
under suspicion of mala fide practices, local authorities could prove nothing, let
alone impose sanctions. With unbelievable statements like “we asked for a new
passport, because this is the new model, and we like new things”, a smuggler got
away with filing a false application (case 6). One smuggler transporting two ille-
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gal migrants was found carrying the residence permits of his son and brother.
The pictures resembled the illegal migrants and were probably intended for their
use (case 21). Nothing could be proven. Another transporter was found carrying
his own passport, which he had reported stolen. He avoided any penalty by
declaring that a friend of his had bought the passport back on the black market.
He claimed he had informed the local police. The local police were “not sure” if
he had really told them, but because there was doubt, no further action was taken
(case 2).
5.2.6 Enforcers
When only one or a few migrants are smuggled, it is not essential to have enforc-
ers around. Enforcement is especially unnecessary when the migrants are friends
or family. The smuggler and his client(s) often live in the same place and may
share the same food. However, this does not rule out friction. One migrant com-
plained on the phone to his mother in China that he had been waiting at the
smuggler’s place for four months for a chance to continue his journey to Eng-
land. He had nothing to do and had already seen all the videos from the Chinese
video library (case 28). Another migrant complained of too much sun in his room
(case 9). But such comments also indicate that these migrants are not maltreated
or intimidated by their smugglers.
In several cases involving large groups of migrants, there was a much
greater distance between the smuggler and his clients. These smugglers often
spoke of their clients in degrading terms, such as piglets (zhuzha) and ducks
(yazi). This suggests there is a major distance between the smugglers and their
clients. Even the smuggled people refer to themselves as ducks to describe their
plight. For instance, some unknown illegal migrants who stayed in a safe house
had drawn flying ducks on the walls representing themselves (personal observa-
tion). The terms piglets or ducks are also suggestive of the business the smug-
glers see themselves involved in: transporting ‘livestock’. Just like animals, the
smuggled people have no knowledge of their exact location or plans regarding
their transportation (Chin, 1999). These terms are never used in smaller smug-
gling cases, probably because the workings of social capital create less distance
between smuggler and client.
Large groups of illegal migrants are customarily put up in safe houses. This
is commonly referred to as “duck storage” (case 9). In a similar vein, Chin relates
that sometimes safe houses are called “duck houses” (Chin, 1999: 194). These
duck houses are characterized by less than favorable conditions. First, they are
usually situated in bleak neighborhoods, where the houses are often derelict.
Because the safe house is used as temporary housing for migrants, the smugglers
are not going to invest time and money installing better plumbing or insulation.
The advantage of such neighborhoods is that the level of social control is low.
Nobody will report constant arrivals of groups of Chinese people to the police.
Second, the migrants are given cheap food (those who want better food have to
pay more). Third, the migrants are uncertain when their journey will continue.
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They sometimes have to wait months before moving on because the smuggler
could not arrange the promised transport. All the while, they are not allowed to
leave the house. In one case, about 30 migrants were kept locked up in a small
apartment in Paris. They were prohibited from moving around to keep the noise
down because of the neighbors. Because no plane tickets were available, the
migrants had to wait for months before they could continue their journey. One
migrant developed a physical problem due to the cramped conditions. His situa-
tion worsened drastically and in the end he could not move his legs at all. Because
the smugglers feared detection if they took him to the hospital, they took him to a
doctor of Chinese medicine in the Netherlands (case 9).
The overall situation in safe houses thus creates resentment towards the
smugglers. The migrants become unruly and may even start to fight among
themselves, which can result in injuries (case 9). As a countermeasure, the
smugglers use enforcers to keep the peace. The smuggler hires somebody to keep
watch over the migrants. Enforcers are young men who are not afraid to use vio-
lence. In some instances, a migrant was asked to keep order. In exchange, he was
given preferential treatment or a discount on the smuggling fee. It seems that
these migrants cum enforcers already knew the smugglers personally back in
China (case 29). 
Sometimes migrants were mistreated. When the smugglers believed the
migrants had misbehaved, they ordered the enforcers to beat them up (case 9).
Sometimes the police found indirect evidence of maltreatment, such as hand-
cuffs and nightsticks, during a search of the premises (case 23). However, rape
was not discovered in any of the Dutch cases. 
Most migrants would not report maltreatment. There is a twisted connection
between the smuggler and his clients. The clients depend on the smuggler to take
them to their destination. A certain amount of hardship is just something to be
endured. Over the years, the police have observed that several migrants they took
into custody after a raided safe house, returned to their smugglers voluntarily
after their release (cases 9, 29 and 98).
5.2.7 Debt collectors
None of the people in the OM-data query functioned as a debt collector. As most
smuggling cases in the Netherlands involve smuggling to the UK or the US, debt
collecting most likely took place in the country of destination. Another likely
place is China, where friends or family pay the smuggler after a migrant success-
fully arrives at his destination (see also section 6.2.1). However, the Dutch files
contain no data on this subject because the Dutch and Chinese authorities do not
cooperate with each other.
5.2.8 Corrupt civil servants
The files show that corruption played a role in a number of cases, but it took place
for the most part in China and was therefore not dealt with further in the files.
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However, some information on this matter was obtained through intercepted tel-
ephone calls to China made by smugglers based in the Netherlands. For example,
a man in China told a Chinese smuggler in the Netherlands that he had had a run
of bad luck. A good friend of his at the public security office had died when he
was run over by a car in a road accident. To make matters worse, the dead man
had some doctored passports in his desk at the public security office that were
already paid for (case 9). One man in Dubai was known to have fraudulently han-
dled student applications (case 17). In two other investigations, a frisk search of
two transporters at Schiphol Airport yielded their notebooks (cases 51 and 57).
They contained a list of things to do, such as hire a driver, book a plane ticket and
get a passport, and ‘bribe Customs in China’. According to the transporter, the
bribe would cost 25,000 Renminbi (RMB) per smuggled person. By comparison,
a Chinese passport (probably applied for legally) cost only RMB 3,000 and a visa
RMB 2,000. Bribing customs officials in Malaysia was relatively cheaper at just
RMB 15,000 per person.
This is not to say that corruption takes place only in China. In some human
smuggling cases, it occurs closer to home. In one case, an organizer had a highly
placed customs official at the airport in Paris ‘in his pocket’ (case 9). This man
had officially been appointed to prevent illegal migration to the United States and
Canada. By virtue of his position, he consulted regularly with embassy personnel
and the US customs authorities. He even had the right to deny migrants permis-
sion to continue their journey if he had any doubts. This made him ideally suita-
ble for the purposes of the organizer, whose clients were en route to the United
States. He was able to give detailed advice. For example, it was better to smuggle
no more than one or two people at a time because that would be less conspicuous.
Intercepted telephone calls proved that the customs official had received a fee of
USD 2,000 per person for his part in the successful smuggling of at least 30 ille-
gal migrants. He was able to operate for a long time without drawing suspicion
because he was actively engaged at the airport in intercepting smuggled  people
(also Chinese) who were not clients of the organizer. But the question is, did Chi-
nese corruption occur in the Netherlands as well?
Since few of the files contain corruption charges, it would seem that it
occurred only sporadically. However, a former head of Internal Affairs (B9)
pointed out that officials found guilty of human smuggling would most likely be
prosecuted separately under the general heading of ‘corruption’. Therefore OM-
data would show official corruption records, but not connect them with specifics,
e.g. drug trafficking, fraud or human smuggling. Furthermore, when evidence of
corruption among officials is discovered during investigations of human smug-
gling, the matter is split off from the main investigation and handled under
embargo by Internal Affairs as a separate case. Other officials interviewed stated
that it is common for corruption to be dealt with internally, for example by remov-
ing people from their positions and giving them other responsibilities (B3, B4).
In a roundabout way, three cases involving (alleged) Dutch corruption were
uncovered through several interviews and newspaper clippings.
The first one involved an official of the Aliens Police (case 19). To make mat-
ters worse, he was one of the few Dutch ‘Chinese experts’ who could even speak
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Chinese. It turned out that he had given information on internal procedures and
approved residence permits that otherwise would have been turned down. In the
end, he was not prosecuted, but forced to take early, dishonorable, retirement.
The second case also involved an official from the Aliens Police (case 26).
After being passed over for a promotion and given a less interesting job, he
decided to make some extra money by helping illegal aliens obtain residence per-
mits at a fee of 3,000 or 4,000 euros per permit. His earlier contacts provided a
steady flow of requests for residence permits. The prosecution stated that from
1996 to 1999 he had helped at least 20 people gain unlawful entry into the Neth-
erlands. Most of his clients were Turkish and Moroccan, but there were also a few
Chinese. Sometimes he would tamper with the central registration, at other times
he was observed advising Chinese couples how to fake a marriage in order to
obtain a residence permit. He was fined and sentenced to five years (reduced to
three years on appeal). When the prosecutor was asked if other people from his
section had been involved and prosecuted, the answer was “no legal and convinc-
ing evidence has been found to do so”.
The last case involved charges of fraud against two Dutchmen working at the
Dutch embassy in China (case 63). One official misused his authority and applied
an incorrect procedure to get his Chinese girlfriend on a list of business delegates
to the Netherlands. He was assisted by the other official, a Chinese expert. The
court ruled it was a case of bad professional judgment, and since both of them
had no prior convictions they were acquitted.
Establishing such proof sometimes appears to be difficult. E.g., during an
investigation, the main suspect made a telephone call to an unknown person. The
suspect asked if he was a translator at Schiphol airport, which he confirmed. She
then introduced herself and wanted to know if he had recently translated for a
group of intercepted Chinese. This was indeed the case. She asked if she could be
posted on the proceedings and promised him some ‘tea money’. The translator
appeared glad to oblige: “we are all Chinese and have to help each other”.
Although the investigating team took this very seriously, in the end no prosecu-
tion followed because no person could be identified as the translator in question
(case 9). One other difference between suspecting something and lawful, con-
crete enough proof can be found in case 28. Telephone interceptions pointed out
that a suspect in the Netherlands was talking with an unknown person in Zhe-
jiang about an unknown person in Shanghai who had a ‘good relationship’ with a
Dutchman working at the Dutch consulate. For a little fee, applications would be
less cumbersome. Further conversations on this matter were not recorded and
hence no action was taken (case 28).
Although there is no concrete evidence of other incidents of corruption in
connection with the Dutch embassy in China, the Court of Audit indicates that
the Beijing mission has had serious integrity problems (AR, 2003: 39). The
embassy is also known to have illegally charged an extra fee of 11 euros for “send-
ing faxes to The Hague” in order to expedite visa applications. The applications
were not actually faxed. The fee was merely a way of generating extra cash, which
was used, for example, to put in a swimming pool at the ambassador’s home
(Meijdam, 2003). Needless to say, this would suggest that the extra fax fee had
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been charged very frequently. This raises the question whether the financial inter-
est was deemed more important than the interest of conducting a thorough
examination of the application’s validity. However, no criminal prosecution was
initiated, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now admits, years later, that “at
the time embassy staff contravened the rules by charging extra fees for expediting
visa applications” (Trouw, 2004).
5.2.9 Supporting personnel and others
Supporting personnel are typically found in smuggling cases involving more than
three defendants. These are people who are willing to do small jobs for a few hun-
dred euros. For example, a Turkish organizer was able to register a company and
a lorry in the name of a young Dutchman. This person had debts and was willing
to sign a few papers without knowing what he was involved in.
Another form of support is interpreting. Two defendants were the only ones
in the smuggling group who spoke German and English. From time to time, they
were therefore asked to rent a safe house or contact smugglers of another nation-
ality. They were paid a small fee for their services.
In nearly every case, people are hired to transport the migrants within the
Netherlands. Theirs is not to be compared with the role of the transporters. The
distances are usually small and there is virtually no risk involved because there
are no border controls to be avoided. For example, a transporter takes a group of
migrants to the Rotterdam railway station, where he hands them over to the ‘col-
lector’, who in some cases is also the enforcer at the safe house. The transporter
leaves and the collector takes the migrants to the safe house. They travel by foot,
tram or car, depending on the distance. Conversely, right before a journey begins
someone takes the migrants from the safe house to, for example, the airport
where a transporter takes over. The transporter then attempts to get them across
the border. The average fee for picking up and dropping off migrants is ten euros
per person (cases 6, 9, 23 and 29).
In many cases, the organizers and transporters also carry out supporting
functions themselves. For example, an organizer was phoned by another smug-
gler because the illegal migrants staying at a certain safe house were hungry. The
organizer instructed the smuggler to buy noodle soup. The enforcer replied that
he had already done that, but the migrants wanted something else to eat. He
wanted to know what he should do. This angered the organizer, who started to
swear. In the end, though, the organizer gave in and both the organizer and the
smuggler were seen buying large quantities of fruit and vegetables at the market
(case 9).
None of the people in the OM-data query had exclusive specialist knowledge
on asylum procedures. On the contrary, all the smugglers seemed to be knowl-
edgeable about asylum procedures, even those of different countries. For
instance, an organizer discussed with a transporter the problem of a 17-year-old
boy who wanted to go to America (case 9). Being of such an age might qualify the
boy for the much-coveted special unaccompanied minor asylum status in the
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Netherlands. However, the client did not want to stay in the Netherlands. He pre-
ferred to join his family in America. Because he was underage, the smuggler was
afraid that the usual plan would go wrong. Normally people fly to the United
States and claim asylum upon arrival. Afterwards the smuggler would arrange for
someone to turn up and claim to be a family member. The asylum applicant
would then be released and was free to go. The problem in this case was that the
boy would be kept in detention because he was underage. The smugglers knew
this, and therefore tried to obtain an adult passport. This knowledge was probably
derived from experience; an earlier smuggling attempt with a small Chinese
woman had failed. Although she was 25 years old, she looked very young (even to
Chinese eyes). When she arrived in America and claimed asylum, the US officials
believed she was an underage victim of human trafficking and therefore kept her
in special detention. She was locked up for months (for her own protection…),
while others in her smuggling group were released within a short period of time
and started making money by working illegally. Furthermore, it does not require
much specialist knowledge of asylum procedures to advise illegal migrants to
ditch their passports and claim asylum when something goes wrong. It is well
known that the Dutch government finds it difficult to repatriate Chinese people
who have no passport (see chapter 8). In addition, some of the places where asy-
lum seekers are housed while awaiting the decision on their application provide
Internet access. Considering the workings of social capital, what better way is
there to keep the home front informed of changes in procedures?
There is also no evidence of recruitment in or infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses and institutions. The smugglers merely make use of the legal opportuni-
ties available to them. For example, international courier services are used to dis-
patch passports. Smugglers book flights with ordinary travel agencies. They never
have to bribe travel agents or establish agencies themselves. Smugglers simply
choose a particular agency because it is nearby or it employs Chinese staff. At
most, these companies might start to wonder about certain clients who book trips
very regularly and pay cash (case 73). In an official statement, a photographer told
police that, now that he had been asked, he did indeed find it odd that a certain
Chinese person came to his studio every week with groups of five or six other
Chinese people to have passport photographs taken (case 9). But asking ques-
tions might have led to a loss of custom. Lorry drivers are approached if they are
interested in smuggling migrants. Some of them agree, without their bosses
knowing. Smuggling migrants in the lorry of company X therefore does not equal
the involvement of this company but merely the involvement of the individual
lorry driver. Only one exceptional case involved the establishment of a transport-
ing company with the sole purpose of facilitating human smuggling. Further-
more, this was carried out by Turkish and Dutch defendants, not Chinese.
It is also striking that no money launderers or underground bankers were
found in any of the cases. Only one defendant was accused of money laundering,
but there was actually very little to the case. He had merely set up a one-off ‘loan
back’ structure via his father in China in order to buy a house (case 9). In addi-
tion, it is not uncommon for legal channels to be used in smuggling operations.
For example, money is transferred to China legally from the Netherlands by way
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of the Bank of China in Luxembourg (case 9). Maybe there is little need to laun-
der money in the Netherlands because it seems a great deal of money does not
leave China but is rather invested there in real estate (B3).
Some files, however, suggest that professional service providers abroad are
involved in smuggling operations. In two high profile cases, Dutch ethnic-Chi-
nese smugglers had struck a deal with interpreters and lawyers in the UK and the
US (cases 9 and 30). These professionals were told when and where to expect the
arrival of illegal Chinese nationals. At the same time, the people to be smuggled
were instructed and given telephone numbers to contact certain law firms once
they had arrived at their destination. These law firms would then handle their asy-
lum cases. For instance, when the smuggled Chinese arrived in America, they
disposed of all their documentation and applied for asylum at the airport.
Because of American asylum practices, detainees could be released on bail if they
had friends or family to stand bail for them. The American law firm wrote hun-
dreds of bogus letters allegedly from families who wanted to stand bail. As a
result, the smuggled people were able to leave the detention centers, were picked
up by the lawyers and were taken to safe houses. The ensuing American investi-
gation resulted in the closure of the American law firm, the arrest of several legal
representatives, and strict prison sentences and heavy fines (B3).
5.3 Conclusion
The files contain very little information about the smuggled persons, but quite a
lot about the smugglers. Several different functions that can occur in Chinese
smuggling operations were identified on the basis of the literature. This chapter
examined whether these functions could be distinguished in the Netherlands.
Some of the roles were filled by defendants in the cases reviewed and others were
not. For example, no recruiters were found. This is due in part to the source mate-
rial used. The ban on data exchange with China prevents us knowing precisely
what happens there. On the other hand, the data in the files suggests that recruit-
ment does not play a very important role. This is logical in view of the principles
of social capital from a migration perspective (see section 2.2.4). Family and
friends appear to influence the decisions migrants make about whether or not to
have themselves smuggled to a foreign country. It is also common for family
members and friends to put the potential migrant in touch with smugglers.
Apparently, the Dutch smugglers do not have to go in search of clients. In a
number of cases, the clients found them. Supposedly, migrants choose a particu-
lar country for specific reasons and therefore do not allow smugglers to take them
just anywhere. Due to the nature of the source material available, however, there
is no information on any social bonds between the smuggler and the smuggled
people, or the living environment where the smuggled people end up.
Another function category that was not found in the research group is the
local guide. This is to be expected because the function is irrelevant in the Nether-
lands. There are no sparsely populated, inaccessible border areas. Corrupt public
officials appear to play only a marginal role in the Netherlands, which from a
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Dutch criminological perspective is not a surprising conclusion. Previous
research showed that Dutch investigating officers are not highly susceptible to
corruption (Bunt & Kleemans, 2004: 205). Criminal groups in the Netherlands
prefer to avoid detection than to bribe law enforcement officers (Huisman et al.,
2003: 18). On the other hand, there are indications of corruption among govern-
ment officials in China. However, again, because court records were used, little
information could be obtained about this subject.
Furthermore, debt collecting is apparently not an important part of the
smuggling process in the Netherlands. None of the suspects was engaged in this
activity fulltime. One possible reason is that the smuggling fee is often paid in
China (see chapter 7). Another reason could be that the Netherlands is often not
the migrant’s final destination. Most smuggling cases (especially the major cases)
involve smuggling Chinese migrants out of, rather than to, the Netherlands. Fur-
thermore, even when smugglers are caught bringing migrants into the country,
that does not necessarily mean that the Netherlands is the final target country.
The migrants or their smugglers often say that they were on their way to the UK.
The migrants were accommodated in the Netherlands temporarily until the jour-
ney could continue. Since the Netherlands is not the target country, there is little
need for debt collecting here.
Other functions were positively found in the OM-data. Twenty-two people
were identified as organizers. This is a large number, but it should be kept in
mind that the sample of smugglers is not random. Since the Dutch government
targets precisely these people, it is not odd that this function is well represented.
What practically all the organizers have in common is that they attempt to smug-
gle migrants out of the Netherlands to Britain or the United States. Organizers
who only smuggle migrants into the Netherlands operate on a very small scale.
Furthermore, the organizers are not “distant masterminds”, but are constantly
involved in the day-to-day activities (Kleemans & Van de Bunt, 2003).
The role played by women is striking. Although this was not listed as a sepa-
rate characteristic for a certain type of organization in chapter 2, traditional ideas
about crime disregard the role women can play (Inciardi, Block, & Hallowell,
1977). Members of triads (or the Italian Mafia) and other key figures in organized
crime supposedly are, by definition, always men. In this context, the only roles
available to women are those of a supportive nature or of the victim. However,
several women acting as organizers were found in the research group. No expla-
nation was found for this phenomenon. The importance of women acting as
organizers is certainly not a Dutch fluke. For instance, the 1993 Golden Venture
incident in America (see introduction) was allegedly carried out by a woman
arrested in 2000 (Kyle & Liang, 2001; Morse, 2001). It is a powerful reminder
that in any study on organized crime (as in other fields of study), women should
certainly not be overlooked.
A few individuals were identified as enforcers. This function is not always
necessary in small-scale smuggling operations, perhaps because smugglers and
clients are connected through family networks. On the other hand, in large-scale
smuggling the social distance is correspondingly greater between smugglers and
migrants. In such cases, migrants are often denigrated by being referred to as
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piglets or ducks. They are fed poorly and large groups of them are housed in
small apartments (safe houses) while they wait for their journey to continue.
Enforcers, often illegal migrants themselves, are deployed to maintain order.
The role of transporter is the most common. In the Netherlands, Chinese
migrants are transported by air and by road. There are no cases of migrants
traveling exclusively by sea from China. There is a large number of routes for ille-
gal migration by Chinese nationals. Every available opportunity is used to reach
the West. This results in what at first appear to be odd movements in the journey,
but this often indicates that the smuggler was able to arrange visas for particular
countries. There is an important difference between (semi-)legal travel and clan-
destine travel. (Apparently) legal documents are used in (semi-)legal travel. Trans-
port proceeds through normal channels. In this method, ethnic Chinese trans-
porters nearly always accompany the migrants. There are various reasons for this.
With such an open form of smuggling, the migrant must be well-instructed and
prompted when crossing the border. After a successful crossing, the escorts con-
fiscate the passports for reuse. It is not always clear how the smugglers obtain the
documents. In some cases, the services of document vendors abroad are engaged,
but the files contain no further information about this matter. In other cases, the
smuggler purchases identity documents from non-Asian forgers in the Nether-
lands. But the smugglers are just as likely to use their own passports, or those of
friends or family members.
When no identity documents are used, the journey has to take place in
secret. The geographical location of the Netherlands allows for land travel the
whole way. For example, migrants cross the border between Jilin and Russia
(legally) and take the train to Moscow. From there they proceed by train, bus or
car and travel through the Czech Republic and Germany to the Netherlands and
beyond. Most of the non-Asian transporters are involved in such road transports.
They transport groups of Chinese migrants in small or large lorries or vans.
These groups can consist of dozens of migrants. However, there are also some
Asian transporters – usually Vietnamese – involved in road transport. They carry
groups of migrants from the Czech Republic to the Netherlands via Germany.
The route from the Netherlands to Britain is usually covered by Dutch and British
drivers.
However, identifying different functions does not mean that tasks can always
be clearly separated and rigidly defined. Individuals can play more than one role.
The most obvious example is organizers picking up their clients from the airport
or arranging supplies for the safe house. The next chapter addresses how smug-




The previous chapters contain information about people tried in the Netherlands
for smuggling, the functions these defendants fulfilled in the smuggling opera-
tions and in that respect the manner in which smuggling occurs in the Nether-
lands. However, no information was included about how the smugglers are
organized. Several characteristics that can help to answer this central question are
listed in section 2.3. This chapter will address the first two, namely the durability
of the cooperative ties and the extent to which an entire smuggling process is cen-
trally controlled.
When smuggling operations are arranged by bureaucratic groups, it is plau-
sible that the smugglers form fixed working relationships with the same people,
under the umbrella of a centralized coordination body. When smuggling activi-
ties are carried out through more loosely organized social networks, the coopera-
tive ties are more likely to be of an ad hoc nature, without central management.
Of course, smuggling operations arranged by individual friends or family mem-
bers do not involve smuggling groups and will therefore lack central coordina-
tion. However, this last approach cannot be adequately examined in this study
because of the distortion caused by the research data.
6.2 Logistics and group size
In their research into organized crime in the Netherlands, Kleemans et al. said of
human smuggling that “the logistics of the illegal activities have a bearing on the
structure of the cooperative ties involved” (Kleemans et al., 1998: 38). Those who
have easy access to the required documentation (e.g. falsified passports) are able
to travel with regular airlines. The smuggling process can therefore remain rela-
tively small-scale. By contrast, those who do not have access to the required docu-
ments are forced to transport people over land in a clandestine fashion. This com-
plicates the logistics process. More support personnel are needed en route, such
as drivers and safe house caretakers.
For the most part, the empirical data supports this logistical point of depar-
ture. In interviews, Chinese nationals and investigators alike referred to the exist-
ence of simple smuggling methods involving just a few people. For example, a
certain manager of a Chinese company registered in the Netherlands invited peo-
ple from the People’s Republic of China to come to the Netherlands for business
purposes once or twice a year. The Dutch authorities granted visas to these people
on the basis of the invitation. However, this example falls within the realm of
human smuggling because, unknown to the government, the manager charged a
few thousand dollars for the invitation and the ‘businessmen’ did not leave the
Netherlands after the visa had expired (A2). In another simple method, Chinese
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persons who had been granted Dutch nationality sent their Dutch passport by
post to a family member in China, who used it to enter the Netherlands as a ‘look-
a-like’ (B4, B7, B14, B18). A marriage of convenience is another simple way to
enter the Netherlands. In one such example, a Dutchman stated that he had been
asked by a Chinese acquaintance to marry a relative from China. When she
acquired Dutch citizenship after three years, they divorced. The Dutchman
earned 7,500 euros (which, to be safe, his Chinese partner paid him in yearly
installments of 2,500 euros) and the Chinese side of the family paid all the
expenses (case 28).
Although all the interviewees were familiar with these simple forms of
smuggling, very few examples of these methods were found in the research
group. It is said that such cases are too small-scale to attract the attention of the
investigative agencies (B3). As long as these types of smuggling are organized
only once or twice a year, they go unnoticed. The Dutch government is unlikely to
be suspicious providing the aforementioned company manager does not invite
too many people a year to the Netherlands. But even when suspicions do arise, it
is difficult to get convictions for human smuggling in such cases. If the prosecu-
tion knows of just one incident, it will be difficult to prove there was a profit
motive.24 The aforementioned manager would testify that he acted in good faith,
and that his trust had been betrayed when the businessman he had invited did
not return to China. Those who lend out their passports are also difficult to pros-
ecute. They can easily cover their tracks by reporting the passport lost or stolen
when the authorities discover a migrant attempting to enter the Netherlands as a
look-a-like. Marriages of convenience are also difficult to prove, especially when
the individuals involved have actually lived together for some time. That is why
the case described above was ultimately not prosecuted and why, in another
instance, a Dutch woman suspected of marriages of convenience between 1982 and
1999 was still able to marry a Chinese man four times (case 28).
In small-scale cases, the only risk is that the smuggled persons will end up
talking to the police. However, in these forms of smuggling the social capital
bonds will certainly play a role. When the smuggled persons and the smuggler
are acquaintances or even relatives, the former are unlikely to report the latter to
the authorities. The prosecutor therefore has to weigh the pros and cons. Because
small-scale smugglers act only once or twice a year, it is simply too costly to initi-
ate a long-term police investigation of which the outcome is fairly uncertain. The
Public Prosecutor has to believe there is enough evidence to prosecute under
Article 197a (human smuggling). In practice, this means that the smuggling inci-
dents that result in prosecutions are those that almost certainly involve more than
one individual. Table 2 in chapter 4 indicates that 60 smugglers in total were
involved in just seven cases with six or more defendants. However, the file docu-
ments also show that in nearly every case with only one or two defendants
(96 defendants in total) various other suspects or involved parties can be identi-
fied who were not prosecuted for various reasons (e.g. the Public Prosecution
Service’s lack of funds, capacity or time). Thus, it can be said that all the 88 cases
24. The OM-data set deals with the period 1996-2003, during which a profit motive was essential to
establish human smuggling.
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studied involved some form of cooperation. As a result, the focus of this study
shifts more to distinguish between the hierarchical and network models than the
migratory model.
6.3 Type of cooperation in the Netherlands
The files show that, in terms of logistics, the smuggling method or route used is
not the determinant factor that defines the difference between large and small-
scale forms of smuggling. It is not only the small-time smuggler who fraudu-
lently uses a passport. Some large smuggling groups are equally likely to use
clandestine border crossings as the look-a-like passport or business visa methods.
Some arranged travel for their clients on direct scheduled flights (case 9, 28, 60).
However, when such methods are used, there are significant differences between
large-scale and small or individual organizers. First of all, the number of
attempted smuggling operations is higher. A large-scale smuggler will attempt
smuggling operations once a month or once every two weeks rather than once a
year. Second, a large-scale smuggler has difficulty obtaining the necessary pass-
ports or visas. An individual smuggler can use his own passport. Large-scale
organizers run into trouble trying to acquire the passports and visas needed for
more frequent smuggling attempts, so they steal, alter (falsify) or buy passports
on the black market. Third, the large-scale organizer usually attempts to smuggle
more than one or two people at a time. Lastly, the files show that large-scale
smugglers all smuggle people out of the Netherlands, whereas small-time smug-
glers are more likely to bring people into the country. Once again, social capital is
a probable explanation. Small-time smugglers bring over their friends and family.
As there is some form of social relationship between smuggler and migrant, they
are more likely to stay together (at least at first).
In order to understand the degree of organization, the logistics argument
holds more sway if we do not look at the methods of transportation, the route fol-
lowed or time spent on the road, but at the number of people the smugglers are
able to ‘process’. The more migrants an organizer is able to bring into the country
or smuggle through to other countries, the more people are systematically
involved. Case 9 is a good illustration. The organizer boasted on the telephone
that she was able to successfully smuggle 160 people a year (not counting fail-
ures) by plane to America. The investigation showed that this was no idle boast.
On average she tried to transport 16 illegal Chinese a month. Because she han-
dled such a large number of people, the smugglers involved in the Netherlands
numbered at least 13, not counting her contacts in China, Thailand, America,
Spain, France and Britain. These 13 people in the Netherlands took care of hous-
ing, food, transport, tickets, financial matters and even grooming to make sure
that the people to be smuggled looked the part of worldly ‘Japanese’ travelers.
This brings us to another observation. Not only do organizers that are able to
handle large flows of people have multiple people who help them, but they also
tend to work with other nationalities. This occurred in all cases in which more
than six defendants were prosecuted. A possible explanation lies in the number
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of people who are smuggled on a monthly or weekly basis. Individuals or very
small-scale organizers are able to handle everything themselves because they
have to take care of only one or two migrants. The sheer volume of migrants often
causes trouble for bigger smuggling operations. For instance, the actual physical
transportation becomes problematic when more than 20 migrants are simultane-
ously transported to Britain. Such volumes of people cannot be hidden among the
cargo of ordinary, unsuspecting lorry drivers, simply because that number of
migrants takes up too much space. An obvious solution is to set up a transport
company as a cover for human smuggling operations, but this strategy is very dif-
ficult to implement in reality. All kinds of problems have to be dealt with. For
instance, how does one register a company, how does one book cargo or a journey
to Britain, what is a reliable truck, where is parking permitted, how does a tacho-
graph work, etc. Furthermore, there are several formal requirements for running
a company and driving a truck, such as having the appropriate driving license,
ownership papers, clearances for transport and paying certain taxes on owner-
ship, etc. Chinese smugglers lack the inside knowledge that anyone involved in
the transportation business has. To counter this problem the Chinese smugglers
have to rely on the cooperation of lorry drivers. As this is not a common occupa-
tion among Asians in the Netherlands, snakeheads have to look outside their own
ethnic group. Some Chinese smugglers therefore are dependant on people who
are not ethnic Chinese for a quick turnover of their ‘livestock’. Without the help
of Western drivers the smuggling groups would be unable to transport as many
people as quickly as they do. The cooperation between Chinese organizers, trans-
porters, enforcers, Western truck drivers etc. is addressed in the next sections.
6.3.1 Hierarchical
When smuggling operations are arranged by bureaucratic groups, it is plausible
that the smugglers work together over a long term in fixed combinations. The fol-
lowing statements based on the results of the file analysis show some truth in this
proposition.
First of all, continuity was very common. In several major investigations
smugglers were tapped and observed for a long time, sometimes for over a year.
During that time many smuggling operations were attempted. In most attempts,
the same individuals worked closely together and performed the same functions.
It is therefore possible to distinguish separate smuggling groups. The changes
that occurred were mostly a matter of convenience. For example, a wife took over
her husband’s smuggling operations after he was arrested. At first, her husband
advised her from prison (during visiting hours or by telephone), but she quickly
began acting autonomously (case 32).
Secondly, the continuity was probably reinforced through affective relation-
ships like a shared family background. In case 23, for example, two brothers and a
cousin worked together. In another case, two of the organizer’s sisters abroad
were involved (case 9). Married couples were also encountered (cases 23, 28, 31,
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84 and 98). However, family ties within smuggling groups constitute the minor-
ity. The family factor is therefore not conclusive.
Thirdly, the smuggling groups tended to be ethnically homogeneous. Vari-
ous nationalities occurred, but they were nearly always clustered by ethnicity. For
example, there were clusters of Chinese, Dutch, British and Turkish suspects.
The Chinese suspects within a smuggling group often originated from the same
region, e.g. Zhejiang or Fujian. But a group from a certain province was also
likely to include people from other provinces. Ethnicity transcended national bor-
ders as well. A Chinese smuggling group could also include suspects from, for
example, Singapore or Hong Kong. However, no Chinese smuggling group
included non-Chinese. Or for that matter, no European smuggling group
included Chinese.
Fourthly, the distinctive groups were highly concentrated geographically in
the Netherlands. There was remarkably little geographical spreading of suspects
in the same smuggling group. They tend to live in the same city and/or the region
immediately around that city. For example, nearly all the suspects in the major
criminal cases in Eindhoven, Rotterdam and The Hague live in Eindhoven, Rot-
terdam or The Hague respectively.
Fifthly, it should be noted that the smugglers also maintained stable contacts
with outsiders who were not members of the smuggling group, e.g. Chinese
travel agency owners or Dutch lorry drivers. Over a long period of time, the same
people were asked again and again to book trips or transport migrants.
Lastly, finances very likely helped to seal the bonds that hold the group
together. A characteristic of the smuggling groups is that the organizer manages
the money. The organizer pays the other suspects for certain services and can
therefore be placed at the top of an organization. This in turn leads to the
assumption that the organizer issues orders to the other suspects, who are given
specific tasks to perform. Someone takes care of the safe house, another drives
the migrants to the airport or delivers them to a Western truck driver. Suspects
with special skills such as the ability to speak English or German (rare skills in
Chinese smuggling groups) serve as liaisons between Chinese and Western
transporters for a small fee. Approximately one quarter to one half of the suspects
are unemployed or on benefit and see human smuggling as a means of earning
extra money. As shown in chapter 5, the fee for transporting migrants is often cal-
culated per job. In two cases, it was even observed that the organizer paid out
fixed monthly salaries (cases 29 and 98). Sometimes a couple hundred euros
extra in ‘pocket money’ was added to that. In one case, the smugglers even talked
about being on the payroll of ‘our company’, or the ‘association’ (case 29).
It should be noted however, that such terms or the existence of smuggling
groups do not imply that they correspond to the classic definition of triads. There
is no evidence to suggest that members of these groups use triad names, swear
allegiance to one another or practice initiation rituals. Furthermore, triadic organ-
izations (whatever their form) in the Netherlands are often linked to the 14K from
Hong Kong or the Ah Kong from Singapore (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996). But
these two nationalities constitute only a minority in the smuggling cases (see
table 11). Analysis of the court files also show people from these nationalities
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often in supportive functions, not in positions of power. And even more impor-
tantly, triads would probably have a hard time tapping into the smuggling market
as most migrants come from Fujian and Zhejiang, not Hong Kong or Singapore
(see also Zhang & Chin, 2003).
 As further evidence of the hierarchical structure, during interviews with the
police various suspects stated that they were low in the hierarchy and were given
orders. Refusal was supposedly not an option. For example, one Chinese trans-
porter stated: “If you refused, you would be beaten up or get into trouble” (case
98). Some of the suspects were very anxious during the interview. Although at
first they made incriminating statements against some of their fellow perpetra-
tors, their whole demeanor changed when they heard the name of an organizer.
For example, one police officer reported the following:
“While discussing the topic [an organizer] the suspect became very nervous. He was
now keeping his eyes averted from us and stared at the ground. The suspect kept
sighing deeply, his eyes teared up, his whole body was shaking and he lit one cigarette
after the other” (case 98).
The suspect stated that he preferred to go to prison than make any statements
about the organizer. Talking about the organizer would be like signing his death
warrant.
External, non-Chinese suspects also indicated that they felt strongly pressu-
rized. Dutch drivers, for example, stated that they had wanted to quit after an
unsuccessful transport, especially because they had been placed on the list of sus-
pects by the British border control and were therefore no longer permitted to
enter Britain. Their Chinese contacts pressured them to continue and recruit
other drivers (case 15). This behavior suggests that the groups formed around
non-Chinese nationalities are subordinate to a Chinese group.
The fear observed both inside and outside ethnic Chinese smuggling groups
is not really surprising. Violence did occur in the smuggling world, as could be
glanced from section 4.2.3. In addition, there are also other incidents that are not
found in the charges. These are absent for lack of evidence or in some cases, the
known perpetrators are not charged because victims or witnesses refuse to coop-
erate. Interviewees from the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIE) and other investiga-
tors familiar with the Chinese underworld were able to mention a few examples:
due to mistakes made by a minder several migrants ran off before they had paid
the fee for their passage. The minder was held responsible for the financial loss
and was ordered to pay compensation. When he failed to pay, he was kidnapped,
tortured and left for dead (B7, B8). In another smuggling group, a disagreement
over money between an organizer and a member of the supporting staff led to a
serious assault. To pressurize the victim, her baby was forced to swallow half an
XTC tablet (B3). In yet another case, a group of men allegedly beat a minder with
a hammer among other things to show him who was boss (B7, B8). It is therefore
not surprising when some interviewees believed it was a strict command struc-
ture that even culminated in three murders (cases 23 and 32). In both cases, an
organizer ordered the murder of a fellow smuggler because of a dispute that spi-
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raled out of control. At one time, a friend of a victim who happened to witness the
event was also silenced. The organizer then ordered members of the smuggling
group to get rid of the bodies.
All things considered, the evidence strongly suggests a hierarchical struc-
ture. There are smuggling groups that operate with a fixed complement of per-
sonnel for long periods of time, maintain a division of tasks, clustered by ethnic-
ity, geographically limited to one specific location and do not avoid using
violence. However, some particulars can also be viewed in a different light.
6.3.2 Network
The existence of fixed smuggling groups seem a contradiction to a network
approach. After all, the network was supposed to be flexible and ad hoc. However,
the observation of group cohesion is by itself not necessarily in conflict with the
network approach. Familial or ethnic bonds can be seen as affective relations,
which of course will ensure cohesion (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004: 81). Such
affective relations are very prominent among Chinese human smugglers. It
would therefore be a mistake to merely view a network as a loose collection of
individuals.
The files show that smuggling groups make use of outsourcing of certain
tasks like physical transportation. In the hierarchy model, it would be easy to
think that the Chinese group dominates external individuals (or groups). But in
the network model, the one does not necessarily dominate the other. One telltale
sign is that these external contacts are not exclusively linked to one specific smug-
gling group. It appears that external parties offer their services to several people
or groups. Take for example a Vietnamese transporter living in Germany who had
two prior smuggling convictions (case 18). He had been convicted for smuggling
Chinese people and for smuggling Iranian people into Germany. He did not
belong to a Chinese-Vietnamese smuggling organization in the first instance, nor
did he belong to a Turkish-Vietnamese smuggling organization in the second
instance. He just worked as an independent contractor. In another case, a Dutch
group transported Chinese migrants for an ethnic-Chinese group on one occa-
sion and narcotics or duty-free cigarettes for Turkish clients on other occasions
(case 15). Once the group completed the job, there was nothing to link them to the
client. The fact that Chinese smuggling groups in the Netherlands cultivate such
relationships with external parties over a longer period of time is not inconsistent
with the network structure. In the end, the smugglers will favor the path of least
resistance. Contacts that do what is required adequately will be used over and
over again.
Furthermore, when interviewed by the police, suspects of course try to down-
play their own role above all, so their statements about a layered hierarchy some-
times have to be taken with a grain of salt. More importantly, the tapped conversa-
tions and police observations do not consistently paint a picture of a strict
hierarchy. The relationships within nearly every group tend to be loose and fairly
comradely. The suspects visit each other’s homes or go to casinos or (Chinese)
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clubs together in the evening. For example, the police Observation Team saw an
illegal alien who worked as an enforcer at a safe house repeatedly dining out with
the organizers (case 29). The same transporter who was quoted above saying he
was afraid of being beat up also made other statements. He stated that socializing
with the organizers, who paid for everything, “generated a kind of friendship and
at the same time a kind of moral obligation” (case 98). When asked whether he
had been forced to do certain things, he answered: “not actually forced, but I felt a
moral obligation to do things for them because they had done so much for me”
(case 98). There are no known cases in which a suspect got into trouble for refus-
ing to fulfill a request from the organizer because it was inconvenient.
Nevertheless, violence did occur between individual smugglers, as in the
aforementioned cases of assault and murder. However, violence is not a unique
characteristic of hierarchical organizations. It is equally likely to occur in a net-
work setting. Moreover, the circumstances of the aforementioned murders were
actually more banal than they first appear. In one case, the organizer was actually
really frightened of the employee he eventually killed. This man had a reputation
for violence and was blackmailing the organizer. The situation came to a head
because he demanded more and more money and began threatening to use phys-
ical violence against the organizer and his family. It was not the organizer’s wish
to impose his dominant position on anyone, but he feared for his life and decided
to preempt the blackmailer. In the other murder case, the perpetrator discovered
that the victim was having an affair with his wife. He was so angry that murder
seemed to be the only solution. During a police interview afterwards, the perpe-
trator said that he still hated the victim. “It is even so bad that I could dig him up
and smash his bones to bits with a spade” (case 32). This was not a professional
hit, but an interpersonal problem that had gotten completely out of hand. The
other violent incidents described above (and a few others not mentioned here) are
thought to have occurred within the same smuggling group (B4, B6). This sug-
gests that violence is an exception rather than the rule. In addition, the investiga-
tors suspect that the abuse was not carried out by members of the smuggling
group, but was ‘outsourced’ to third parties. This would be consistent with the
blueprint of criminal networks. However, this supposition could not be tested
because the perpetrators were not mentioned in the files.
Still, relations between smuggling groups are usually characterized as good.
Organizers from different groups telephone each other and dine out together
(cases 9, 30 and 98). In one intercepted telephone conversation between organiz-
ers, they said they needed to support each other because in the end their objective
was the same, namely to earn money smuggling Chinese people (case 9). Prob-
lems are usually resolved through consultation. It is highly exceptional for groups
to cause each other harm (see also section 7.4).
In short, the existence of cohesive and fixed groups do not rule out a network
approach. Affective relations will enhance durability. When an outsider suffices,
he will be used again and again. Furthermore, the relations within and between
groups of smugglers seem everything but strictly hierarchical. Thus far, however,
only part of the evidence (the Dutch situation) has been examined. It is necessary
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to look at the wider international context in order to better consider the suitability
of a hierarchical or a network approach.
6.4 Type of global cooperation
Another factor that can indicate the difference between a hierarchical organiza-
tion and a network is whether or not the entire smuggling process is centrally
managed. An incredible amount of logistical and organizational effort goes into
smuggling, for example, 20 people a month from China to Britain. How does the
smuggler find 20 reliable migrants each time? Finding 20 people who want to
migrate is not a problem, but how does the smuggler know for sure that the 20
have the ability to pay (Zhang & Chin, 2002: 76; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996: 7)? The
migrants then have to be brought to the West. If the journey takes place over land,
it will take weeks if not months. During the operation, the migrants have to be
cared for, fed and housed. And the smugglers are not dealing with only one group
of migrants who started out in September, for example. Other groups that started
out in the months previous or started later will be en route at the same time.
Furthermore, as soon as the migrants begin their passage, the ‘fog of crime’
comes into place. Unforeseen circumstances can interfere with even the best laid
plans. Smugglers act on incorrect information and lose control of the process.
Here are a few examples. A safe house in Moscow with 30 illegal migrants had to
be evacuated suddenly because the neighbors complained about a leaking pipe
and the housing inspectorate was going to come round (case 23). In another case
a passport supplier died in a traffic accident (case 9). A migrant became gravely ill
and had to be taken to hospital (case 6). The files show that every time, the smug-
glers have to act quickly to prevent discovery. To manage all these problems, each
smuggling group concentrates on just one part of the journey. As stated above,
several different smuggling groups operate along side each other in the Nether-
lands. The files indicate that the same situation exists in other countries. Similar
to the situation in the Netherlands, where several different smuggling groups can
be identified, there are different organizers with several people working for them
in the Czech Republic, France, Britain, China, etc. It is the cooperation between
these groups spread out over different countries that makes large-scale human
smuggling possible. Taking a broader perspective and examining the transna-
tional interaction between these groups can reveal more about the dominant type
of cooperation than looking exclusively at the cooperation within a single group.
6.4.1 Hierarchical
The hierarchy model assumes that the entire journey from China to the West is
coordinated centrally. Different smuggling groups are ultimately responsible to a
snakehead di tutti snakeheads. This supra-organizer ensures that the migrants are
helped to reach their final destination by a chain of smuggling groups in different
countries. In China it is claimed that such individuals are situated in the West,
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out of the reach of the Chinese police (Interpol Beijing, 2001: 23; Zhang & Chin,
2002). According to Western sources, such individuals are situated in China, and
that is how they manage to elude the Western authorities (Shelley, 2003: 243).
Several Dutch government officials also hold the latter view. The head organizer
is said to be situated in China, not in the Netherlands (B22). The fact that the
Dutch-based organizers take on assignments is considered evidence of this the-
ory. Through telephone contact the Chinese smugglers in the Netherlands are
notified, for example, that new groups of smuggled people are on their way. Des-
tinations are sometimes adhered to and sometimes altered. In one case, a
migrant decided not to continue his journey to Britain following a telephone con-
versation with an organizer in China. This organizer informed the organizer that
the migrant was allowed to “disembark” in the Netherlands (case 98).
Financing is another important reason for smugglers in the Netherlands and
in China to consult with each other. While most migrants claim they had to pay
20,000 euros for their passage to the West, the Dutch smugglers earn a great
deal less, for example about 5,000 euros for the Netherlands–Great Britain route.
And various expenses have to be paid from that fee. For example, the organizer
has to pay the Dutch transporters in cash. That can cost up to 1,000 euros per
smuggled migrant, so he has to have a considerable amount of cash on hand. In
addition, the other members of the smuggling group have to be compensated,
cars or safe houses rented, food bought, etc. If the journey is not carried out in a
clandestine fashion, passports and airline tickets have to be purchased. The net
profit for the Chinese smuggling group is therefore closer to 1,000 to 3,000 per
smuggled person (although because smuggling groups bring in a high volume of
migrants each month, the total profit is probably considerable). In one exception,
an organizer in the Netherlands was paid 28,000 euros per smuggled person, but
only because, instead of Great Britain, she offered passage from the Netherlands
to the United States, which is a much sought-after final destination (case 9).
From the hierarchical perspective, it is plausible to speculate that a large cen-
tral organizer in China determines the smuggling fee and compensates the
smuggling groups accordingly. However, there is neither proof for or against this
theory. During the research period, financial matters were either not investigated,
or there was only a cursory examination. As a result, it remains unclear how the
organizers arrange their finances. The only certainty regarding financial matters
to emerge from file study is that the migrants frequently pay their smuggling fees
in China (this topic is addressed in detail in section 7.3). If and how the money
finds it’s way to the smugglers in the Netherlands remains unknown.
In short, taking the entire smuggling route into consideration, it seems obvi-
ous that there is central coordination. Because a smuggling journey is often split
up in different legs, someone has to keep in control. On the other hand, the evi-
dence for this assumption is less convincing than may at first appear. An alterna-
tive explanation is set out in the discussion of the network model below.
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6.4.2 Network
In the network model, each group manages only part of the smuggling operation.
The lack of central coordination is what distinguishes the network model from
the hierarchy model. The Chinese groups in the Netherlands are not subordinate
to any other Chinese group abroad and no Chinese group abroad is subordinate
to any group in the Netherlands. According to the network model, the fact that an
organizer is notified that a group of migrants is on its way to the Netherlands is
not necessarily evidence of a hierarchical relationship. Nor is the fact that a
migrant received permission to halt his journey in the Netherlands. It is just a
change in one business agreement.
In order to better understand this line of reasoning, we must examine the
smuggling process more closely. Let’s start with a simple example, derived from a
tapped telephone conversation between two organizers. The first organizer said
that if the other organizer could get migrants into Canada, she would get them
into the US. Each would be responsible for one part of the process. At no time
would either party have complete control of the operation (cases 9 and 98). They
acted autonomously, but it is their mutual cooperation that leads to the establish-
ment of smuggling routes. 
The same principle applies to more extensive operations. In a tapped conver-
sation, it was said that someone “will take the lead”. In other words, that person
would start the first part of the smuggling operation in China. Next, he sought
others to carry out the following legs of the journey (case 28). Imagine that a
smuggling operation involving the smuggling of 10 migrants from China pro-
ceeds via Moscow, the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands to Britain.
In China arrangements are made to get the migrants to Moscow, where they are
taken over by another group, which gets them to the Czech Republic. A group in
the Czech Republic then takes them to Germany and from there the migrants
proceed to the Netherlands. Finally, the Dutch group smuggles them into Britain.
At no point does any one of the groups involved have control of the entire opera-
tion from China to Britain. As soon as a group hands over its ‘piglets’ to another
group, its task is complete and it is no longer involved. The group in the Czech
Republic has no authority over the transport of the migrants in the Netherlands.
Nor does the group in the Netherlands have any say over the transport from the
Czech Republic. What is more, none of the groups are controlled by a separate,
central group. This may appear to be somewhat illogical at first glance. Why is
there no central management?
In reality, the network is not a simple chain structure with just one link in
each country. A Chinese organizer in the Netherlands receives migrants from var-
ious organizers in China. This is illustrated by the statements made by an
enforcer and seized accounts showing that not every illegal migrant who placed
telephone calls home was charged the same telephone rates. Each organizer in
China was charged a different rate (case 98). Information from intercepted tele-
phone conversations also revealed, for example, that smuggling group A, a Czech
based Chinese group, asked an Chinese group in the Netherlands to take six peo-
ple to Britain. This Dutch group charged 5,000 euros a head. At the same time,
the Dutch-based smuggling group provided transport services for another Czech
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smuggling group, group B. The organizer of group B received a discount because
he happened to be an old acquaintance of the Dutch organizer’s brother. The
Czech organizer from group B therefore paid only 4,000 euros for the same
transport arrangements to Britain. This is an important finding because it shows
that the smuggling group in the Netherlands worked for different organizers in
China or elsewhere at the same time. The Dutch group is therefore not linked to
one specific organizer in e.g. China, but offers its services to different parties.
Just as the Chinese organizer operates autonomously in the Netherlands,
there are independent organizers in the other transit countries. The result is a
complex stream of migrants. For example, four different groups in the Czech
Republic passed on their clients to the same Chinese smuggling group in the
Netherlands (case 9). To prevent confusion the migrants can be numbered. For
example, numbers 12, 15 and 16 belong to smuggler A, numbers 24, 25, 26 and
27 to smuggler B, etc. A migrant’s number is sometimes written on his hand in
felt-tip pen (case 6). Meanwhile the smuggling group based in the Netherlands
might receive people from Germany as well, or be approached independently by
illegal aliens already residing in Europe (see section 5.2.2 on recruiters). While
awaiting transport onwards to Britain, outsourced by the Chinese group to an eth-
nic Dutch smuggling group, all these migrants stay in a safe house together. They
are split up upon arrival in the target country. According to testimony of one sus-
pect, at the time of the failed Dover transport no less than 15 different organizers
were having their clients transported simultaneously by a single Chinese smug-
gling group in Rotterdam, bringing the total number of migrants to 60 (case 98).
Because each smuggling group creates its own smuggling route and
method, including foreign suppliers of migrants, this also becomes their secret
recipe. The files show that organizers are careful not to reveal the ins and outs of
its proprietary operation to others. From a network point of view, this makes
sense. Other groups are basically its competitors and should be kept in the dark
lest they try to copy the system and it then loses its unique value. For example, an
organizer of one group warned the other members of his group not to tell the
organizer of a particular other group who the contacts were in the Czech Repub-
lic. The organizer was afraid this group wanted to steal her route (B3, case 9).
From the viewpoint of a central organization, it would probably matter less if
smuggling groups along the route knew each other’s processes. All would ulti-
mately belong to the same organization.
However, although the organizers try to shield themselves from the outside
world, they are less concerned about internal protection. From the files it appears
that in most groups everyone knows who the organizer’s special domestic and
foreign contacts are. This can be seen as further evidence of loose internal rela-
tions, but from a network perspective it seems less logical. Theoretically, in terms
of the social network model, the difference between an organizer and, for exam-
ple, an enforcer lies in the contacts that they each have. The organizer is the one
with the best contacts, the one who knows, for example, where to obtain pass-
ports. This knowledge makes him an organizer. However, in practice, this knowl-
edge is often dispersed throughout the group. Once again, it is probable that
affective relations within the group, as commented upon in section 6.3.1,
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counters these theoretical separations between members. Among family and
good friends, there is less incentive to keep secrets from each other.
In short, it seems that the network model is the best fit when applied to the
entire smuggling route. There are no simple chain structures in large-scale oper-
ations. In reality, migrants enter the Netherlands via a complex set of channels,
making it illogical to assume there is a central organizer. Still, the lack of infor-
mation about certain financial aspects leaves one fundamental problem. It is evi-
dent that because the large smugglers in the Netherlands take care of just one
part of the journey, they therefore charge a proportionate fee. The same probably
happens in other countries along the smuggling route. A smugglers in the Neth-
erlands charges a Czech organizer a few thousand euros for passage to Great Brit-
ain. The Czech smuggler probably charges his colleague in Moscow a certain fee
for passage to the Netherlands. In turn the smuggler in Moscow will have
charged an organizer in China for the transport to the Czech Republic. Through
this principle the total amount a migrant has to pay is in the range of tens of
thousands of euros. Since many migrants have the smuggling fee paid  out in
China, the parties involved have to reach agreement about how to divide up the
money. However, without financial investigations, there is no way to know pre-
cisely how this is done. This gap of understanding therefore still leaves some
room for the possibility that someone in China controls the money and allocates
the appropriate sums of money to particular smuggling groups. Maybe the per-
son who controls (?) the financial details, has more leverage than the others.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter made a start in examining specific indicators to determine whether
smugglers operate within a hierarchical structure or within more loosely organ-
ized social networks. It is important to point out that the migratory model was
not addressed in this chapter. While interviews with smuggled people and investi-
gators show that this form of smuggling is indeed common, it is difficult to inves-
tigate and prosecute. Consequently, the findings in this chapter apply only to
larger-scale forms of smuggling.
The form taken by relationships within the smuggling groups is a question
of interpretation. The importance of certain characteristics will vary from reader
to reader. Assuming a hierarchical perspective, one might argue that the smug-
gling groups situated in the Netherlands operate in a fixed (ethnically homogene-
ous) composition for long periods. Within that structure, there is a hierarchy. The
organizer assigns certain tasks and manages the finances. As a result, other
smugglers in the group are dependent on him. In addition, the same people from
outside the fixed group, such as Dutch lorry drivers, are employed over and over
again. Because they indicate during police interviews that they are afraid of their
Chinese bosses, they are deemed to be subordinate to the Chinese group.
Although violence is not necessarily a defining characteristic of hierarchical
organizations, it can be pointed out that some organizers have used violence to
reinforce their internal dominance. In the Netherlands, therefore, it is not true
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that several smugglers join forces only to arrange one passage and then part ways
again. Furthermore, the so-called nodes are less important than the network the-
ory would suggest. For example, two interpreters who served as the only contacts
between Chinese smugglers and Western transporters had a very subordinate
role. There is no evidence to suggest that they had a unique position within the
organization or earned a great deal of money.
At the same time, it must be stated that the hierarchical structure is actually
weaker than it sometimes appears to be. Organizers also carry out low-status
tasks, such as shopping for food for the migrants in the safe house, driving them
to the airport, etc. There are usually no strict forms of etiquette within the smug-
gling groups. Members go to restaurants and clubs together, celebrate each
other’s birthdays, etc. Affective relations will function to consolidate working rela-
tions. In some cases, there is a mutual family background. Most groups consist of
people who share the same ethnic background. For example, most of the groups
are ethnic Chinese, but a Turkish group and a Dutch group can also be identified.
There is remarkably little geographical dispersion of suspects in the Netherlands
belonging to a single smuggling group. Finances most likely help to reinforce the
bonds within the group. Approximately one quarter to a half of the defendants is
unemployed or living on benefit and see human smuggling as a means of top-
ping up their income. Since the organizer pays cash for services, he naturally
builds up a group of service providers. Furthermore, while a smuggling group
may use the same external contacts regularly, this is merely because it applies the
principle of ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. Moreover, these external contacts do not
work exclusively for one specific smuggling group. They offer a particular service
(for example, transport or passports) to anyone who is willing to pay for it. External
parties take on assignments for a fee, but this does not make them subordinate.
An examination of the entire smuggling operation from China to the West,
rather than just the Dutch smuggling market, more strongly suggests a network
model. The hierarchical model seems logical at first glance, because the smug-
gling of migrants from China to the West can be viewed as a chain. Migrants are
taken from China to Russia, from where they proceed through the Czech Repub-
lic, Germany and the Netherlands to Britain, for example. There is a smuggling
group in each country that arranges passage to the next country. Every smuggling
group is responsible for a particular leg of the journey. It is therefore plausible
that the entire process is coordinated from one central point. But the chain sce-
nario is actually too simplistic. There are several smuggling groups in each coun-
try, beginning with China. From there, various organizers send out groups of
migrants on their way. An organizer in the Netherlands will therefore arrange
passage to Britain at the request of different smuggling groups. Furthermore,
migrants who are already in the Netherlands occasionally seek the assistance of a
Dutch smuggling group independently. The variety in clients (migrants as well as
other organizers) makes the existence of a central coordination less plausible. It is
more logical to view the groups based in the Netherlands, and the groups situated
in other countries, as independent service providers. The various international
smuggling groups make use of each other’s expertise and a smuggling route
develops, without central coordination from above. Obviously, this form of inter-
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national cooperation can persist for a long time. It can be assumed that smug-
glers prefer to tread their tried and tested paths than to seek new ones. In other
words, as long as a contact is satisfactory, cooperation will continue. This is how
fixed routes are created. New partners are sought only when necessary (for exam-
ple, if a contact is arrested or cannot obtain tickets).
Paradoxically, the smaller smugglers are the ones most likely to maintain
control over the entire route. It is possible for this kind of smuggler to oversee the
entire process because it is so small-scale and the route and means are so simple.
For example, they occasionally lend their own passports so that a migrant can
book a direct flight from China to the Netherlands (A2). However, as stated in
section ‘logistics and group size’ of this chapter, these forms of smuggling are
scarcely found in the files, precisely because they are usually too minor to warrant
prosecution.
Still, there is one large gap of information. It remains a great mystery how
the organizer obtains the smuggling fee. The files reveal no information about




Two indicators pertaining to the organization of human smuggling were exam-
ined in the previous chapter, namely the durability of cooperative ties and the
extent to which the entire smuggling operation is centrally controlled. But there
are other indicators as well. As chapter two pointed out, the literature on human
smuggling that tends to use a hierarchic perspective, assumes that the smuggling
group is engaged in a range of different criminal activities. In this scenario, the
smuggled people also run a great risk of exploitation. They may be forced into
prostitution, theft or extortion or subject to other forms of socio-economic exploi-
tation.
The literature on human smuggling that uses a network model, is of a differ-
ent opinion. It is assumed that human smugglers are less likely involved in other
types of criminality. A group is formed for no other purpose than to smuggle
migrants. Individual smugglers may also be involved in the drugs trade, but that
will be on their own initiative and cannot be deemed to be the policy of the entire
smuggling group. Even in cases in which smuggled people are exploited this can-
not be ascribed to the smuggling group as a whole.
In the migration model, there is no place whatsoever for a range of criminal
activities. The smuggler merely helps a family member or friend enter the Neth-
erlands. There is no connection with drug trafficking or theft; however, socio-eco-
nomic exploitation does occur. The moral obligation that a migrant feels to repay
his family or friends for their help can land him in an exploitative situation.
This chapter explores whether the smugglers from the research group can be
linked with other criminal activities, such as prostitution, extortion and theft, the
drugs trade and socio-economic exploitation of migrants. At the end of this chapter,
we take a closer look at the most common financial schemes that the migrants use
to pay their smugglers. For lack of a better term, this will be called prefinancing.
7.1.1 Forced prostitution
In the Netherlands, forced prostitution and sexual abuse among Chinese nation-
als is often associated with underage asylum seekers. For example, it is estimated
that half the unaccompanied Chinese minors seeking asylum have worked as
prostitutes (Venicz & Vanwesenbeeck, 1998: 33). Hoogendoorn states that under-
age Chinese asylum seekers who arrive at the asylum application center without
having been sexually abused are considered fortunate (Hoogendoorn, 1999: 14).
However, the police have always claimed that there is no evidence to support
this (IAM, 2001b). According to police officers and experienced vice detectives,
the accounts of sexual abuse are false (B4, B6). They suspect that a story of abuse,
linked to pregnancy, increases the prospects of obtaining a residence permit. One
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police officer spoke of a different strategy. He knew of several adult female illegal
Chinese migrants who had lived in the Netherlands for years. When they became
pregnant, some of them decided to apply for asylum as minors. This made them
eligible for free medical care, but also gave them a chance to obtain a residence
permit (B17).
There was no evidence in the research group of minors suffering abuse. The
files contain little concrete evidence of Chinese prostitution, let alone abuse. In
fact, it comes up in only one case (case 3), which came to light when an illegal
Chinese woman was arrested for shoplifting. At the time of her arrest, the shop-
lifter was working elsewhere in the country at a local sauna. She spent a few
hours a day there and was able to arrange her own working hours. This was
unlikely to be a case of forced prostitution; the sauna proprietor was acquitted of
charges of human trafficking. The investigation showed no further connection
with human smuggling. During her detention, she told the police that she had
worked as a prostitute in Amsterdam. She said that she and a girlfriend had been
asked by a Chinese man whether they were interested in working as prostitutes.
The police managed to track down this friend and she confirmed the other
woman’s story, but said she herself had refused the work. She said that some Chi-
nese women worked as prostitutes because they could earn money faster that way
than by washing dishes in a restaurant.
In addition to the lack of direct evidence supporting a link with prostitution,
there was no indirect evidence of smugglers forcing their clients into prostitution
either. It was alluded to in only one case (case 9). In that case, the organizer (a
woman) felt her client was taking too long to pay the smuggling fee. In order to
bring pressure to bear, the organizer threatened to sell the client into prostitution.
She did not say to whom. This remained only a threat.
It is plausible that a sexual relationship could develop due to the position of
power that the smuggler has over the client. One of the smuggled people inter-
viewed in Chin’s research reported that after arriving in the Netherlands, a
woman from Shanghai decided to have sex with her smuggler. For each encoun-
ter, USD 200 to USD 400 was subtracted from her smuggling fee. The woman
was eventually allowed to deduct a few thousand USD from her smuggling fees
(Chin, 1999: p. 91). However, no evidence of such practices was found in the
research group.
In conclusion, based on the court files no connection can be made between
smuggling and forced prostitution in the Netherlands.
7.1.2 Extortion
It is stated that some of the people smuggled into the country are recruited by the
criminal organizations that bring them here (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996). They
are forced to threaten and extort people in their own Chinese community in order
to pay off their debts (Vogels et al., 1999: 124).
However, the files studied revealed no such relationships and it is therefore
highly doubtful that there is a relationship between smugglers and incidents of
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robbery or extortion. First, as chapter 4 stated, the smugglers have no criminal
record of robbery or extortion. Second, the files show that the smugglers in the
research group were rarely directly involved in robbery or extortion while they
were performing their smuggling activities. In fact, there was just one case in
which a smuggler committed extortion (case 101). It appears he was in financial
trouble and committed the act of extortion in order to earn some cash quickly.
The smuggling group as a whole was not involved. It is also worth mentioning
that a transporter in one smuggling group attempted to extort money from his
own organizer (see section 6.3.1), but this is obviously not the kind of evidence
that shows a link between smuggling and extortion in general.
It is possible for smugglers to be indirectly involved in extortion and robbery.
Police investigations of extortion incidents in the Chinese community often
reveal that these crimes are perpetrated by illegal aliens and asylum seekers (B6).
It is assumed that they commit these acts under duress from their smugglers.
However, the research group provides no evidence to support this assumption.
There is no information to suggest that smugglers ordered migrants to extort or
rob a particular restaurant. Nor do any of the files show that migrants who had
found work were forced to reconnoiter the situation at their place of employment
and provide their smugglers with information about, for example, the location of
the safe. Only one Dutch police investigation has ever been able to demonstrate
this type of relationship (Beljon & Vaarkamp, 1993; LCIDO, 1996: 13). However,
that investigation was conducted in 1993 and therefore falls outside the research
period covered by this study. Consequently, it can be concluded that the smug-
glers who were tried in Dutch courts between 1996 and 2003 were generally not
involved in incidents of robbery or extortion.
7.1.3 Drugs
Asian criminal organizations supposedly use the same routes, resources and meth-
ods to smuggle drugs and people simultaneously (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996;
Schloenhardt, 1999). In the Netherlands, the Chinese were heavily involved in
the import of heroin in the 1960s and the 1970s (B6, B7, B8, B11, B12, B17).25
Since the 1980s, however, Turkish groups have taken over this trade. Today, the
Chinese in the Netherlands are rarely encountered in the heroin trade.26 Instead,
they have shifted their attention to XTC. The Netherlands produces large quanti-
ties of XTC that is not only a lot cheaper than Asian XTC, but also of better qual-
ity. Chinese drug traffickers therefore buy Dutch XTC for a low price and sell it in
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and China. In a reversal of roles, the Chinese drug
importers from Asia have become drug exporters to Asia. However, some
25. This association gave the Dutch language the verb ‘Chinezen’ or in English ‘Chinesing’, the
smoking of heroin vapors. In English-speaking countries this practice is called ‘chasing the
dragon’. Both terms reveal their Eastern origin (Grund & Blanken, 1993). Today ‘Chinezen’ is
also used to refer to dining in a Chinese restaurant or getting Chinese take-away.
26. Some Dutch police analysts think heroin is still imported by Chinese nationals, but sold in
France or Germany (personal conversations).
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Chinese drug dealers are also involved in the import of certain precursors, such
as ephedrine, which are required to make XTC. These chemicals are difficult to
acquire on the Dutch market and are therefore smuggled in from Asia and East-
ern Europe.
However, the court files provide no evidence of systematic links between the
smuggling of drugs or precursors and the smuggling of Chinese illegal migrants.
Drugs were not found in any of the intercepted human smuggling transports, nor
did any of the investigations produce evidence of migrants carrying drugs to or
through the Netherlands during their journey.
Some smugglers turn out to be recreational drug users. XTC tablets were
found during several house searches of human smugglers. However, the quantity
was too small to warrant suspicions of dealing. Only six defendants in the
research group had previous convictions under the Opium Act (cases 9, 28, 32
and 97). Three of them were not Chinese and can be considered transporters.
Sometimes they transported drugs for Turkish clients, and on other occasions
they carried illegal migrants for Chinese clients (case 97). The three other defend-
ants with previous convictions under the Opium Act were ethnic Chinese. There
is no evidence that these people combined drug trafficking with their human
smuggling activities. One individual attempted to bring cocaine into the Nether-
lands (case 29), but his role in the human smuggling operation was minor. Due
to gambling debts, he had a smuggler’s car registered in his name and in the past
he had escorted a small group of migrants to Belgium by train for the same
smuggler. Another person was involved in exporting XTC (case 32). As an organ-
izer he also arranged transport for Chinese human smuggling operations. How-
ever, his contacts in the drugs trade were separate from his human smuggling
contacts. In this case, too, the two activities did not overlap. Finally, the files show
that one woman tried to help her boyfriend with his XTC business on her own
initiative. This was separate from her involvement in human smuggling (case 9).
The investigation team leader suspected that she simply wanted to try her luck at
dealing pills (B3). Her contacts in the narcotics business were later examined in a
separate investigation which resulted in several convictions.
A visit to the former Synthetic Drugs Unit (Unit Synthetische Drugs - USD)
revealed a significant difference in profile between Chinese drug traffickers and
Chinese human smugglers. The former often originate from Hong Kong, Singa-
pore or Malaysia, are approximately 40 years or older, became naturalized Dutch
citizens a long time ago and have a history of convictions under the Dutch Opium
Act. On the basis of chapter 4, however, it can be concluded that most (and at any
rate, the most prominent) ethnic Chinese human smugglers originate from the
People’s Republic of China, are approximately 30 years old, were recently natural-
ized and have few prior arrests, if any. To sum it all up, during the research
period, Chinese human smugglers were only rarely involved in the drugs trade.
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7.1.4 Socio-economic exploitation
Although the relationship between human smuggling and forced prostitution,
drugs or forced robbery seems to be weaker than is often assumed, migrants can
be subject to other forms of socio-economic exploitation. They have, after all, no
status and are therefore in a marginalized position. Because they recently entered
the country, they do not yet speak Dutch, have no permanent residence permit
and are unfamiliar with the laws and regulations of the Netherlands. This means
that they are often totally dependent on their employers, all the more so if those
employers helped them get to the Netherlands (Sciortino et al., 1993). So what are
the main occupations available to illegal immigrants?
A typical characteristic of the Netherlands is that there are virtually no Chi-
nese sweatshops in the garment or leather industry, as there are in France and
Italy for example. During the research period, there was just one case in the Neth-
erlands involving a Chinese tailor (case 71), but the owner, originally from Zhe-
jiang, was not involved in smuggling illegal migrants. He merely hired people
who were willing to work for low wages. During two different inspections, legal
and illegal Chinese migrants as well as illegal Sri Lankan migrants were found to
be working for him. Instead, the Chinese restaurant sector functions as a chain
occupation in the Netherlands that employs 50% to 60% of the Chinese working
population (ACB, 1990: 14). It is known to the authorities that many Chinese res-
taurants employ illegal workers (B1, B3, B4, B6, B7).
However, none of the large-scale investigations showed a direct connection
with illegal labor. There was no evidence that major organizers put migrants to
work in restaurants illegally in order to skim off their monthly pay. But the large-
scale investigations provide some evidence that inconspicuous restaurant owners
could well be involved indirectly. Some restaurant owners had advance knowl-
edge of family members or fellow villagers being smuggled into the Netherlands.
They were in contact with the smugglers and asked when the migrants were
expected to arrive. They would pick up the migrants, who would then probably go
to work for the restaurant owner (cases 9, 23 and 29). However, there is no evi-
dence that restaurant owners paid the smugglers a monthly fee for this service.
As explained in the following section, the restaurant owner would usually pay the
full amount to the smuggler, thereby eliminating the ties between the smuggler
and the smuggled people. However, it should be borne in mind that under the
working definition of human smuggling (Article 197a), these restaurant owners
could also be found guilty of human smuggling. By giving migrants money and
accommodation (in exchange for their illegal labor), these restaurant owners are
giving the migrant the means and knowledge to stay in the Netherlands illegally.
According to the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, business owners who
employ illegal labor are earning huge profits by not paying the minimum wage
and wage taxes. When fines are imposed, they amount to tens of thousands of
euros, the profit according to the tax authorities’ ‘conservative’ calculation (cases
83 and 84).
Furthermore, theoretically, there is a significant chance that in the unorgan-
ized, small-scale smuggling cases migrants are exploited by their smugglers. Rea-
98 Chapter 7
soning on the basis of the social capital principles, small-time smugglers are
more likely to smuggle friends or relatives. This is widely acknowledged in the lit-
erature on migration. Successful Chinese businesspeople bring family members,
friends and acquaintances over from China or Hong Kong to work in their busi-
ness (Moerman, 1933; Moll, 1929; Pieke, 1988; Rijkschroeff, 1998; Tseng, 1983).
The migrant receives little more than pocket money, if anything at all, in return.
Since this study is largely lacking in small-time smuggling cases, the effect of
such social capital principles cannot be adequately studied. The files only con-
tained one such case. A restaurant proprietor brought his brother over from
China. When he arrived in the Netherlands, the man began working, largely with-
out pay, in his brother’s restaurant. He described the end of his working day in
his diary: “When I finished my arms were extremely swollen and my wrists were
stiff. Then I had to wash up the kitchen utensils. At the end of the day, I was so
tired that I went straight to bed” (case 23). But he accepted his plight and did not
want to let his brother down.
In other words, no evidence was found to support the theory that smuggled
people are subject to socio-economic exploitation by large smuggling groups.
However, the social capital principles suggest that this type of relationship is
likely to exist with small-time smugglers or people indirectly concerned. This
could be inadequately tested due to the nature of the empirical data.
7.2 Smuggling fee
From a financial angle, a partial explanation can be presented for the lack of a
range of criminal activities. Both the hierarchical model and the network model
assume that Chinese human smuggling is motivated by financial drivers. This
was certainly the case with all defendants.27 The smugglers talk about profits and
losses, owing each other money and receiving payments. In the thousands of
tapped telephone conversations, no motive based on idealism was ever discussed.
One lawyer attempted to convince the appeal court that his client had acted out of
Christian charity. However, this did not prevent the smuggler to turn his human
smuggling operation into a profit-making business. In one tapped telephone con-
versation, he enthusiastically told a friend in China that he had earned over
100,000 euros the previous year (case 28).
The relationship that the smugglers in the research group had with their
migrants was therefore financially motivated. In recent years, various studies
have shown that human smuggling from China to the West is very expensive.
The smuggling fee for passage from China to the US can vary between USD
30,000 and USD 60,000 (Kyle & Liang, 2001: 20; Morse, 2001; Wang, 2001:
350). Passage to Europe is somewhat cheaper at around USD 30,000 on average
(Godfroid & Vinckx, 1999: 37, 63, 233; Vogels et al., 1999: 123). The Dutch court
files also confirm that smuggling involves such high fees. The highest smuggling
27. Most smuggled people will also have been motivated by financial drivers, as the section on
recruiters suggests. Nevertheless, the empirical source material on this subject is somewhat
scanty to substantiate any conclusions.
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fee recorded for the journey from China to the Netherlands was 30,000 euros
(case 98) and the lowest was 15,000 euros (case 42). But how does a migrant pay
such a large amount?
The prevailing (media) image is that a smuggled person plunges himself
into debt to the smuggler. In that way the smuggled person is obliged to pay off
his debt to the smuggler at a huge interest rate over a period of several years. Due
to strict sanctions, these payment obligations are said to have far-reaching conse-
quences. Some Chinese men are forced to become involved in crime (robbery,
extortion), while women can end up in prostitution.
However, this is not an accurate reflection of the Dutch situation. The previ-
ous sections showed that smugglers did not exploit their clientele. Furthermore,
this widespread assumption of debt bondage leaves little scope for the possibility
of other financial arrangements. One common alternative method is ‘prefinanc-
ing’. In line with the accepted views on smuggling, it is true that a smuggled per-
son has to work hard for years to pay the sum of some tens of thousands of US
dollars. There is, however, one crucial difference. That debt is often not paid to
the smuggler or smuggling network, but to the smuggled person’s own family/
relatives or circle of friends. The money is raised in different ways. Some do this
by borrowing from family. In such cases, the next of kin and the extended family
are apparently financially secure enough to finance the smuggling. It is also cus-
tomary for friends, neighbors or even local loan sharks to lend money at a certain
interest rate. Alternatively, migrants are known to sell their houses or land. The
important thing is the money necessary for the smuggling operation is somehow
available before the journey commences. When the money should be transferred
from migrant to smuggler is a delicate issue. How can the person being smug-
gled be sure that after payment he will actually be taken to the target country?
And conversely, how can the smuggler be sure that after arrival in the target coun-
try the smuggled person will not run off, but will hand over the money owed?
Apparently, the migrant has a strong bargaining position. As a token of good-
will, he will pay about 10 percent of the total sum in advance. Family, relatives or
friends see to the settlement of the remainder only after the migrant has arrived at
his destination. Following a successful journey, the smuggled person contacts
them by telephone and informs them that he has reached the country of destina-
tion safe and sound, and that the smugglers can be paid. A slight variation on this
procedure is when the smuggled person telephones his guarantors after success-
ful completion of each part of the journey, for instance from China to Russia,
from Russia to Germany, from Germany to the Netherlands, etc. Another method
is to place the amount due in the hands of a trusted third party. The smuggler is
thereby guaranteed that the sum is real and the smuggled person can be sure the
money will be kept safe during the journey.28
28. The prefinancing method is not specifically tied to Chinese nationals. Other nationalities also
use this method. Investigations into the smuggling of Iraqis suggest that the preferred method
of payment is to use a trusted third party, who is often a man of some standing in the local com-
munity and involved in underground banking (personal observation based on the analysis of
several Dutch investigations on the smuggling of migrants from Iraq).
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Payment of the smuggling fee usually takes place in China, but can also take
place in the country of destination. In the latter instance, the transfer is often
done by relatives or friends who migrated previously and are willing to act as
guarantor for the migrant. Smuggled people are usually kept in safe houses until
payment is made, which can take anywhere from a day to several weeks. During
this time, the illegal migrants are restricted in their freedom of movement. They
know beforehand that this is part of the procedure. According to Chin’s research,
in some cases a contract is signed before the journey starts stating, among other
things, that people can be held hostage (Chin, 1997: 192, 193).
Information from abroad suggests that the prefinancing method is fre-
quently used. Wang estimates that the majority of the Chinese who enter the US
illegally have their friends and relatives pay the smuggling fee (Wang, 1996: 53-
56). Chin’s field investigation carried out in the mid-nineties corroborates this
(Chin, 1997: 174-179). The use of prefinancing is quite appealing to smuggling
groups. Once the job is done, they get paid. They do not have to spend years col-
lecting small monthly payments. It can therefore be argued that the menacing
image of a powerful organization that skims off the wages of hundreds of illegal
immigrants every week is unfounded. It would be an enormous task for smug-
gling groups that smuggle a few hundred migrants a year to keep track of all their
clients. They would have to monitor their place of residence and work, their
income and make sure that they make their payments. This would not only be
very labor-intensive, but maintaining such a relationship with the illegal migrant
would also increase the risk of detection by the investigating authorities. Further-
more, the smuggling group has to invest considerably in the smuggling opera-
tion (buying travel documents, arranging transport, accommodation, etc.) and
does not wish to wait for years for this investment to pay off (Chin, 1997: 194).
It is not known what percentage of smuggled people use the prefinancing
method in the Netherlands. It is likely that confirming the use of this method
would be disadvantageous for some migrants. For example, the (person who
claims to be an) unaccompanied underage asylum seeker can hardly declare that
family members in China raised the fee for him or her.29 They are therefore
unlikely to talk about the method of payment. However, the source material is
also largely to blame for lack of knowledge about financing methods. During
police investigations, smuggled people are often only asked how much they had
to pay, not how and when payment was made. Still, in those cases in which the
how and when questions were asked, prefinancing was mentioned very fre-
quently. It is therefore likely that a high percentage of smuggled people use the
prefinancing method.
29. In 1999 the percentage of underage asylum seekers reached 68% (amounting to 792 people) of
the total number of applications for asylum by Chinese nationals (figures from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service). In 2000 the figure was even slightly higher at 69% (942 people). 
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7.3 Risks associated with prefinancing
The prefinancing method also entails risks for both the smuggled people and the
smugglers alike. As long as a smuggled person has not paid the fee, he is not free
to leave. Smugglers have been overheard in tapped telephone conversations say-
ing that this or that migrant “can be released [italics MS] because payment has
been made” (case 29). This implies that the migrants are not free to come and go
as they please. They are forced to remain in the safe house until the fee is paid. To
encourage fast payment the situation in the safe house is often fairly unsavory.
Smuggled people have reported that they were forced to sleep on a dirty floor in
cramped circumstances, and the police have actually encountered such situa-
tions. During a routine inspection because of suspected illegal occupancy, 45 ille-
gal aliens were unexpectedly found living in a small apartment. The police did
not have sufficient transport to take them all away and had to rent a coach (B4).
In order to make the stay in the safe house even more unpleasant (and has-
ten payment), smugglers charge all kinds of extra costs. Every telephone call to
China costs 100 euros (or 5 euros a minute) and food costs extra, too (cases 29
and 98). If payment takes a while due to unforeseen circumstances, a hostage sit-
uation can develop. Tapped conversations have shown that smuggled people are
pressured to pay. This can escalate from verbal to physical violence. In one inves-
tigation, the enforcer reportedly said that he had “had to use strong language
without getting physical” with one smuggled person (case 29). However, there are
also reports that “the pressure has to be stepped up”; “some kind of threat was
needed”; “a rougher approach is needed”; “you can hit them” and “whack her a
couple of times and then tell her to call home”. But once the money had been
paid, the enforcer was also told that violence “is no longer permitted”. In excep-
tional situations, migrants are tied up, abused continuously and forced to phone
friends and family in China who then hear how the smuggled person is being
mistreated, which obviously puts them under more pressure (Chin, 1997; Soud-
ijn, 2001). There are very few cases of such extreme circumstances in the files,
but handcuffs, clubs and the occasional firearm were found during searches of
safe houses in the Netherlands (cases 9, 23, 29 and 98).
There are also risks for the smuggler with the prefinancing method because
he will only receive payment if his clients instruct their family members or
friends to pay the fee. Until then, the smuggler will have received at most a down
payment on the total sum, which does not cover all the costs involved in the oper-
ation. Pieke presents an example of a smuggler who complained about the costs
he incurred. He had to look after 60 people who had ended up in his safe house
en route to Europe (Pieke et al., 2004: 93, 94). Smugglers frequently invest their
own money in the smuggling business and make a profit only when operations
succeed and they receive payment in full (Zhang & Gaylord, 1996: 113).
The smuggled person is therefore the key to receiving payment of a large
amount of money. This makes the smuggler somewhat vulnerable and attracts
competitors. The one who intercepts a smuggled person immediately after a jour-
ney is completed, but before the fee has been paid is in luck. He can instruct the
migrant not to pay the fee to the smuggler, but to another contact, leaving the
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original smuggler empty handed while he is the one who paid all the expenses
and bore all the risks. Of course, due to the illicit nature of the enterprise, the
smuggler is not in the position to sue his competitor. Furthermore, if a smug-
gler’s clients are ‘stolen’ from him, he can be held liable for the losses by family
members (Pieke et al., 2004: 94). To counteract such problems, one smuggling
group ordered migrants to pay the smuggling fee for a trip to Great Britain in
advance (case 98).
The files show that some organizers occasionally referred to the financial
risks (cases 9, 23 and 29). They warn each other to be careful and sometimes pur-
chase a firearm for protection. Enforcers are not only responsible for minding the
migrants, but must also take care not to allow strangers into the safe house.
Smugglers use secret codes for protection. For example, a road transporter had to
pick up four illegal Chinese nationals who had just arrived in the country by train.
He was instructed to look for ‘number 22’ (case 32). He revealed the meaning of
this code later during questioning. The migrants were told to avoid any other per-
son who approached them without this code and would know they were to go
with him when they heard the number.
Nevertheless, measures of this nature are sometimes insufficient or are used
too late. Despite the usual good relations between smuggling groups, three files
showed that one group actually stole illegal migrants from another one (cases 29,
32 and 73). One minder told how he arrived at Schiphol by airplane with a small
group of migrants. When leaving the arrivals hall, four armed Chinese nationals
forced him at gunpoint to get into a car and took him to The Hague, where he
was held captive for several days. His clients were abused and forced to call their
family members in China. When payment was finally made, everyone was set
free. The kidnappers asked the minder to work with them in future. He would
only have to tip them off when a new load of migrants was due to arrive. Two
other smugglers were kidnapped by unknown Chinese people and forced to dis-
close the location of a safe house. When the original organizer found out, he
quickly moved all migrants to another safe house. In one other case, there was a
plan to murder a member of another smuggling group for allegedly stealing
migrants. However, the plan was never carried out. In retrospect, it appeared
more to be a matter of miscommunication than rivalry. It turned out that a group
of migrants that arrived in the Netherlands would be split according to prior
agreements between different organizers. Apparently, one organizer in Amster-
dam picked up some migrants from another organizer by mistake.
It stands to reason that an additional consequence of the real or perceived
external pressure brought to bear by the risk of malicious competitors (on top of
the risk of criminal prosecution) is further strengthening of ties within a smug-
gling group.
7.4 Conclusion
Large fees are charged for smuggling people to the West. Amounts of 20,000
euros and more are not uncommon. However, the method by which these fees
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are paid by the smuggled people must be properly taken into account. If it is
assumed (or overlooked) that it is impossible for illegal migrants to get such a
large amount of money together, it is logical to conclude that they are ‘victims’
and exploited by their smugglers. It thereby seems obvious that migrants are
coerced into various forms of forced labor or prostitution. From the hierarchical
perspective based on the smuggling literature, it is also assumed that smugglers
are involved in e.g. heroin transportation. The Dutch files show, however, that
such assumptions are incorrect. In the cases of human smuggling brought before
the Dutch courts, hardly any evidence was found of a symbiotic relationship
between human smugglers and forced prostitution, drugs, extortion or robbery.
Of course, there is a possibility that as soon as other forms of crime crop up, the
investigating team chooses to ignore these or establishes a separate investigation
teams in order to keep matters simple. However, interviews with diverse police
personnel give the impression that smugglers were mostly involved in types of
crime that are intrinsically related to human smuggling, such as passport falsifi-
cation, but did not show criminal diversification. This lack of criminal diversity is
in line with the network perspective found in the literature on human smuggling.
One possible explanation for the lack of exploitation by smuggling organiza-
tions is the way in which migrants finance their passage. In another study it was
already pointed out that migrants make use of prefinancing methods of payment
(Chin, 1997). This entails the migrant collecting the amount required for passage
before the journey begins. When the migrant arrives at his destination, the smug-
gler is paid by his relatives or friends. This is not as odd as it may seem at first
glance. The literature on migration suggests that migration is not a decision
taken by just one individual, but that several people (family, friends) often play a
role. The method of prefinancing is advantageous for all the parties involved. The
smuggled person has the assurance that he will not be cheated. His family and
friends consider it a good investment, because they will be repaid with interest.
And the smugglers who run large-scale operations benefit in particular. It is
inconvenient for them to have to skim off the monthly pay of illegal immigrants
for years on end and increases the risk of being caught. By using prefinancing
arrangements, the smugglers will be paid immediately upon the successful jour-
ney of their clientele.
Instead, it can be argued that exploitation would be more prevalent among
the small-time smugglers, and in particular those who work alone. The reason
lies in the nature of migration. Social capital plays a role in this type of operation,
so small-time smugglers are most likely to attempt to smuggle relatives or
acquaintances and they can then be put to work in the family restaurant, for
example. However, because the research material used contained virtually no
cases of small-scale smuggling, there was too little evidence to support this sup-
position.
However, this does not mean that individuals smuggled by the larger smug-
gling groups are never exploited or abused. The use of prefinancing methods can
also lead to some particular hazards for the migrant. Because the migrant pays
out his smuggling fee at the end of his journey, the smuggler must ensure that he
reaches his destination and remains under his control. If the migrant were to run
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off upon arrival, the smuggler would not get paid. If a rival smuggler would kid-
nap his clientele, he also would not get paid. Therefore, safeguards are employed.
The migrants are locked up in safe houses and enforcers are used to keep every-
thing in check. In rare instances, people did receive violent treatment and techni-
cally speaking, a hostage situation developed.
Furthermore, when the prefinancing method is used, the smuggled person
obviously remains indebted to those who advanced him the money to pay the fee.
And as we know, these fees are huge. It is highly plausible that reciprocity
exchanges occur. The migrant tries to redeem the debt to his financers (family
and other acquaintances) by working long hours. In this way, migrants can end
up in exploitative situations, although the original smugglers are not involved.
Lastly, most of the case files in the research group deal with smuggling out of
the Netherlands rather than to the Netherlands. As indicated in chapter 4, the
Netherlands is a transit country in almost all of the studied court files. It is there-
fore possible that migrants encountered in the Netherlands are traveling onward
and are not exploited here but at their final destination. However, if we allow for a
network perspective, that also means that they are exploited by other smuggling
groups situated outside the Netherlands.
8 Government action – smuggling reaction
8.1 Introduction
The last indicator to be considered is the possible interaction between govern-
ment action and the organization of human smuggling. Considering human
smuggling from a hierarchical viewpoint, it can be argued that more repressive
government action leads to higher sums being paid for smuggling and too much
risk for small-time smugglers, which in turn plays into the hands of highly organ-
ized groups of smugglers. However, thinking from a network point of view, it can
be reasoned that stricter government action leads to even greater fragmentation.
Nevertheless, the point of departure for these propositions is that there is
interaction between government policy and the organization of smuggling. But
how can we determine such interaction? A simple way to investigate this is to
mark the year 1994 as a major calibration point for the Netherlands. In that year
Article 197a of the Dutch Penal Code came into force. In other words, it had not
been possible before then to convict anyone under Dutch criminal law for ille-
gally bringing third parties into or through the Netherlands (unless forced prosti-
tution or fake documents were involved). Based on the ideas on hierarchic
organizations in the human smuggling literature, this could mean that before
1994 – let us say in the pre-197a era – there was only a low level of organization
involved and that once 197a had been introduced, all kinds of government meas-
ures led to a high level of organization. On the other hand, although this com-
ment is not made in the literature on human smuggling, it is just as likely that
powerful smuggling organizations controlled human smuggling in the pre-197a
era precisely because of the lack of a criminal law approach. The lack of need for
cover could have led to the formation of large-scale enterprises. Only when an
active prosecution policy came into effect (and with it the need for cover) these
organizations would have to start working on a smaller scale because of the need
for self-preservation.
The next sections will look at the organization of Chinese human smuggling
in the pre-197a era. Thereafter the research period of 1996-2003 is considered in
more detail. It is a fact that the Dutch government started to take a harder line
against human smuggling during this period. This is shown by all kinds of anti-
smuggling measures that were introduced and governmental bodies that were set
up at the time. But practical limitations have also to be taken into effect to fully
understand the interaction between government policy and the organization of
Chinese human smuggling.
8.1.1 Pre-197a, part 1
Given that human smuggling has only been a criminal offence in the Nether-
lands since 31 December 1993 (which means that the law actually came into force
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on 1 January 1994), 1994 is an important dividing line in the question as to
whether changes have occurred in smuggling organizations as a result of govern-
ment policy. In this context it is logical to assume that human smuggling must
also have occurred before 1994 because new legislation always comes after the
occurrence of criminal developments. Criminal provisions cannot be drawn up
immediately, so there will have already been human smuggling activities noted in
the run-up to the new provisions. However, the question is how far does this
period go back in connection with the smuggling of Chinese?
Remarkably, it goes a long way back, to before the Second World War. There
is evidence of human smuggling since the emergence of the Chinese community
in the Netherlands. Van Heek, for example, researched the Chinese community
in the 1930s. One of the crimes that he addressed was smuggling. This included
the smuggling of goods, but the “smuggling of humans” is also mentioned under
a separate heading (Van Heek, 1936: 82). Rotterdam was an important transit
port for these activities. Van Heek did not venture an estimate of the number of
Chinese nationals who entered the Netherlands illegally, but he expected the
number to be very high.
A report drawn up by Inspector Van Vliet of the Rotterdam Aliens Police
Department also states that the Netherlands was a transit country for Chinese
human smuggling as early as 1920. For example, a Chinese national living in
Lombokstraat in Rotterdam was “under serious suspicion of involvement in the
smuggling of Chinese nationals as stowaways to America” (Van Vliet, 1920: 5).
The use of forged documents appears to have been standard practice.
“Reports reach me that prove irrefutably that Chinese nationals are entering our country
using passports sent to them – at their place of residence abroad – by countrymen who
are already in the Netherlands. When they show these passports at the Dutch border,
they apparently count on the similarity in appearance between many Chinese causing
the border official not to notice that the photograph in the passport is somewhat
different from the countenance of the bearer” (Report 63/3166, 1935).
However, no information for this early use of the look-a-like method is given
about whether payment was required and if so, how much. However, the smug-
gling of Chinese nationals before the Second World War into the Netherlands
probably already involved large sums of money. A Chinese man, for example,
made the following statement about how he came to the Netherlands:
“I come from a farming family in Zhejiang. We were neither poor nor rich; we were
middle class. But in the ‘30s things got worse and worse for us […] Then our former
neighbor came back from Europe. His father-in-law had given him money to visit his
family and told him that he should bring his family and friends back with him if they also
wanted to go to Europe. I went with him, together with four others from my village,
three men and one woman. My wife and son stayed behind. I was supposed to pay 300
Chinese guilders for the voyage. That was a lot; it was in 1936. We traveled first to
Shanghai. From there we sailed on a German cargo ship to Marseilles. In Marseilles I
went ashore, which I had to do in secret. The others traveled on to Germany and the
Netherlands.” (Sciortino et al., 1993: 12).
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Still, there is not enough information available about the organization of these
early forms of smuggling to substantiate any statements. Nevertheless, it would
be mistaken to disregard this smuggling of Chinese nationals as only small-scale
in terms of organization. For example, Wubben reported a large-scale smuggling
operation (Wubben, 1986: 119-122). This concerned the following. As a result of
the barriers to migration by Asians put up by Australia in the 1920s, they were
only able to enter Australia if they were smuggled in. However, the ships that
came directly from China were rigorously checked. Therefore a supply route
developed from an unsuspected spot like the Netherlands. First of all, the
humans to be smuggled were brought illegally on board ships bound for Europe
in Hong Kong or Singapore. The migrants would often be disembarked in Mar-
seilles or Genoa where they would be given temporary accommodation in the
local Chinese community. They would then travel on to Rotterdam by land. Hav-
ing gathered in Rotterdam, the illegal aliens would be smuggled on board Dutch
ships bound for Australia. During the journey they had to hide in concealed
spaces, which led to terrible conditions. Although they were given food and drink
by European or Chinese crew members who had been bribed, problems could
occur – especially with large groups. For example, in October 1927, 50 illegal
aliens were found on a Dutch ship in Freemantle harbor. They were so weak that
they were unable to leave the ship unaided. At least two stowaways had suc-
cumbed to the hardships of the journey and they had been thrown overboard with
the utmost secrecy on the open sea. Although there were a lot of rumors during
the subsequent inquiry about large profit margins, bribed Lloyds ships officers
and the involvement of shipping masters, no one was ever convicted.
8.1.2 Government action
Based on the (albeit meager) files in the municipal archives and on interviews,
the recognition of human smuggling in the 1930s apparently did not result in
active criminal investigations. This was because the State had another solution.
In accordance with the policy at the time, attention was focused more on remov-
ing illegal aliens and “Chinese paupers”. This was very possible because of the
lack of liberal influences. Take, for example, the action taken by the Amsterdam
police in the 1920s following the confrontation between two Chinese organiza-
tions, Bo on and the Three Fingers, who were incidentally later called triads in the
literature (Bresler, 1981; Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996). Supporters of these organi-
zations shot at each other in broad daylight, resulting in several fatalities. The
government responded with a pointblank round-up of suspects and a show
trial.30 Finally, 207 Chinese nationals were deported to China under Marine
guard (Vellinga & Wolters, 1966: 47; Wubben, 1986: 66-73).
30. The subsequent trial can only be described as amazing. Especially for the occasion, the renowned
Sinologist from Leiden, Duyvedak, had made up an oath to be taken by the Chinese nationals
involved in the case. They had to swear not to withhold any information on pain of being struck
down by the wrath of the gods. Then two red candles had to be blown out. The 22 Chinese defend-
ants and 72 witnesses were assisted by only one interpreter who could only speak Mandarin. The
trial lasted only one day because this interpreter had to catch a boat the same day to accept his
appointment at the Dutch embassy overseas (Voordewind, 1950: 134; Wubben, 1986: 75, 76).
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Systematic deportations also followed the economic crisis of 1929. The
Dutch government was afraid that unemployed Chinese sailors and worn-out
stokers would place too great a burden on the treasury. But the unemployed peo-
ple who took it upon themselves to start selling cheap peanut cakes in the streets
were also considered to be causing a nuisance by the local authorities. The sellers
were labeled a danger to public health and their street sales were seen as a dis-
guised form of begging. The local police chiefs were also concerned about tolerat-
ing successful sellers because they might encourage others to come to the Neth-
erlands as well. Measures were therefore taken in the mid-1930s in the form of
very stringent rules and active repatriation. Chinese illegal aliens, old people and
sick people with insufficient resources to support themselves were sent back
without mercy to Hong Kong and China. A special department was set up to cen-
trally register all Chinese nationals living in the Netherlands. This department
was responsible to the Central Border Control Department and the Aliens Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Justice and was known as the “Chinese Registration
Department” (Zeven, 1987: 59).
Van Heek comments that a voluntary return was not an option in his opin-
ion because the Chinese would be afraid of losing face if they returned penniless
to their native region.
“How they would be ridiculed and what shame would be brought on their family name
by these failures of sons who – oh the disgrace! – would have to be supported by their
elderly parents!” (Van Heek, 1936: 26).
The Chinese consul in Amsterdam, Yuan Tieh, protested in vain against these
deportations. He commented that the repatriates did not even ask the Dutch
authorities for support. Furthermore:
“these ageing sailors will have difficulty finding the means to support themselves in
their own country having been away so long, whereas here they are provided with their
daily bread by their friends, so here is where they want to stay.” (Report 63/3165, 1937).
It was to no avail. Yuan Tieh was informed in advance about repatriations and the
only thing that remained for him to do was to inform the local authorities in
China in good time so that help could be provided. A few months later Yuan Tieh
tried again to soften this policy. He pointed out that the situation in China was
now far from normal. The war meant that the civilian population had to contend
with enemy attacks on the one hand, whilst on the other hand there was a very
high level of unemployment and little chance of help from the local Chinese
authorities (Report 63/3165, 1937). He again made little impression. Einthoven,
in those days chief of the Rotterdam police, stressed the preventive effect. “A Chi-
nese national is very reluctant to return to his country without any money. Many
who were expecting to be removed left our country of their own accord.” (Report
63/3165, 1937). In his answer to the consul Einthoven added:
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“Furthermore, the question occurs to me as to whether it is responsible – given the
consequences – to allow destitute subjects of every country where there are exceptional
circumstances to stay in these parts as long as those circumstances persist.
Repatriation has been a regular occurrence in the case of Spanish undesirables returned
to their country whilst the civil war was in progress there, as well as in the case of Jews
returned to Germany, where in my view there have also been exceptional circumstances
for them since Hitler’s administration came to power. I am therefore of the opinion that
no exception should be made for Chinese nationals in general” (Report 63/3165, 1937).31
The only way of avoiding deportation was to have a third party pay a deposit of
1,000 guilders. However, this sum proved so high in practice that this way out
was actually impossible. Such a situation, combined with economic malaise,
reduced the Chinese population from several thousand people to only around
800 people in 1939. It was not until 1949 that repatriation officially ended when
the communists came to power in China.
8.1.3 Pre-197a, part 2
Smuggling of Chinese nationals also took place in the decades between the Sec-
ond World War and 1994. Although information was not available regarding pos-
sible illegal Chinese migration in the 1950s and 1960s, the archives and inter-
views show that Chinese nationals were certainly smuggled into the Netherlands
in the 1970s.
“It is so obvious that the journeys to Western Europe by ‘illegal’ Chinese nationals – or
at least their illegal entries – are organized by unauthorized people that I ultimately
wonder whether general measures to combat this evil can be taken at national level”
(Report 432/6830, 1971).
The illegal aliens often first crossed the Chinese border illegally to enter Hong
Kong, where they were given a new status by the Hong Kong authorities before
continuing their journey. A chief of police at the Aliens Police in The Hague
noted down the following route in a report to the Central Department for Alien
Affairs and Border Control at the Ministry of Justice:
1. “Chinese nationals, from China, but living in Hong Kong, apply for a “Certifi-
cate of Identity” from the authorities in Hong Kong.
2. They then take this travel document to the Danish Consulate in Hong Kong to
obtain a visa to visit Denmark as a tourist.
31. After the Second World War, Einthoven spearheaded the formation of the Dutch security service
and became its director. In honor of Einthoven’s services, his personal motto “living fishes swim
against the stream, only the dead float along” (levende vissen zwemmen tegen de stroom in,
alleen de dooie drijven mee) has been adopted as per undas adversas (against the stream) in the
official logo of the Dutch Intelligence Service (Einthoven, 1974).
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3. They then present the travel document, which now includes a Danish visa, to
the Belgian consulate in Bangkok, Taipeh, Manila or Hong Kong to obtain a
visa for a short visit to Belgium.
4. In most cases, the flight via Bangkok to Brussels then takes place very soon
after they obtain this last visa.
5. After they arrive in Brussels they either carry on immediately to the Nether-
lands, or they do so after a short stay in Belgium.
6. They usually cross the Belgian-Dutch border by car, which of course is easy
because there are no border controls” (Report 432/6830, 1971).32
No further details are given about whether some organization or other was
behind these activities. Once again, the Dutch State had had a simple solution
available to combat human smuggling, namely focusing on deporting Chinese
illegal aliens rather than on the smugglers. But the usual countermeasure of
deportation also started to fall apart in the 1970s. The next section will focus on
this shift.
8.1.4 Government action
It must be pointed out that Chinese illegal aliens mainly came from Hong Kong
in the years between the Second World War and the 1970s. Given that this was a
Crown Colony of Great Britain, many of them could use a British passport as an
intervening opportunity (see section 2.2.4 on migration). When they arrived in
the Netherlands they had to register with the local Aliens Department. If some of
them became illegal aliens after a time (because the period for which they were
allowed to stay in the Netherlands had expired), then their identity could still be
determined. Because they often also kept their original documents (passport and
ticket) for identification purposes, these illegal aliens could then be deported back
to Hong Kong again without any problems (B1).
Another striking aspect of that period is the handling of illegal aliens who
were caught without any form of identification. If an illegal Chinese alien had no
papers, the detectives would make enquiries in the Chinese community, during
which time the illegal alien would remain in custody. Papers would finally surface,
and the illegal alien would then be deported after all. However, on occasion one
and a half years went by before the necessary documentation was found and the
illegal alien remained locked up at the police station during all that time (B1, B6).
It should be noted that this was in holding cells at police headquarters, not proper
32. As a result of various treaties that were signed in the 1960s between the Benelux countries (The
Netherlands, Belgium, Benelux), the border controls were restricted to the common outer bor-
ders of the Benelux countries. However, pushing back the borders also produced criticism.
“Abolishing the border controls for people crossing our southern border has, however, made it
very easy to enter the Netherlands. Many foreigners are obviously aware of this, which is why so
much use is made of these border crossings” (Halma, 1979: 42). Such criticisms are also
recorded every time the European Union is nowadays extended.
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detention centers. Kalmthout notes that these temporary holding cells were actu-
ally only suitable for a stay of a few days (Van Kalmthout, 2003: 294).
However, this state of affairs was already beginning to change slowly in the
1970s when more and more illegal Chinese aliens from the People’s Republic of
China instead of Hong Kong turned up in the Netherlands. These Chinese
nationals from the People’s Republic of China were completely stripped of any-
thing that in any way could point to an identity. “The clothes look new. The pock-
ets are completely empty; there is not even so much as a handkerchief” (Report
432/6830, 1971). However, illegal aliens’ identities had to be determined; other-
wise the People’s Republic of China would not recognize them as state subjects
and would not be prepared to take them back. The willingness of the Chinese
embassy to find other solutions was considered minimal. The Chinese illegal
aliens from the People’s Republic knew this too, and therefore were deliberately
uncooperative. The only possibility that then remained for the Aliens Department
was to hold the illegal aliens from the People’s Republic of China in detention,
like the illegal aliens from Hong Kong, until they revealed their true identity.
However, the illegal alien does not know:
“how long he will have to stay there because the judicial authorities have no way of
knowing whether and if so, when the documents needed to release him will arrive from
China […]” (Coterell, 1982: 693).
The courts therefore ruled that aliens could not be held in detention indefinitely
because after all, they were only illegally resident and that was not a crime. If the
Dutch authorities stopped trying to unearth the alien’s identity, the judge would
order that the person be set free. In practice, the maximum period for which an
illegal alien could be held in detention was often about six months.33 After this
period the detention order had to be lifted and the Chinese illegal alien was set
free. In the 1970s he would then receive a reporting note. He had to take this note
to the police station once a month to get it stamped. In effect it functioned as a
‘get out of jail card’. When the holder of such a card was arrested on grounds of
suspicion of illegal residence, he only had to show this note to avoid detention
and continue his business. It therefore became known in Southern Chinese cir-
cles as [phonetically] hangkaiqi or ‘walking note’ (B1).34 Quite literally, he was
allowed to walk free. It also meant that his residence was in fact tolerated; he was
semi-legal and the situation would often lead to legal status. The reporting note
became therefore very much in demand. At a given moment, illegal people even
came of their own accord to the police station to get a “walking note” (Report 432/
6835, 1984). A report by the Hague Aliens Department indicates that this method
was already widespread in 1971. The reporter notes:
33. Dutch prisons and their mild regimes were probably far from a deterrent for Asians. It was even
possible to earn some money by carrying out simple tasks (De Vries, 1985: 222; Willems & Cot-
taar, 1989: 125). This six-month period still applies in 2005.
34. The Mandarin transcription should probably be read as Xingqiqi (5887-1148-2601) or ‘walk agree
period’.
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“You are undoubtedly aware that the Chinese community in these parts knows that not
having identity papers ultimately leads to a residence permit. This knowledge has
already led to a steady increase in the number of voluntary registrations of ‘illegal’
Chinese nationals” (Report 432/6830, 1971).
Nonetheless, this warning was largely ignored at the time. It is true that ‘walking
notes’ were no longer being issued by the end of the 1980s, but a similar avenue
was still open for an illegal alien: he could request asylum. This may sound cyni-
cal, but not all Chinese asylum seekers are genuine political refugees, as other
studies already confirmed (Kung, 2000; Wang, 1996: 60).
Asylum gave the applicant legal status, at least while this application was
being processed. If his application were rejected, he could appeal several times,
after which the application had to be processed again. Certainly until the mid-
1990s anyone who was in the asylum system could remain legally in the Nether-
lands for a number of years. And most people could ultimately obtain a perma-
nent residence permit because of the length of time that they had already been
waiting in the Netherlands for a final decision on their asylum application.
However, with the increase in the numbers of asylum seekers (see also table
eight) and the increase in the numbers of illegal aliens of all nationalities, the
government slowly started to take new structural measures. These measures fall
into three categories (see appendix two for a brief overview). The first category
consists of all kinds of measures that regulate entry. Various forms of border con-
trols are designed to ensure that the people who enter the Netherlands are enti-
tled to do so. The second category of measures is an attempt to make staying in
the Netherlands unprofitable in order to limit the influx of illegal aliens. Policy in
this regard focuses on illegal residence as well as the options for requesting asy-
lum. For example, if strict labor inspections make it more difficult for illegal
aliens to obtain legal or illegal income, this makes it more difficult for them to
exist as illegal aliens. The migrant could then theoretically choose to build a life in
another environment (displacement effect) or even not to enter the country at all.
The same applies more or less to asylum. If asylum applications have a low suc-
cess rate and there are no advantages involved, this should discourage migrants
from choosing the Netherlands as their destination (if the success rate was a
determining factor). A third measure – repression – approaches the problem
from a new angle. Because of the introduction of Article 197a, the government is
able to begin to focus on those who benefit from the arrival of illegal migrants.
This means not only people using illegal labor, but also those who bring them
here (i.e. the smugglers). In other words, the criminal prosecution of smugglers
is nowadays deemed a valuable measure to manage migration flows (Tweede
Kamer, 1995: 1).
8.1.5 Changes?
The preceding sections have made it clear that the smuggling of Chinese nation-
als has always existed in the Netherlands in parallel to legal forms of migration.
Government action – smuggling reaction 113
However, until the early 1990s the amount of attention paid by the Dutch govern-
ment to the smuggling of Chinese nationals and its organization can be consid-
ered minimal. Various reasons can be put forward for that. First of all, the lack of
a legal framework will obviously have restricted police action. Secondly, the Dutch
government had a sovereign remedy for illegal Chinese migrants available in the
form of deportation. This possibility has receded since the 1970s when illegal
aliens started arriving from the People’s Republic of China who knew how to
make full use of their rights. They could no longer be held indefinitely while their
identity was being determined and they were even given the possibility to obtain a
residence permit. But is the lack of government attention and information suffi-
cient indication that the influx in the pre-197a era did indeed have a lower level of
organization?
The attention paid previously by the government to human smuggling is in
fact insufficient to enable a good comparison with the present-day situation. It is
therefore not possible to adequately refute the assumption that lack of govern-
ment intervention resulted in a low (or high) level of organization of smuggling
in the early days.
Still, it is worth noting that a few individual detectives with knowledge of the
Chinese community were already expressing suspicions in old police reports that
the entry of Chinese illegal aliens was highly organized.
Furthermore, we should not immediately deduce from the current
(increased) level of government attention to human smuggling that there will not
be any more small-scale forms of organization in the era following the introduc-
tion of 197a. The danger is that we will simply look at ‘major’ organized crime,
which will cause us to quickly overlook simple forms of smuggling. There are still
intervening opportunities that allow simple forms of smuggling to go ahead, as
will be indicated in the following section.
8.2 Post-197a
The Dutch State started to pay more attention to human smuggling since Article
197a came into force on 1 January 1994. Article 197a was strengthened in 1996
(and again, in 2005). In addition, various old but also a number of new govern-
ment organizations became involved in the fight against human smuggling (see
appendix two). In this sense a stricter approach has certainly been taken against
human smuggling. Moreover, stricter methods of investigation cannot be seen
separately from two other packages of measures taken by the Dutch State, namely
pre-border controls and changes in dealing with illegal residence and asylum. It
is therefore difficult to assert which individual policy measure has what specific
effect on smuggling (see also Zetter et al, 2003). However, that is actually not nec-
essary for the purpose of this research. The general tendency has been for policy
to become stricter. In this sense it is still possible to examine whether there is a
general interaction between the organizational form(s) of Chinese human smug-
gling and government policy.
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However, a stricter government policy has also to be translated into practice.
It is therefore important to look not only at the theory (the legislation and regula-
tions as well as the crime fighting organizations that are involved), but above all
at the actual practice. Kwong’s research showed that inadequate checks on com-
pliance with labour regulations became even an incentive for Chinese employers
to employ illegal workers (who were by definition cheaper than legal workers)
(Kwong, 1997, 2001). This reinforced the attraction for Chinese migrants to come
to America, illegally if necessary.
There is often the requisite tension between the formal and the informal
line. This tension is caused, for example, by the difference between an aliens pol-
icy considered desirable by the government and the restrictions that apply when
implementing that policy (Calavita, 1998: 147-149; Müller-Schneider, 2000: 131).
There are therefore certain qualifying comments to be made regarding combat-
ing human smuggling. In the next three sections, we take a closer look at actual
practices in regard to combating illegal entry, illegal stay or the beneficiaries of
human smuggling.
8.2.1 Entry
Pre-border and border controls are far from watertight. They would require too
great deal of time, money and effort, not to mention the restrictions the Schen-
gen Agreement imposes. The Member States of the European Union who signed
the Schengen Agreement agreed to carry out checks at the outside borders of the
Schengen Area only. There is more or less free movement of people and goods
across the internal Schengen borders. Once the outer border with the rest of
Europe has been crossed by some means, there are almost no obstacles to enter-
ing the Netherlands over land. For example, anyone who is able to enter Europe
at the Paris airport will be able to travel on by train to the Netherlands without
much hindrance. The Mobile Border Supervision of Aliens Police does carry out
random checks in the border regions, but these checks have little effect because
they are carried out very irregularly and only on a small scale (see also Witte et al,
2001). The entire operation requires quite a lot of manpower (which is not always
available) and only a very small number of cars can be checked per hour (personal
observation on 13-09-2004). The impact on the total movement of people in the
border region is therefore almost nil. This means that the risk of being caught is
relatively small for e.g. Vietnamese transporters driving migrants from Germany
to the Netherlands.
Pre-border measures for travelers from outside the European Union also
have their limitations. The European tourist industry expects a substantial boost
from the emerging Chinese tourist market. Some 12 million Chinese are already
reported to have taken a holiday abroad in 2001 (Butler, 2003). In order to make
entry easier for Chinese tourists, various European countries, including the Neth-
erlands, signed an “Approved Destination Status” agreement with Beijing in
2004. The Netherlands Board of Tourism and Conventions expects, partly
because of the signing of this agreement, that around 340,000 Chinese tourists
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will come to the Netherlands in 2006, with that number rising to half a million
in 2009 (Van der Heide, 2004).
Of the total of 10,314 visa applications at the Netherlands’ visa office in Bei-
jing in 2002, no less than 95% (in the first instance) were approved (AR, 2003).
Germany’s Beijing visa office approved a slightly lower percentage at 92%; how-
ever, they received 89,202 applications (AR, 2003: 23). The lack of border con-
trols between the Netherlands and Germany also means that it is unknown how
many of the 89,202 German visa applicants traveled on to the Netherlands.
Although the rule is that a visa can only be issued once a guarantor has been
found, this rule is a mere formality. In theory the guarantor could be fined and
ordered to reimburse other government costs, but this does not happen in prac-
tice (AR, 2003: 66). Inquiries on the work floor revealed that starting a procedure
to recover money owed brings with it the risk – because of the guarantor’s rights
to appeal – that the return will be less than the costs involved. This is why these
measures are not applied (B6). The guarantor therefore runs little risk, except
that he will probably not be accepted so easily as a guarantor in the future.
In addition, the Dutch government is not able to determine whether the Chi-
nese tourists, family members or business people for whom the guarantors put
themselves forward do actually return to China. At the time of writing it is
deemed not feasible to oblige these returning Chinese to register their return
with the authorities in China. Suppose the Netherlands would give an applicant
only a visa on condition that he shows his face at the Dutch embassy once he had
returned to China. If the applicant lives in Guangdong he will have to travel three
days by train, simply to present himself to the embassy staff in Beijing. The
Dutch government has decided that it cannot impose such a burden.
Returning Chinese not only do not have to register their return; the date of
their return journey to China is not registered either. According to the Nether-
lands Court of Audit, it is possible to state in respect of only about 6% of all visa
holders that they actually leave the Netherlands after their visa expires (AR, 2003:
6). Given similar observations regarding guarantors, it can be hypothesized that
it is precisely the migratory forms of smuggling (with friends or family as guaran-
tor in a false application for a visa) that still have a good chance of success.
8.2.2 Illegal residence
In a second type of measure to counter human smuggling, the government
attempts to make it unprofitable for an illegal migrant to stay in the Netherlands.
To counter illegal residence, checks are carried out on illegal work and illegal res-
idence. However, these checks are not always stringently applied in all regions.
According to a strict interpretation of the legislation governing controls in the
catering and restaurant sector, an illegal alien must be caught working. Only then
can he be placed in detention. In the past, Chinese illegal aliens were arrested in
the kitchen of a restaurant if they were wearing a chef’s hat or an apron. Employ-
ers have therefore ensured for years now that illegal cooks are not caught wearing
this paraphernalia. There have also been cases where the kitchen staff quickly sat
116 Chapter 8
down at a table in the kitchen to read a newspaper during an inspection. They
were still illegal, and they were sitting next to a pan of boiling soup, but there was
nothing to show that they were working.35 Delaying tactics are also used. The
kitchens are locked and difficult to get to. Someone then presses an alarm to
warn the kitchen staff that the inspectors are coming. This gives the illegal staff
more than enough time to hide. At one time the people from the Aliens Police
were physically prevented from getting in for just long enough to allow the
kitchen staff to flee to the apartment above the restaurant (personal experience,
April 2000). The inspectors were then forced to break off their action because
they only had authority to enter the kitchen and not the apartment. The kitchen
staff watched from behind the upstairs curtains as the inspectors were forced to
slink away.
But imagine that Chinese illegal aliens are arrested. There is still the prob-
lem that it is difficult to deport them. If illegal aliens or failed asylum seekers are
caught, they do have to leave the Netherlands in theory, but it is not always possi-
ble to actually enforce their departure. Chinese illegal aliens in particular have the
reputation of being impossible to deport (B4, B6). The Netherlands Court of
Audit reports accordingly that a comparison of various nationalities shows that
“deportation to China is the most difficult” (AR, 1999: 19). Various respondents
blame the Chinese embassy (B1, B3, B4, B6). If the Dutch State is unable to con-
clusively identify a Chinese illegal alien or a Chinese failed asylum seeker, the
embassy will not recognize this person as a subject of the People’s Republic of
China. The person will not be given a laissez passer to travel to China. This situa-
tion is quickly reached if the Chinese alien in question refuses to say anything
about his identity or deliberately gives a false identity. This makes deportation a
practical impossibility. In other words, this problem dating back to the 1970s has
still not been solved (see previous sections).
The difficulties that there have been for years in deporting Chinese illegal
aliens have made some regions of the Netherlands a lot less enthusiastic about
intensive checks on Chinese catering businesses and restaurants. The Aliens
Police in many cities also sees Chinese illegal aliens as “trouble”. After all, you
cannot deport them. This is why Chinese illegal aliens are often given verbal noti-
fication to leave the Netherlands and then sent back out on the street again (per-
sonal experience, July 1999). These situations appear to occur frequently in prac-
tice (B1, B4, B6, B7), particularly if, for example, there is insufficient cell capacity,
not enough interpreters, too few personnel when they are arrested or if there are
problems transporting the prisoners because police vans are not available.
It stands to reason that human smugglers are also aware of this state of
affairs. For example, in one case the suspects spoke on the phone about a failed
smuggling transport (case 29). No one seemed to be really worried. The smug-
gled humans had been told beforehand to keep quiet if they were arrested. After
all, within a few days they would be back on the streets and able to contact the
smugglers again for a second attempt. Some of them had also been intercepted
35. Incidentally, this tactic does not always work. Depending on the inspector in charge, he may
argue that with no one else around, it is only too clear that the illegal alien was boiling the pot of
soup.
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before and therefore knew what to say and what not to say. The smuggler also told
them they could ask for asylum. They would then be sent to an Application
Center that they could simply leave on their own initiative. The wisdom of these
instructions became apparent only too quickly. When they were intercepted the
smuggled humans did indeed request asylum. They were then told by the police
that they had to go by themselves to the Application Center in Rijsbergen in order to
register for an asylum application. And indeed, they were released and shown the
way to the train station. But given that there was no further police accompani-
ment, it is not surprising that they never turned up in Rijsbergen.
8.2.2 Repression
The third measure to counter human smuggling, is repression. Since 1994 those
who profit from illegal labor and smuggling can be prosecuted. Over the years,
several governmental organizations to combat human smuggling have been set
up.36 But in spite of the tightening up of legislation on human smuggling and
the setting up of various anti-smuggling organizations, it would be a serious over-
statement to say that the criminal law approach to tackling human smuggling is a
well-oiled machine.
The countless consultative bodies, reorganizations and departments that are
concerned with human smuggling are an indication that the approach to human
smuggling does sometimes run less smoothly than first impressions suggest.
Although the appointment of a National Public Prosecutor for Human Smug-
gling shows the seriousness that the government attaches to tackling human
smuggling, the creation of this function was also born out of necessity. Partly due
to the initial low threat of punishment, local public prosecutors were reluctant to
take on human smuggling cases. A National Public Prosecutor is intended to
help to change that situation. 
However, there are still regions that are less willing to deal with human
smuggling cases in spite of an increased level of punishment (IAM, 2005: 45).
They prefer to prioritize crimes that have a much greater impact locally than
human smuggling. It should be noted that human smuggling causes very little
nuisance for the average citizen, whereas young people hanging around and van-
dalism cause quite a lot more. Therefore not enough detectives are available for
investigating smuggling cases. For example, in 2000 a lot of police man-hours
were taken up by the introduction of the euro and by the European Football
Championships (B6). Sometimes priority must be given to more urgent cases.
For example, there is a case on file where an investigation of a Chinese smug-
gling organization was cut short following a major disaster in Enschede: a fire-
works factory had exploded, taking several blocks of houses with it. All available
detectives were allocated to assist for months in the aftermath of the disaster. The
human smuggling investigation was therefore stopped (case 16). In 2002, the Mare-
chaussee was obliged because of political pressure to suddenly pay a lot of attention
36. For a detailed overview of different government bodies involved with the tackling of human
smuggling, see appendix two.
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to so-called “pellet swallowers”, passengers who had swallowed pellets of cocaine in
an attempt to smuggle them across the border that way (OM, 2002). Manpower was
transferred to this task from existing human smuggling investigations.
We must also not forget that setting up a human smuggling investigation
requires quite a lot of manpower. Furthermore, every human smuggling investi-
gation will by definition need interpreters. After all, these are foreigners trying to
enter the Netherlands, which means that a large part of the investigation soon
involves working with other ethnic population groups. Because telephone tap-
ping is frequently used in criminal investigations in the Netherlands, many hours
of interpreters’ services are required. Take the “GATE” investigation, for example.
This was an investigation into human smuggling involving Iranian and Iraqi sus-
pects, which took place from February to November 1996. The suspects made no
less than 30,015 telephone calls (IJzerman, 1999: 84). Because some ethnic
groups are relatively new in the Netherlands and speak obscure dialects, there is
often a lack of (reliable) interpreters. The police therefore spend a lot of money in
each investigation on (exclusive) interpreters alone. In addition, such investigations
usually last several months. Given the nature of the crime, there is very quickly an
international component to the investigation. However, cooperation with foreign
authorities is a difficult process due to all kinds of legal complications.
Policy decisions are also taken that affect how human smuggling is tackled.
In 2003, a lack of court capacity meant that passengers who had tried to leave the
Netherlands on a false passport at Schiphol Airport only had to pay a fine and
were then able to continue their journey. Policy was temporarily changed because
of the thousands of cases at Schiphol Airport (ANP, 2003). At the beginning of
2004, Haarlem Public Prosecutor Hartjes admitted “that the passengers with
forged travel documents are mostly asylum seekers or illegal aliens who have
been put on the plane by human smugglers [italics MS]” (Schenk, 2004). Neverthe-
less, there was no prosecution, let alone a police investigation. If the passengers
refused to pay the fine, they were not even summonsed to appear in court. The
reasons given were: lack of cell capacity, summons problems, and “they’re going
to leave the country anyway and the criminal organizations can’t be traced via
smuggled humans in any case,” according to Hartjes (Schenk, 2004).
In short, the government may well have created the possibilities in 1994 to
combat not only illegal residence, but for the first time also human smuggling.
However, in practice, this has not amounted to a full-scale war on smugglers.
Reasons cited are different priorities and lack of time, money or manpower. The
next section therefore considers whether government policy has had any kind of
effect on smugglers’ organizations.
8.3 Changes?
One indicator of the hierarchical human smuggling vision is that where govern-
ment policy is stricter, the organization of human smuggling is also more hierar-
chical. However, a network approach assumes precisely that more small groups
will work together. Formally speaking, since the beginning of the research period
Government action – smuggling reaction 119
(1996), a relatively tougher approach has been taken over the years to combating
human smuggling (and illegal residence). Nevertheless, the previous sections
have also shown that in practice there are a number of major qualifying com-
ments to be made. Either one of the two effects (stricter policy or holes in the
implementation) is stronger, or they cancel each other out.
The latter possibility is probably true. In the era following the introduction of
Article 197a there have been various investigations into the smuggling of Chinese
nationals. The results as regards cooperation noted and criminal involvement in
other areas have already been presented in the previous chapters. However, it is
striking that no significant differences can be found between the beginning and
the end of the research period (1996-2003). The method of transport, the type of
people involved and ultimately also the type of organizations that can be identi-
fied remained the same throughout the research period.
Firstly, for example, an examination of the contents of the files failed to show
any differences in the working methods of the smugglers over the years. In 1996
migrants were hidden in precisely the same way in the load on a lorry heading for
England as they were in 2003. The use of look-a-like documents did not change
either.
Secondly, the same types of people were involved in these forms of smug-
gling in 1996 as in 2003. The number of people involved who already had a crim-
inal record was not greater than in 1996. In both years the vast majority of the
Asian suspects had no criminal record. The ethnic composition did not change
either. Over the years Westerners and non-ethnic Chinese have always been
involved in these smuggling activities. The proportion of women involved can be
considered fairly constant. An average of three in 20 defendants every year are
women (see table 10).
Thirdly, over all the years of the research period, there were also no differ-
ences discovered in cooperation methods used in the Netherlands. Table two
showed that there was no structural increase in the size of the business in 2003
(which would imply a larger organization) compared with 1996. The case files do
not show any changes in the type of organization either. In all the years of the
research period more or less the same people always worked together. The way in
which the smuggling journey from China to the West was organized did not
change either. During the research period, smugglers received their clients by a
network of suppliers. The method of pre-financing did not change either.
The only notable change is a slight increase in the smuggling price. For
example, a smuggler told he had raised his smuggling price after four years for a
trip to America by 2,000 USD (case 28). However, for lack of information we do
not know if other organizers along the route also raised their prices. Moreover,
the price of more or less everything increased during this period, and we also
know too little about the demand to be able to derive a relationship here between
government policy and the sums paid for smuggling. A greater need for smug-
glers may simply have driven prices up. That greater need is not simply the con-
sequence of a stricter Dutch government policy as regards entry possibilities. The
Netherlands has in fact increased rather than decreased the number of visas
issued for legal entry over the years, for example as a tourist or on business.
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More importantly, developments in China itself make it only recently possi-
ble for many people to travel abroad. Although critics might say that the current
migrants from Mainland China can point to economic and political motives, it
must not be forgotten that these reasons existed already before (probably even
more so), but for a long time there was only very limited migration from Main-
land China. When Deng Xiaoping took power definitively in 1978, important
changes in policy began to be made. This period is also described as the period of
the Open Door Policy. This meant that the Chinese government was facing a
major catch-up operation in order to catch up economically after years of mis-
management. The aim of throwing open the borders (the Open Door Policy) was
to enable foreign investors to establish branches in China (Terrill, 1980: 923).
The restrictions that had applied until then on the movement of goods, services
and people were slowly lifted. It also became increasingly easy to leave China to
reunite families, for study purposes, for work or as a tourist. The Chinese govern-
ment began to realize that migration could ease the overpopulation problem and
at the same time bring in welcome foreign capital (Custers, 1983: 7). In 1985 a
new emigration law came into effect in China. Anyone who could show a letter
from an overseas Chinese sponsor was offered the opportunity of being given a
Chinese passport (Pieke, 2002: 11). In the years after that it became even simpler
and easier to get a Chinese passport (BuiZa, 2004: 40; China Daily, 2003; People’s
Daily, 2002; XNA, 2003).
The only noticeable effect of tightening up of Dutch government policy was
that smugglers became more careful and learned from their mistakes. For exam-
ple, one smuggler told another that he had read in the newspaper in 1997 that the
police could listen in on landline telephone calls and that it would therefore be
better to use mobiles (case 28). When it later emerged that the Dutch police also
listened in on mobile calls, the smugglers thought that calling from a telephone
box at the corner of the street would be safe (which was not the case). Some (but
take note, not all) smugglers also started talking more often in code: there were
no references to smuggled humans, only to balls or boxes (case 29). References to
false passports were replaced by references to booklets or notebooks (case 22).
The transcripts of tapped conversations show that smugglers also allow for the
possibility of border controls. For example, one transporter was told that he would
be best advised to take the ferry to England between three and six o’clock in the
afternoon because it was very busy then and the checks were less rigorous (B22).
But all these types of measures have nothing to do with a change in the setup of
the smuggling organization. There were no further changes in the smuggling
group itself as regards composition and structure. The smugglers only became
more careful in practice.
Finally, this reflection on government policy makes also clear that it is pre-
cisely because of the various cracks in the system in practice that it definitely
remains possible for individual or small-scale smugglers to become or remain a
success in human smuggling.
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8.4 Conclusions
Various government reports have made it clear that the Dutch government
wanted to fight human smuggling with all it had in the 1990s. One of the reasons
was that the percentage of asylum seekers and illegal migrants coming to the
Netherlands with the help of the so-called ‘human smugglers’ or ‘travel agents’
had been estimated at three quarters of the total number (see chapter one). The
idea was that by tackling human smuggling, the influx of illegal aliens and asy-
lum seekers would decrease. Whether this opinion was correct or not is actually
not relevant for the purposes of this research. We will also skip the debate about
whether smuggling is a positive or negative phenomenon.37 What matters is that
this opinion did help to shape official policy and this chapter is precisely about
the consequences of that policy. However, the remedy may be worse than the dis-
ease. A side effect of a more restrictive admissions policy and more repressive
investigation methods may be that more and more people turn to human smug-
glers to enter the Netherlands. There is then the danger that illegal migration to
the Netherlands (and the West as a whole) will become more professional and
more a part of the criminal world as a result. In other words, the services of the
human smuggler are becoming more important. Simple ways of smuggling are
disappearing, and only the large-scale ‘smuggling organizations’ remain.
The position of the Dutch government therefore has the potential of signifi-
cantly affecting the activities studied. A convenient dividing line is the beginning
of 1994. At that time, a new article of legislation (197a of the Penal Code) came
into force, which made smuggling of humans a criminal offence for the first
time. This article was tightened up in 1996 (and 2005). Based on the common
opinion that more government involvement leads to the criminals becoming
more professional, smuggling should theoretically have had a low level of organi-
zation in the period before the article came into force in 1994. The level of organ-
ization should have increased after the article came into force in 1994, the estab-
lishment of various new government institutions to combat human smuggling
and other policy measures making residence and asylum more difficult. How-
ever, it is often forgotten that this line of reasoning can just as easily be turned
round: it could be precisely the active government pursuit following the coming
into force of Article 197a that causes the previously large-scale organizations to
start operating on a smaller scale to prevent discovery. Scale reduction may there-
fore take place. The professionals from before would then need to be less noticea-
ble in their work. Large-scale organizations would be too noticeable and thereby
would present a risk of detection.
The data showed that organized human smuggling of Chinese nationals into
the Netherlands was already taking place before the Second World War. But there
are also signs that human smuggling groups were active between 1970 and 1990.
However, it was not possible to find enough substantive information on the pre-
37. Due to the restrictions on legal migration, smuggling can be considered a solution by potential
migrants. And without it, could the asylum seeker have reached the Netherlands? See for exam-
ple (Doornhein, 1996; Florin, 1996; Koser, 2001; Morrison & Crosland, 2001; Vermolen, 1999;
Wijn-Maatman, 1999).
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197a era to sufficiently investigate a possible change in the level of organization
in respect of the Netherlands. This therefore left the possibility of investigating
the period between 1994 and 2003 – the period for which enough research infor-
mation was available – to determine whether any changes had taken place in that
period. But surprisingly, no changes in the type of organization could be found in
that period. Between 1996 and 2003, the characteristics and type of smuggling
organization did not change. An important finding is that certain problems from
the 1970s that obstructed any effective government approach to tackling Chinese
illegal aliens at that time are still present. Because the Chinese embassy does sel-
dom recognize illegal Chinese migrants as citizens of the People’s Republic of
China, it becomes difficult or impossible to deport them. Such a practical look at
the situation shows us that Dutch government action needs to be held up to more
scrutiny so that statements can actually be made about the possibilities and
impossibilities of a low level of organization or even unorganized human smug-
gling. Contradictions were found. For example, economic interests take prece-
dence over a very strict visa-issuing policy. Human rights considerations place
restrictions on overly enthusiastic police action. In addition, political, economic
and above all technological developments have caused a phenomenal increase in
international mobility in recent decades. It is therefore not the case that the possi-
bility of entry has remained the same whilst the government has only become
stricter.
In spite of a policy that is sometimes ambivalent, illegal residence or asylum
has definitely become a less attractive option in the last 10 years and in that time
police investigation of smuggling has increased. However, this still does not nec-
essarily mean that only professional smuggling organizations (hierarchies or net-
works) pull the strings. The holes noted in the system in practice are very suitable
for maintaining a small-scale type of organization. A good example is the lack of a
criminal law approach to checks on false guarantors. A guarantor can operate at a
small scale and fraudulently invite one or two people each year with a very small
risk of being discovered. Even if he is discovered, there will not be any rapid con-
sequences because the State is afraid of long drawn-out legal proceedings that can
cost more money than they save. It clearly remains possible for individual or
small-scale smugglers to enter or remain in the human smuggling business. This
makes a migratory approach very possible. What is striking is that examples of
small-scale smuggling occurred more often in the few interviews that were con-
ducted for this research in the Chinese community than they did in the files. But
these small-scale smuggling examples would probably not have been picked up
by investigation teams
Still, the supposition that stricter policy causes human smuggling organiza-
tions to reorganize themselves, remains valid. However, actual practices need to
be carefully looked into. In the Dutch situation, the risk of detection has not
increased manifold. This is probably why there were no significant changes in
organization in the research period between 1996 and 2003.
9 Final remarks
9.1 The whole, the sum and the parts
Through newspaper articles and government reports, the general public nowa-
days is familiar with certain characteristics of Chinese human smuggling. For
instance, there are snakeheads who orchestrate the smuggling journey from
China to the West. These journeys can take weeks or even months. The traveling
conditions are not always entirely risk-free (the 58 migrants who suffocated while
crossing the English Channel to Dover in the year 2000 is an example that
springs to mind). The smuggling fee may be as much as 30,000 euros. It takes
the migrants years to repay this debt, often by working in exploitative conditions.
All of these statements are correct. But as the whole becomes more than the
sum of its parts, a disturbing picture emerges. It seems that the smuggling of
Chinese people is an evil business in which migrants fall prey to powerful crimi-
nal organizations. However, concentrating on certain other characteristics of Chi-
nese smuggling makes a different assessment possible. For instance, interviews
with smugglers show that they are generally not involved in all types of crime.
Transport is often provided for migrants through their family networks and social
contacts. Migrants themselves prove not to be hapless victims but consciously use
the services that smugglers provide. After Clausewitz, human smuggling seems
nothing more than the continuation of migration by other means.
Although these two views contradict each other, it does not necessarily mean
that one is right and the other is wrong. They can co-exist alongside each other.
Some migrants use smugglers who put them through horrible experiences,
whereas others are helped by a good friend and have no problems at all. The dif-
ference between these two contrasting findings can often be explained by looking
at the kind of data that are used as well as the method by which the data is col-
lected. The conclusion that smuggling is carried out by a powerful criminal
organization is often based on government reports and official statements,
whereas the conclusion that smuggling is carried out through looser social net-
works is often based on field interviews. Although studies based on fieldwork
generally do not use the conclusions of government reports, the reverse is not
always the case. Several government reports acknowledge that individuals or
small networks can smuggle illegal aliens into the country. However, these
reports emphasize the existence of other, much more serious forms of smug-
gling, the so-called organized forms of smuggling. These are encountered (and
combated) in large-scale police investigations. Field research would supposedly
miss these kind of smuggling organizations because they are deemed unap-
proachable.
The same issue emerged in relation to a Dutch study of cocaine trafficking,
which was based on, amongst others, interviewed cocaine dealers. The study
showed that cocaine shipments to Holland and the subsequent distribution were
not controlled by large Colombian cartels (Zaitch, 2002). A former Dutch direc-
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tor of the Prisma team (a police team dealing with cocaine trafficking) called the
research a valuable contribution, but at the same time remarked that the
researcher did not have access to certain information that actually confirmed the
existence of such organizations (personal conversation). 
It makes one wonder if the materials obtained through police investigations
do indeed throw a whole new light on the subject at hand. Zhang and Chin
acknowledge that because their sample is based on field interviews through the
technique of snowballing, there is a possibility that “any more organized and
closely guarded groups, such as those managed and controlled by traditional
organized crime groups, might have been unavailable to the researchers and their
contacts” (Zhang & Chin, 2004: 11).
It cannot be denied that police investigations have certain methods at their
disposal to obtain information that researchers relying on field interviews do not
have. Most noteworthy is the use of wiretaps, the continuous monitoring of sus-
pects and the ability to conduct thorough searches of persons and premises. If
there is a possibility that field interviews see only a partial part of the picture,
police files are most likely to present another piece. This thesis had the opportu-
nity to analyze just the kind of data likely to contain the more organized type of
smugglers: court files. By using these so far relatively underused data in a com-
plementary fashion with the known findings from field research, it is possible to
gain a better, more complete understanding of the ways people cooperate to
smuggle Chinese migrants.
This final chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents a
number of straightforward findings that have a bearing on the subject of organi-
zation. These findings are then discussed from a more theoretical point of view
and compared with other studies. Finally, some policy implications are high-
lighted.
9.2 Findings
This research is based on the analysis of all court files (88 cases concerning a total
of 172 unique individuals) regarding the smuggling of Chinese nationals, stretch-
ing from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2003. The analysis of these files cen-
tered on the main question, namely who are the smugglers of Chinese people
and how do they collaborate with each other? With regard to the first theme, a
closer look was taken at the defendants who were brought to court on suspicion
of smuggling Chinese people. Thereafter, the research focused on how these
defendants cooperated with each other. Based on the literature on organized
crime, human smuggling and migration as well, three different types of coopera-
tion were then distinguished. These are hierarchic organizations, looser organi-
zations through social networks and migratory ties. Chapter two further outlined
certain characteristics per type of smuggling organization, which are briefly
described below.
If human smuggling is organized according to a strict hierarchy, it stands to
reason that smugglers work together in fixed combinations for long periods of
time. The entire smuggling operation from China to the West is centrally man-
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aged and monitored. The human smuggling literature presents such organiza-
tions as being likely to be involved in other types of crime, like the narcotics trade
or extortion, for example. Smuggled individuals are also said to be at great risk of
being exploited by the organization because the migrants are not likely to have a
social relationship with their smugglers, they are indebted to their smugglers and
they have to repay the smuggling fee. Government suppression causes smug-
gling organizations to become larger scale, as small-time smugglers perceive the
risks in continuing their trade to be too great. The smuggling market will there-
fore become more professionalized.
However, the hierarchical vision is also contested. Supporters of the network
view could argue that social contacts and friends give rise to criminal activity, not
enforced orders from a top-down bureaucratic organization. Therefore, the
human smuggling will be characterized by various (changing) combinations of
smugglers. There is no central management or monitoring of the entire process.
If there is criminal heterogeneity, it cannot be attributed to the smuggling group
but arises from the conduct of a few individuals. The smugglers are not structur-
ally involved in the exploitation of their clientele, the more so because of the like-
lihood that these clients include family members and fellow villagers. If exploita-
tion occurs, third parties are responsible. Government suppression will reinforce
the network effect, resulting in more small-scale operations and outsourcing
between groups.
A migratory perspective, which is in fact a non-criminal market-based
approach, sees smuggling as nothing more than migration by illicit means.
Smuggling is not the sole domain of criminal organizations, but can occur on a
much smaller scale. Where the smuggling operation is effected primarily
through the direct mediation of friends or family members, there is little organi-
zation involved. The clients are likely to be restricted to family members or fellow
villagers. It is unlikely that diverse criminal activities will accompany this form of
smuggling. Exploitation, if it occurs, can be placed within the (negative) frame-
work of social capital. It is difficult to determine the effects of government sup-
pression. Greater pursuit of existing criminal groups will have little effect on peo-
ple who smuggle family members. By contrast, a broader focus on those who
violate the letter of Article 197a would bring more non-criminal people to the
attention of the police.
In the preceding chapters, we have looked at all these different focus points
to determine the type of organization. It turns out that all three views have empir-
ical support, although the network perspective is overall the most applicable to
the data from the court files. The migratory view appeared not to provide such a
good explanation of the data. In retrospect, this was somewhat to be expected as
smuggling via migratory ties is situated more on the unorganized end of the
smuggling spectrum. Such incidents are not always investigated and subse-
quently brought to court because certain ‘invisible thresholds’ of police practice
come into play. For example, interviews with government officials show that
investigations are more likely to be carried out if more than one individual smug-
gler is involved in more than one incident. In addition, tactical police information
has to be relatively new, that is, it must not be more than a few months old. Pref-
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erably, there has to be some proof that the ‘subjects’ will still be involved in smug-
gling after a new investigation starts (although such information is often only
obtained after the actual investigation has been carried out). Another important
reason why migratory forms of smuggling are hardly found in the data is the anti-
smuggling legislation itself. During the research period, the law stipulated that
pursuit of profit in relation to illegal border crossing was an essential element of
smuggling. This profit motive was sometimes difficult to prove in border cross-
ing incidents, especially if no follow-up investigation was carried out. Some spe-
cial forms of small-time smuggling are also completely absent. No sanctions were
applied to those who fraudulently became guarantors of visa applicants. Some
officials stated in interviews that the costs of prosecution would outweigh the
benefits. The chances of a conviction were slim and possible punishments negli-
gible. The result of all these restrictions is that small-time smugglers (the so-
called ‘mom and pop’ smuggling operations) are essentially absent from the files.
However, the remarkable thing is that in the couple of field interviews conducted
in the Dutch Chinese community at the start of this research, examples of small-
scale smuggling were prevalent. Other field research in different migrant com-
munities in the Netherlands also encountered this type of smuggling (Engbersen,
1999; Staring, 2001).
Although the data lacked information regarding migratory matters, a
number of conclusions on the more organized forms of human smuggling could
be drawn. These concern the persons involved and the type of cooperation. Before
these are presented, however, the reader should be aware that there is one peculi-
arity of the type of smuggling encountered in the files:
• The cases brought before Dutch courts predominantly concern the smuggling
of Chinese migrants out of the Netherlands. The Netherlands apparently
functions as a transit country, not a destination country. The preferred desti-
nation of most illegal migrants is Great Britain.
When we look at the smugglers involved, the following observations are impor-
tant:
• Out of a total of 172 defendants, 44 were non-ethnic Chinese (32 Europeans
and 12 Asian). About a quarter of all the smugglers involved were therefore
non-ethnic Chinese. These ‘foreign devils’ often act as large-scale transport-
ers, smuggling dozens of migrants at a time.
• About 13% of all smugglers were ethnic Chinese women. Although they con-
stituted a minority, some played a very important part. Five of them could be
described as organizers of large-scale transports. Over the years, these women
coordinated the smuggling of hundreds of migrants, controlled the financial
aspects and maintained international contacts with other smugglers.
With regard to the type of cooperation between smugglers, the following findings
are significant:
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• Large-scale investigations showed the same persons carrying out the same
tasks over a long period of time (i.e. several years). Because particular smug-
glers worked together in fixed combinations for long periods and were geo-
graphically limited to a certain city, distinct smuggling groups could clearly be
distinguished. Cohesiveness was further strengthened because within a
smuggling group, affective relationships were prominent from the start.
Group membership followed ethnic lines and also sometimes coincided with
family relationships. Any contacts with outsiders (e.g. people of another
nationality) were also quite stable.
• The relationships between smugglers within these groups were generally
informal and friendly. Family or shared backgrounds (e.g. common village
roots) were likely contributing factors. Although every smuggler could be
assigned certain core functions (organizer, transporter, enforcer, etc.), these
distinctions did not lead to a rigid hierarchy. For example, organizers were not
distant bosses but were involved in the daily affairs, even doing menial jobs
themselves.
• Violence within smuggling groups did occur, but not on a structural level.
Over an eight-year period, several beatings and three murders were recorded.
However, these should not be seen as evidence of the strict, disciplinarian
nature of human smuggling organizations. Nearly all of the beatings were
related to one smuggling organization. It would therefore be dangerous to
generalize based on this one particular case. The murders were likewise not a
sign of leadership. It was not strict discipline but fear and marital infidelity
that led to bloodshed. It is also noteworthy that out of 172 defendants, only six
people were charged with illegal possession of firearms. Furthermore, there is
no record of violence between smuggling groups in the Netherlands and
smuggling groups abroad.
• No evidence was found of a central organization controlling any (let alone all)
smuggling operations, either from the Netherlands or from abroad. The
degree of diversity found in smugglers and in smuggling groups (large and
relatively small) also makes it implausible that there is overall control. In the
same vein, it was impossible for one particular smuggling organization to
establish a monopoly in the Netherlands. Although some smuggling groups
were responsible for the smuggling of hundreds of people, at the same time
there were many others (large or small smuggling groups and also individual
smugglers) who were active, each independently using different methods and
strategies. With the absence of a central organization and the lack of local
domination or coordination, it is therefore safe to say that each smuggling
group functioned autonomously.
• Because smuggling groups act autonomously, a good reputation is essential.
Those who fail to successfully smuggle people across borders will lose cus-
tomers. Those who succeed in getting people undetected to Great Britain will
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see their business grow by word of mouth. The clientele comes from two
spheres. First, the organizers receive the bulk of their clients from other organ-
izers abroad. Although there is no central organization, this does not preclude
interaction between smuggling groups. Secondly, migrants themselves also
contact smuggling groups. They (or their family) choose to hire the services of
a smuggler for a particular leg of the journey. Some simply turn to those with
whom they previously had a good experience. Others rely on the recommen-
dations of friends. As one smuggler explained to an investigating officer, he
did not need recruiters. Potential migrants would come to him because of his
good reputation.
The smugglers mostly concentrate on smuggling and do not display heterogene-
ity in criminal behavior:
• No evidence was found of smugglers selling migrants into prostitution. Over
an eight-year period, only one case of Chinese prostitution was recorded.
However, the defendant turned out to have nothing to do with smuggling
women and was acquitted. Furthermore, the file gives the impression that the
woman entered prostitution of her own free will (although freedom of choice
is debatable when one has an illegal status combined with financial prob-
lems).
• Although interviews with officials established that a large percentage of rob-
beries were carried out by illegal migrants, this by itself is not proof of a direct
link with human smuggling. The court files showed no evidence that robber-
ies and extortion were carried out by, or at the instigation of, human smug-
glers. In the rare case that a file contained a link with robbery or extortion,
ensuing investigations showed no structural involvement of the smuggling
group, but rather the actions of an individual member.
• In no single instance did any Asian crime group use its trafficking routes and
personnel for the (simultaneous) transportation of both narcotics and
migrants. During the research period, there was also no evidence of structural
involvement of several well-known Chinese drug traffickers in human smug-
gling. Although a few Asian individuals were involved in narcotics smuggling,
the smuggling group as a whole was not.
• In general, smuggled persons worked very hard in the illegal labor sector,
which could sometimes end in exploitation. However, there was no evidence
that large-scale smuggling groups were directly involved in this exploitation.
On the contrary, it was only the small-scale smugglers who directly employed
illegal migrants.
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There is a lack of empirical evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship between
more stringent government policy and the organization of human smuggling.
However, one important finding can be highlighted:
• Over the last couple of years illegality and asylum have become less attractive
options for smuggled migrants. At the same time, more and more resources
are being poured into combating human smuggling. However, this does not
mean that only professional smugglers are in control. Some fundamental
problems in dealing with illegal Chinese migration that were encountered in
the 1970s are still present. The most important of these problems is the diffi-
culty in removing illegal Chinese people from the Netherlands. There are also
contradictions. Economic interests trump a watertight visa procedure. Human
rights curtail overenthusiastic police activity. These ‘holes’ make it possible for
small-time forms of smuggling to still exist and to continue to exist.
9.3 Discussion and theoretical implications
What conclusions can be drawn from the above findings? For the most part, the
court files show many similarities with field interviews from other studies. The
involvement of women (Zhang & Chin, 2002: 746), the lack of central coordina-
tion (Zhang & Chin, 2002; Zhang & Gaylord, 1996), the general absence of vio-
lence between smugglers (Zhang & Chin, 2002: 755; Zhang, 1997: 327; Zhang &
Gaylord, 1996: 7), the importance of a good reputation (Zhang & Chin, 2002:
757) and the lack of criminal diversity (Pieke et al., 2004; Zhang & Chin, 2002)
have already been commented upon in field research. It is therefore essential to
stress that these similar observations have been derived from such diametrically
different sources. It is not only the difference in field interviews or police investi-
gations, but also the difference in terms of geography. Most field studies are
based on source or destination countries, i.e. the People’s Republic of China and
the United States, whereas this study deals with transit smuggling from a Euro-
pean country.
Nevertheless, the presence of non-ethnic Chinese and the cohesion of smug-
gling groups are two distinctive additional observations. Field studies often miss
the presence of non-ethnic Chinese because the focus is generally on the Chinese
community, i.e. ethnic Chinese smugglers. The observation about the cohesion of
smuggling groups could be derived from police investigations because they
closely followed the actions of several important organizers for eight months or
more. It is likely that this type of smuggler is difficult to interview. These two
observations have the following implications.
The predominant function of non-ethnic Chinese smugglers in the Nether-
lands is to transport large numbers of migrants. Western transporters are ideal in
several respects. Not only do Westerners attract much less attention than Chinese
nationals during a border crossing, but the Chinese smugglers also lack the skill
and knowledge to keep large-scale transportation ‘in house’. They therefore have
to rely on outsiders with the knowledge to obtain a lorry and (fake) cargo and with
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the necessary skills and papers to drive the lorry. It is therefore logical to find Chi-
nese smugglers making use of outsiders. They transported large groups of (up to
60) migrants on a regular basis whereas ethnic Chinese transporters were gener-
ally only able to transport a few migrants at a time. In the case of these ethnic
Chinese transporters, they either accompanied the migrants through Customs at
Schiphol Airport or drove them across the borders in private vehicles or small
vans. Larger groups would attract too much attention because border guards are
especially on the lookout for suspicious groups of tourists or Asian drivers with
Asian passengers. But this also leads to the following hypothesis: without these
non-ethnic Chinese transporters, Chinese organizers would have smuggled a sig-
nificantly smaller number of migrants. Or, to put it another way, the Chinese
smugglers who use Western transporters can become important organizers.
Equally, Chinese smugglers who do not use non-ethnic Chinese will only be able
to transport migrants on a smaller scale.
However, when a Chinese smuggling group used non-ethnic Chinese, these
individuals did not become intrinsically part of the Chinese group. The transpor-
tation was merely outsourced. Sometimes a lone individual (such as a lorry
driver) was found; at other times a Westerner would act as a go-between and sub-
contract the actual transportation within his own circle of friends and acquaint-
ances. The relationship between ethnic Chinese and Westerners is thereby purely
instrumental. An indication of this instrumentality is that, in contrast to mem-
bers who are intrinsically part of Chinese groups, the Western transporters are
immediately paid for each service rendered.
Certain statements about Chinese smuggling need to take account of the fact
that Westerners are not intrinsically linked with Chinese smuggling groups. This
relates to the rate of criminality and the percentage of women involved. Non-eth-
nic Chinese generally have extensive criminal records. They are the more typical
‘career’ criminals who are involved in a life of petty or more serious forms of
crime. Ethnic Chinese generally do not have such records (although Asian smug-
glers not having criminal records from their home countries still leaves open the
possibility that they were involved in different types of crime in those countries).
Therefore, if all ethnicities are added together, the overall effect is a rise in general
crime rates. If the ethnic Chinese smugglers are treated as a separate group, the
general crime rate drops because they did not display heterogeneous criminal
behavior in the period that they had been living in the Netherlands. It should also
be noted that the inclusion of non-ethnic Chinese in this study (often in a typical
male profession such as lorry driver) also lowers the overall percentage of women
smugglers involved. Based on the court files, the figure for the Netherlands was
13%. Zhang and Chin’s field study revealed an 18% involvement of women
(Zhang & Chin, 2002: 746). If this study based on court files had not included
the non-ethnic Chinese, the percentage of women would have risen to 17%,
which is similar to field studies.
Another finding is that the same smugglers cooperated in the same setting
and carried out the same functions over a long period of time. Moreover, it stands
to reason that these individuals were wary of police interference and, to some
extent, of possible competitors. These outside pressures were likely additional
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factors in the forming of smuggling groups. The Chinese smuggling world in the
Netherlands therefore does not consist of individuals who form “temporary busi-
ness alliances” (Zhang & Chin, 2002: 758). The portrayal of criminal partner-
ships as loose networks nowadays all too easily disregards the fact that the rela-
tionships between criminal individuals can be relatively stable. The Chinese
smugglers are not only bound by instrumental relationships, but also display cer-
tain mutual affective interactions (e.g. family, personal history) that result in
strong cohesion (see also Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004: 81). These bonds do not
indicate flexibility and fluidity but durability and consistency. 
However, this cohesion should not be mistaken for proof of the involvement
of any ‘triads’. Human smuggling is a crime that is well organized, but by itself
that does not make it equivalent to (traditional) organized crime (Zhang & Chin,
2003: 477). The files show no triad groups smuggled Chinese migrants; nor was
any formal Chinese organization involved based on region, occupation or clan
affiliation (also known in America as ‘Tongs’). One possible explanation for the
absence of such more traditional criminal groups might be the country or place of
birth of most ethnic Chinese defendants. Hong Kong and Taiwan have more of a
‘triad’ history than does mainland China. But as table 11 showed, the number of
Chinese nationals from Hong Kong and Taiwan is relatively low compared to the
number from mainland China, notably Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces.
Although smuggling groups are quite cohesive at a local level, the term ‘tem-
porary business alliances’ is an appropriate description when the whole smug-
gling route is taken into consideration. It is well known that a smuggling trip
from China to Great Britain includes transition through several countries. For
instance, the journey from China to London may pass through Moscow, the
Czech Republic, Germany and Holland before the migrants arrive in London.
Different stages of the journey are taken care of by different smuggling groups.
Because the Netherlands is situated en route to Great Britain, the smugglers in
the Netherlands take care of this part of the journey. It is tempting to view all of
these smuggling groups across several countries as being connected through one
long chain where each group of smugglers passes the migrants on to the next
group. Under such conditions, it would be logical to expect central coordination.
But as the metaphor of a chain is an over simplistic view, it leads to faulty conclu-
sions. The files show that the Chinese smuggling groups in the Netherlands take
on assignments from several organizers abroad. Migrants who start out with dif-
ferent smuggling groups in China, e.g. groups A, B and C, can at one time or
another be transported together by the Dutch ethnic-Chinese smuggling group
D. As smuggling group D transports migrants for different organizers, the group
is accountable to all and thereby to no one in particular. It goes without saying
that group D is responsible for upholding its part of the deal as in any normal
business arrangement. This usually amounts to transporting a certain number of
migrants to Dover, for example, after which another smuggling group takes over.
Once the migrants have been delivered, group D’s responsibility ends and new
assignments can be taken on (or not). Furthermore, because the Dutch Chinese
smuggling world is made up of several groups, organizers abroad are not limited
to group D. For example, if a Chinese smuggler based in Germany has more
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migrants than group D can handle, he or she will simply contract these other
Dutch smuggling groups. In the meantime, migrants also approach smuggling
group D independently to ask for assistance in getting across the Channel. Rather
than through central coordination, smuggling is harmonized by looser organiza-
tions through social networks. It is not known how and why these transnational
relationships came into existence. The files do not contain enough information
on the groups abroad to assess the existence of affective relationships between
smuggling groups in Holland and smuggling groups abroad, for example. Judg-
ing from intercepted telephone conversations, it is unlikely that these relation-
ships are all based on mutual backgrounds or family ties.
However, these contacts and relationships with organizers abroad often go
beyond the transient level. Smugglers (as with most people) will usually stick to
routine. If one side is content with the work of the other side, they are likely to
continue this business relationship in future. Relationships with external people
(i.e. people outside the core smuggling group) will therefore consolidate. If an
organizer abroad is reliable, he will be sought out time and again. The same hap-
pens at a local level. If a Dutch lorry driver is trustworthy, he will be given more
jobs. Unless interrupted by police investigations, a temporary situation may last a
lifetime.
Some other observations might need more explanation. The files showed no
connection between large smuggling groups in the Netherlands and forced pros-
titution or other forms of socio-economic exploitation of migrants. Although this
tallies with field interviews, critics might point out that some smuggled migrants
endure bad treatment in the Netherlands. One telltale sign is the employment of
enforcers. In order to maintain discipline, large smuggling groups use enforcers
to beat up migrants if they make too much noise or otherwise step out of line.
Migrants are also maltreated to ensure quick payment of the smuggling fee. In
addition, accidents do occur during smuggling attempts. However, it is important
to point out a number of distinctions. Not all smuggled migrants suffer hard-
ships during their journey. A large (although unknown number) simply fly in
through Schiphol Airport instead of hiding in lorries or crossing borders on foot.
It would also be foolish to suggest that the smuggler does not care if his clientele
makes it alive or not. A smuggler might not be emotionally involved with those
he transports, but as mentioned before, he does care about his reputation.
Besides, if the smuggled people agreed to pay only after their arrival, this is prob-
ably more than enough incentive for a smuggler to make sure that his customers
arrive in one piece.
Such distinctions do not disprove the possibility that smugglers exploit
migrants. However, if we allow for the autonomous smuggling groups, organiz-
ers are only responsible for what happens at that particular stage that they con-
trol. According to the stories of some Chinese migrants, they were sexually
abused in China or Moscow while they were being smuggled. However, due to
the nature of the smuggling business, this leg of the journey is done by other,
local smuggling groups. Any abuse that happens abroad cannot therefore be
blamed on organizations based in the Netherlands. This would explain why no
evidence of sexual abuse in the Netherlands has been unearthed whereas the Asy-
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lum Seekers Medical Reception Centre (Medisch Opvang Asielzoekers) reports
cases of abused underage Chinese asylum seekers, unwanted pregnancies and
venereal diseases (Van Oss, 2004).
Furthermore, if repayment of the smuggling fee is due through some kind of
indebted relationship to smugglers, this is more likely to occur in the destination
countries than in a transit country such as the Netherlands. However, it is also
important to realize that it is against the smugglers’ interest to wait for years of
monthly paybacks (Chin, 1999). The longer the link lasts between the smuggling
group and the clients, the more risk the smuggler takes. If the smugglers were to
exploit the people they smuggle, not only would they have to keep track of dozens
or maybe even hundreds of people, but it would also leave them more vulnerable
to the police. Most smugglers therefore use pre-financing methods. The complete
smuggling amount is immediately paid by friends, family or entrusted third per-
sons as soon as the migrant arrives at his destination and confirms his well-being
to them. The migrant is then released from the smuggler’s custody and is free to
go. This does not mean that the migrant is free of all debt. He will have to repay
his friends and family by working very hard. But it is not the smuggler who collects
these monthly fees because the smuggler already has his share.
Whereas large smuggling groups concentrated on certain parts of the smug-
gling route, e.g. smuggling migrants from the Netherlands to Great Britain, the
opposite could also be observed. The smaller the smuggling group, the more
likely they were to be involved in the complete journey. A small-time, individual
smuggler is able to arrange for the journey of no more than one or two migrants
a year, most likely by direct flight. That means that he does not have such an enor-
mous logistical problem as large-scale smuggling groups have. But it also means
that the one type of smuggler who has the complete smuggling journey under
control is the type of smuggler who is in migratory circumstances. It also implies
that it is not the professional smuggler who is involved in any socio-economic
exploitation, but the small-time, family-oriented smuggler who acts because of
migratory reasons. These ‘harmless’ smugglers will not demand payment up
front or immediately after arrival. They do not use prefinancing. Instead, after
they have brought over a relative free of charge, social-capital effects can come
into play. Reciprocity ensures that a migrant feels obliged to repay the favor. For
example, he may start to work in the family restaurant for little or no pay. Because
family bonds are very well known in the literature on migration, providing labor
as repayment for help with migration is often not interpreted as exploitation in
relation to smuggling. Nevertheless, from a judicial point of view, it could be
argued that a person helped a migrant to enter the country and in turn benefits in
the form of cheap labor. However, because such types of smuggling are very low
key, they are difficult to investigate and remain largely absent from the data. Con-
versely, these are just the type of smugglers that will be approached for informa-
tion in field interviews.
Looking back at all the files, it does not seem very useful to attribute certain
Chinese characteristics to the smuggling process. It should be noted that most
smugglers (and migrants as well) do not stem from backward enclaves in which
time has stood still for hundreds of years. On the contrary, most smugglers are
134 Chapter 9
natives of Fujian and Zhejiang, the two most advanced provinces economically in
mainland China. It stands to reason that language and appearance set Chinese
smugglers apart from indigenous criminals (which, for that matter, will also con-
tribute to the formation of Chinese smuggling groups). But the same argument
also holds for Turkish, Somalian or Colombian groups. A foreign language or a
darker complexion is not an example of a sinological or anthropological distinc-
tion. Specific characteristics such as a sense of honor, a desire for revenge, cru-
elty, loyalty, manners and politeness - in short the standard repertoire of the
comic-book variety of Chinese culture - could not be distinguished. Furthermore,
the defendants did not follow any ‘code of silence’. Almost everyone talked during
police interviews, and a number confessed or accused each other. It is noteworthy
that men were more cooperative with the police than women, but this could just
as likely be gender-related, instead of culture-related.
Objections to the use of the guanxi concept are raised in this study. It is sup-
posedly only through this ‘unique’ phenomenon that social interactions between
Chinese and outsiders can be explained (Myers, 1995). This wrongly suggests a
very typical ethnic component. A simple exploration of other academic fields will
show the guanxi concept to be nothing more than a simplified form of social cap-
ital. However, using guanxi as an exclusive new method of explanation puts all
interactions in a social vacuum and hinders comparisons with other nationalities.
The unique Chinese characteristics that could be found were so few in
number as to represent only anecdotes. For example, one smuggler supposedly
brought 108 migrants at one time to Great Britain and thereby established her
reputation (Meeus, 2001). The fact that 108 is not a round number suggests that
the figure is correct. However, this is most likely an apocryphal story with sym-
bolic meaning for the Chinese community (Buddhism). Does it matter if a West-
erner missed any deeper implications? Probably not, because everyone will pick
up the connotations. The number 108 simply symbolizes a large number of peo-
ple that the smuggler was able to transport, which will enhance the smuggler’s
reputation.
Ultimately this study also leaves some questions unanswered. The files
largely deal with transit smuggling. But an unspecified number of illegal Chinese
migrants are also living in the Netherlands. Were they smuggled in? If so, who
was responsible for bringing them in, large-scale smugglers or the mom-and-pop
ones? And why would they choose the Netherlands as a destination country? Only
fieldwork can tell us more, as case files have insufficient information in this
regard.
Not every aspect of human smuggling is understood. Skeldon noted, “of all
the unknowns associated with [smuggling], perhaps the most intriguing is that of
the economics of the trade” (Skeldon, 2000: 21). Maybe some smuggling fees are
huge (e.g. 30,000 euros) because the journey is handled by several autonomous
organizers and their entourage. Each organizer charges several thousands of dol-
lars for his or her services, which ends up in a large total amount. It is therefore
possible that other migrants who paid far less (e.g. 10,000 euros) were able to
arrange for some parts of the journey themselves and only had to use a smuggler
just before they reached the final destination. Another big question is how smug-
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glers along the route receive their profits. Chin’s earlier field study among smug-
gled migrants mentioned that it was unclear how profits were split or how money
was actually transferred (Chin, 1999: 34). Follow-up field research among smug-
glers did not clarify this question (Zhang & Chin, 2002). Did smugglers use
Informal Money Value Transfer Systems? How does a smuggler in Europe obtain
his money if prefinancing methods are used? Unfortunately the police files were
unable to shed any new light on financial matters because that kind of informa-
tion is largely absent from the files. In addition, it is unlikely that the problem
will be alleviated in the near future, especially since the Dutch anti-human smug-
gling legislation was amended in 2005. The legislation now no longer describes
the offence of human smuggling as being the offering of help in illegal access
and transit in the pursuit of profit. This makes for easier prosecutions, but there is
less incentive to look at financial flows. As we grow to know more and more
about smuggling routes, methods and operations, a gap in our understanding of
the financial side becomes all the more jarring.
It could not be established why female smugglers led some of the largest
smuggling organizations. Maybe it was because human smuggling is generally
not seen in migrant communities as a serious crime, there is no social stigma
attached and it presents a good opportunity to make money. Maybe human smug-
gling is a male-oriented business as long as the smuggler and the migrant come
from different ethnic backgrounds. It is possible that, when the smuggler and the
migrant come from the same or a similar ethnic background, women are more
likely to become involved. The files showed that women accompanied migrants
through Customs checks, accommodated them in safe houses or even orches-
trated the smuggling. These are all activities that necessitate close contact with
the migrant. Non-ethnic Chinese were only involved in mass transportation (or
the occasional sale of false passports). This does not warrant any interaction with
the migrants. Maybe women are considered less threatening and thus have a
head start at building a good reputation. If smuggled migrants are only seen as
victims, a smuggler’s reputation might seem irrelevant. But as is often shown in
field research, migrants are not hapless victims but consciously use the services
that smugglers provide (Pieke et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the files indicate that
the rationale behind choosing a smuggling organization based on female man-
agement would be flawed. Some of the worst mistreatment of migrants occurred
in female-led organizations.
Government sources contained too few materials to adequately research how
the smuggling of Chinese nationals changed between the Second World War and
1996. Retired investigators were also unable to shed more light on this subject.
In their heyday, human smuggling was not prioritized. Consequently, the lack of
data made it difficult to research the supposedly evolving interaction between
government and human smuggling organizations. Theoretically though, it is pos-
sible that more repressive government action will force human smugglers to
organize themselves differently. However, a careful look at actual practices makes
it very plausible that there is still no need for any significant changes. In the
Dutch situation, a lack of manpower, time and resources, as well as different pri-
orities, have certainly not increased the risk of detection (IAM, 2005). Keep in
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mind, though, that other research has already shown that there is no room for
assumptions. Spener points out that between 1977 and 1984 - an era before bor-
der security was heightened - about 80% of Mexican migrants crossed the Amer-
ican border with the help of ‘coyotes’ (human smugglers) on their first attempt
(Singer & Massey, 1998: 586) in (Spener, 2001: 147). The only way to understand
more about earlier forms of Chinese human smuggling organizations in the
Netherlands is to interview senior Chinese citizens.
Future research should also be alert for possible changes. One such possibil-
ity is the growth of Chinese prostitution. During the research period, Chinese
prostitution in general was a very small matter in the Netherlands. However,
from around 2003 police officers started to report the presence of more Chinese
prostitutes. Even Dutch newspapers reported the existence of Chinese hairdress-
ing salons that started to provide extra-curricular services to customers (Smits,
2005). It is unclear who these prostitutes are, where they came from and how
they became involved in this line of work. Are more migrants arriving in the
Netherlands without any social capital? Or do smugglers become involved in traf-
ficking?
It is also possible that human smuggling organizations evolve. Some suc-
cessful large-scale smugglers earn large amounts of money, which propels them
into a different league. During the research period, it had already been observed
by police officers from the Criminal Intelligence Unit that some organizers were
given a lot of respect in the Chinese (criminal) community. When they went out
at night they would surround themselves with bodyguards, gamble away a lot of
money, and have other people make room for them. Such behavior is bound to
attract attention and impress other ‘criminally inclined’ people. It is therefore not
impossible that some sort of fusion could occur. Successful human smugglers
might be approached to participate as an investor in different criminal ventures.
Or a smuggler might need the assistance of somebody wanting to clear an out-
standing debt. Most intra-group beatings that were noted in the files were alleg-
edly outsourced. Maybe it is therefore a matter of time before Chinese smugglers
link up with Chinese drug dealers, for example. Because the files show that most
relationships become consolidated over time, it is therefore possible that in
future Chinese human smugglers will become more structurally involved in
other forms of crime. Likewise, an enduring instrumental relationship between a
Chinese organizer and a Western transporter can also change into an affective
relationship. At that point, it is possible that the hitherto homogeneous smug-
gling groups will also become more ethnically mixed.
Finally, it should be noted that this thesis has focused solely on Chinese
human smuggling. But can the findings from this study also be applied to the
smuggling of people from other ethnic backgrounds? We must remember that
many different nationalities are also being smuggled by their compatriots and
others. In the Netherlands, Chinese nationals are far from being the largest
group (IAM, 2001a, 2002, 2005). More comparative research into other smug-
gled nationalities is therefore needed.
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9.4 Strategic and policy implications
In the preceding chapters we have seen who the smugglers are and how they
cooperate. When a police investigator read a previous version of this manuscript,
however, he commented that it was very interesting but actually of no practical
use for the ‘work floor’. A smuggling case would be investigated and if two or
more people were working together, Article 140 of the Dutch Penal Code could be
applied. This article states that participation in an organization whose purpose is
to commit crimes is punishable by six years in prison. There is no definition of
the characteristics that such an organization must have. So who cares how smug-
glers organize themselves?
In this regard the aforementioned police investigator is probably right: it
does not matter to the prosecutor how defendants operate together. On the other
hand, there is a practical reason for considering what kind of organization is
involved in (Chinese) human smuggling. In the long run, the hierarchical, net-
work and migratory perspectives do have certain consequences as regards police
investigations. A blueprint of hierarchical smuggling organizations gives the
police a clear focus. Once the leadership is eliminated, the organization suppos-
edly crumbles. Because leaders carefully hide themselves behind front men, long-
term investigations (and lots of money) are needed. From a network point of view,
on the other hand, investigators should focus on identifying nodes and facilita-
tors. Taking them out would severely cripple smuggling groups as they would no
longer have the right contacts. Such police tactics are known in the Netherlands
as ‘short blows’. Notice that in the traditional hierarchical view, these facilitators
were seen as only the inferior pawns to the important bosses (Kleemans & Kruis-
sink, 1999). A market-based approach is to look for structural solutions because
as long as there is a market for goods or services that cannot be obtained legally,
illegal alternatives will be created.
Because all three views of the organization of the smuggling of Chinese
migrants have some truth in them, these different strategies all have their strong
points and weak (or impractical) points. Let us consider some aspects, starting
with the hierarchical outlook.
9.4.1 Hierarchical policy
The files show that smuggling groups exist and are quite stable. There is a leader
in the person of an organizer. It is therefore proper for the judicial authorities to
prosecute these people. In order to make a strong case the prosecution generally
tries to prove the involvement of these organizers in as many smuggling attempts
as possible. This leads to long-term investigations that take at least several
months but can even stretch over a year.
However, it is debatable whether the end always justifies the means. After
several appeals, organizers rarely receive prison sentences that are longer than
three or four years. It is therefore noteworthy that the average prison sentence for
a transporter who is caught in flagrante delicto is 18 months. Such cases only take
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a couple of days to document and therefore only cost a fraction of long-term
investigations. So why would the government invest such a disparate amount of
time in the prosecution of an organizer? Officials may insist that there is an
important difference between a transporter and an organizer. It is not difficult to
prove that a transporter is involved, but it is supposedly very difficult to prove that
an organizer is involved. Furthermore, a transporter can easily be replaced
whereas the arrest of the organizer will discontinue the smuggling operation.
But let us reconsider certain findings from this study. The coordination of
smuggling is very time-consuming. Organizers are therefore not ‘distant master-
minds’. Instead, they are heavily involved in the day-to-day affairs of human
smuggling (see also Kleemans & Van de Bunt, 2003: 102). Once an organizer was
identified, his involvement could soon be confirmed. At this point, usual police
practice takes over. The prosecution wants to make sure they have a strong case
and therefore wants to establish the scale of the smuggling and the importance of
the organizer by recording as many smuggling attempts as possible. For this rea-
son, the investigation is allowed to continue for months. At the same time,
because of telephone interceptions, the police will know beforehand (if they are
promptly translated) when a smuggling attempt will take place and try to sabo-
tage it. Failed smuggling attempts also erode the reputation of the organizer, cre-
ate financial troubles for the people involved and therefore create friction
between smugglers.
But do we really need to prove the organizer’s involvement in another twelve
smuggling attempts that will happen in the future simply to place him in a more
central role? It is also not entirely without (political) risk. What if a smuggling
attempt succeeds? What if a smuggling attempt is prevented by the police but
ensuing friction among smugglers (blaming each other) results in violent con-
frontations? What if a transporter is detained and the organizer finds a replace-
ment who would otherwise not have been involved?
Furthermore, the focus on organized criminals is in itself a problem. It is
true that organizers who manage large-scale smuggling groups are responsible
for the smuggling of hundreds of migrants a year. But at the same time it should
not be forgotten that individuals and very small groups are also active. As was
argued in chapter eight, the professional smuggler does not completely dominate
the field. Individual smugglers can still use intervening opportunities like busi-
ness or family visas. These examples are very low key and therefore difficult to
investigate. It is noteworthy that such cases are largely absent from the court files
for precisely these reasons. While on the other hand, examples of small-time
smugglers are quite easy to find through fieldwork. It is therefore not a remote
possibility that more people are smuggled into the country by individuals than by
large smuggling groups.
9.4.2 Network policy
This brings us to a networking approach to counter human smuggling. In this
approach, facilitators and nodes are important targets. They are essential to the
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functioning of the network. The loss of important individuals or any mishap
along the route would weaken or bring on the demise of a smuggling group
(Zhang & Chin, 2002: 763).
However, the files show that there are also problems with this approach.
Although the theory is sound, reality by and large nullifies this strategy. The idea
of essentiality is difficult to apply. Although it is a good idea to take out key fig-
ures, the problem is that it seems that every smuggler is easily replaced. Knowl-
edge is shared within the smuggling group, probably due to the affective nature
of these organizations. Besides, smuggling groups do not depend on any one spe-
cific facilitator. A prime example is the Dover case. The Chinese used other
means after the non-ethnic Chinese transporters were prosecuted. And once the
Chinese group was arrested, others took over. Although at the time of writing
those others have also been arrested, officials believe that they have now been
replaced, too (B6).
The files also show that when organizers, transporters, etc. are arrested that
still leaves many others in place. For budgetary, judicial or other reasons, not eve-
rybody involved can be prosecuted. It is very likely that these remaining others
will somehow learn from the experience, fill the gaps and continue the smug-
gling business. In addition, putting somebody in prison does not stop him from
transferring his expertise (or contacts) to his next of kin, as could be observed in
some instances.
The network approach has a better chance if its implications are considered.
The smuggling of Chinese nationals does not happen in a vacuum in the Nether-
lands (or any other country). As these research findings make clear, the overall
smuggling process never depends on one essential link, simply because it does
not follow a chain structure. Therefore, even if one Dutch group were completely
taken out by everyone involved being arrested; their contacts in Germany or the
Czech Republic would simply go to the next Dutch organizer on their list. This
can only be countered by transnational police cooperation. However, the interna-
tional exchange of police information about smuggling (as well as other types of
criminality) has to date been scarce.
9.4.3 Market-based policy
A market-based approach allows for some interesting theoretical solutions. How-
ever, it is unlikely that these will be put into effect. For instance, it can be argued
that migrants use a smuggler because they cannot enter a certain country by legal
means. Therefore, handing out visas to all applicants would simply spoil the
smuggling market. However, such a solution would obviously be too radical and
defeat the purpose. A slight variation on this theme has the government replacing
the smuggler’s function. If migrants are willing to pay exorbitant prices to be
smuggled, the government should undercut these smugglers by selling long-
term visas for less money. This would give the migrants the right to work legally.
For more details on this train of thought, see (Jandl, 2005).
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Another method is to take into consideration what aim Chinese migrants
have: making money. Wang proposes more frequent checks on employers to dis-
courage the hiring of illegal labor (Wang, 2001: Wang, 1996). In the Netherlands,
illegal Chinese migrants are not employed in sweatshops (at the time of writing,
only one Chinese sewing atelier had been discovered in the Netherlands);
instead, they are usually employed in the Chinese restaurant sector. It therefore
stands to reason that this illegal labor should be made more costly to the restaura-
teur than legal labor. This course of action would make the Netherlands unattrac-
tive as a place for Chinese illegal labor, and thus might lead to fewer migrants
deciding to make the Netherlands their destination country. The experience of the
Aliens Police (and some field interviews) shows that repeated controls indeed make
restaurant owners wary of heavy fines (8000 euros per detected illegal laborer).
They therefore employ fewer illegal dishwashers and cooks than they used to.
Critics may point out that such a solution is flawed as smuggled Chinese
nationals escape persecution and have nothing to do with economic gains,
although evidence to support these claims seems unconvincing, see also (Pieke,
2002). The biggest problem, however, is that controlling the Dutch labor market
is only a partial solution. Because the Netherlands also acts as a transit country,
better control of the Chinese restaurant sector in the Netherlands is of no use as
regards stopping transit smuggling. Other countries have to extend their control
of the illegal Chinese labor market as well. At the same time, we need to realize
that migration factors also play a key role. Therefore, if we allow for the workings
of social capital, illegal migration is not something that can suddenly be halted
(Pieke, 2002: 38).
9.5 Conclusion
All in all, instead of concentrating on one particular strategy, a combination of
some kind looks like the best option.
Migrant smuggling to the Netherlands is best countered not by more strin-
gent border controls, but by effective post-border (internal) controls. That entails
closely monitoring the work sectors in which illegal Chinese migrants are active,
like Chinese restaurants. Employers have been shown to be more wary of using
illegal labor if there is a high chance of detection and conviction. This in turn
leads to a reduction in the demand for illegal labor and thus gives illegal migrants
less incentive to come to the Netherlands.
However, post-border internal controls have no effect as regards stopping
those smugglers who use the Netherlands as a transit country. Under the interna-
tional Schengen Treaty, the Netherlands is obliged to prevent this from happen-
ing. The Netherlands therefore cannot totally rely on post-border controls and has
to carry out police investigations to stop smuggling to other countries. In this
regard, my data shows that investigations should be kept quite short if possible
because long-term investigations do not return sufficient dividends. Shorter
investigations free up money, time and personnel to carry out more investiga-
tions. If possible, more resources should be redirected at the smugglers who have
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been caught red-handed. Even the best laid out (smuggling) plans often come
apart at the moment of execution. This is when a smuggling group is vulnerable
and that can lead to hitherto unknown organizers. It is therefore quite short-
sighted to only prosecute a European lorry driver who is caught at the border with
several illegal Chinese passengers hiding in the back of his lorry, unless time and
money are also made available to investigate his contacts. It stands to reason that
the European lorry driver had to be in touch somehow with ethnic Chinese smug-
glers.
The importance of a good reputation and the overall use of prefinancing also
make it worth paying more attention to the smuggled migrants themselves. The
reality for now is that most police officers think of any discovered illegal Chinese
migrants (whether discovered during a smuggling attempt or as illegal labor) to
be a problem. Because they do not cooperate with the authorities, it is often
thought that nothing can be gained from them. Because an illegal status is not a
crime, long detentions for migrants are seen as improper (see also Boone, 2003;
Van Kalmthout, 2003). As chapter eight pointed out, most intercepted illegal Chi-
nese migrants are therefore released from custody within a short period of time.
As a matter of fact, this is not a uniquely Dutch problem, as the same practice is
reported in other countries. For instance, a few days before the fatal Dover inci-
dent, a group of 60 illegal Chinese migrants were discovered in Puurs in Bel-
gium. However, they were not detained very long and were told to leave Belgium
and put on a train to the Netherlands (NRC, 2002). Naturally, after the discovery
of the 58 bodies (and 2 survivors) a few days later, questions were asked in the
Belgian Parliament. Remarkably, it turned out that the 58 victims had nothing to
do with the original Belgian group of 60 illegal Chinese migrants (Buddingh,
2000). One might wonder if this really let the authorities off the hook. It still
meant 60 other illegal Chinese migrants unaccounted for.
Nevertheless, why should an illegal migrant cooperate with the authorities?
Fear of retaliation or apprehension in the face of unknown authorities might have
something to do with it. But more importantly, both smuggler and migrant stand
to win from a successful smuggling operation. The smuggler makes a profit and
enhances his reputation which might lead to future business. The migrant
arrives at his chosen destination. Therefore, when a smuggling attempt is
detected, both smuggler and migrant lose out. The smuggler loses some money
(along with a bit of his reputation) and will not receive full payment because of
prefinancing arrangements. The migrant has not yet reached his destination and
every day, week or month that he has to wait before another crossing attempt is
made, is a day, week or month lost before he finds a job and starts to earn an
income. It is therefore logical to assume that both smuggler and migrant will try
to arrange a new smuggling attempt. Several files showed that this is indeed the
case. As soon as the illegal Chinese migrants were released from police custody,
they tried to get into contact with their smuggler. The smuggler subsequently
picked them up by car or gave them directions to a safe house. Of course, tailing
these migrants presented the perfect opportunity to gather new police informa-
tion on hitherto unknown safe houses, etc. In other words, illegal migrants who
are released from police custody will not wander around helplessly and do pro-
vide a definitive lead to their smugglers. We have to keep in mind that migrants
are not mere victims but consciously use the services of a smuggler in order to
arrive at a preferred destination.
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Questionnaire used for court file analysis.
Case information
1. Codename investigation.
2. File number and name defendant.
3. Name Public Prosecutor.
4. Name team leader investigation.
5. Location investigation team.
6. Size investigation team.
7. Composition investigating team.
8. Start date investigation.









Legal or illegal status:
Criminal history:
Function in the smuggling incident:
Other (e.g. education, etc.):
The investigation
11. Synopsis.
12. Source and reason to start the investigation.
13. Verdict.




16. Smuggling to or via the Netherlands.
17. Global route.
18. Give reasons for any known transit country.
19. Means of travel.
20.Did the smugglers make use of safe houses.
21. How many migrants were transported at the same time?
22.Total amount of the time period needed to arrive in the Netherlands.
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23. Time period between certain stages along the route.
24.During which period were the smugglers active?
25. How often did the smugglers transport migrants?
26.How many persons where involved in each smuggling attempt?
27. Describe any failed smuggling attempts.
Customers
28.Total amount of customers.
29.Sex of customers.
30. What area in China did the customers originate from?
31. How did migrants contact their smugglers? Were in-betweens used (e.g.
recruiters, family, friends)?
32. Describe the relation between smuggler and client.
33. Who (and why) decided the smuggling destination?
34. Did the smugglers provide employment after arrival?
35. Were the migrants maltreated or threatened?
Documents
36.Did the smugglers use legal or falsified documents?
37. Where were these documents made?
38. How were these procured?
Financial
39.Describe the way in which the migrant (or others) paid his smuggler.
40.Have there been any problems in regard to payment? What were the conse-
quences?
41. Describe the (estimated) costs and profits.
42.Describe how the suspects have spent the proceeds of the smuggling.
43. Describe any possible money laundering activities.
44.Did the suspects use underground banking?
The criminal cooperation
45. Do the defendants have a common background? (e.g. family, neighborhood
friends, occupation, place of origin etc.).
46.If not, how did the cooperation start?
47. Did the smuggling group change in composition and size?
If yes, what are the reasons for these changes?
48.What is the specific function of the defendants? Are these functions fixed?
49.Describe the role women play.
50. Describe the type of organisation (pyramid, network).
51. Who is involved in what other criminal acts?
52. Is their interaction with other ethnicities? If yes, describe these.
53. Do the smugglers cooperate or compete with other smuggling groups?
54. How did smugglers shield themselves from prosecution or competitors?
55. What role does violence play? (e.g., intimidation, kidnapping, physical vio-
lence etc.)
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56.Describe the nature and extent of contacts with law enforcement agencies,
customs and local government. In other words, did corruption occur?
57. Describe the nature, extent and purpose of contacts with e.g. lawyers, account-




Brief overview of the measures and authorities involved in preventing and com-
bating human smuggling through pre-border, border en post-border controls.
The first type of measures is remote border control techniques (such as visa
requirements and pre-flight checks). These are employed with a view to creating
obstacles to illegal entry, before individuals can even begin their journey. The
Netherlands, in common with nearly all other Western states, has introduced visa
requirements for travelers from high-risk countries. In the research period, 1996-
2003, China was considered to be one of these high-risk countries. If the Dutch
embassy in Beijing is to grant a visa, the person wishing to travel must meet a
series of requirements. For instance, they must be able to demonstrate the pur-
pose of their visit, prove that they have sufficient funds to support themselves,
and identify guarantors within the Netherlands.38 Another remote border tech-
nique is to station liaison officers in foreign countries. A number of Immigration
Liaison Officers (ILOs) from the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service
are stationed in China and Bangkok. These officers are responsible for preventing
anyone lacking the correct documentation from boarding flights to the Nether-
lands. They are not permitted to carry out investigations or fine offenders; if they
have doubts about certain passengers, they will advise the relevant airline not to
carry those passengers. The airlines will generally comply with this advice, since
transportation companies are fined if they are found to have brought a passenger
into the Netherlands illegally. In addition, deportation costs may be recouped
from the airline in question, or the airline may be required to carry passengers
lacking the correct documentation back on the return flight (Tweede Kamer,
2003).
Standard border controls are the second type of measure. In addition, since
1994 the Netherlands has also had ‘Mobile Border Supervision of Aliens’ teams
(Mobiel Toezicht Vreemdelingen; MTV), managed by the Dutch Royal Marechaus-
see (Koninklijke Marechaussee; KMar). These teams carry out checks on travelers
into Schiphol airport on flights between Schengen states, and spot check car driv-
ers and passengers in the regions bordering Germany and Belgium. In the latter
case, patrol officers on motorbikes may direct ‘suspect’ cars to a car park along-
side the freeway, where the occupants’ identity papers will be checked.
A third method of control is the implementation of a range of post-border
measures. Various legal and administrative systems have been established in
order to make the Netherlands a more difficult and less attractive destination for
illegal aliens and asylum seekers. Criminal investigations are also carried out.
One can therefore speak of a form of internal border protection (Engbersen,
2004: 23, 24). Means of making illegal residence in the Netherlands less attrac-
38. Needless to say, a person who indicates a wish to seek asylum in the Netherlands will not be
granted a visa. For a discussion of the ethics and legalities involved, see also (Bø, 1998).
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tive include excluding illegal individuals from employment and housing, and also
restricting rights to benefits, schooling, medical care, etc. A detailed review of the
complex set of legislation that has developed over time in the areas of alien
affairs, asylum and migration lies outside the scope of this thesis. That subject
requires a separate research study. However, a number of key developments will
be outlined to illustrate the general approach to illegal residence and asylum in
the Netherlands.
Illegal aliens have not been able to register with their municipality as a new
resident since 1991. As a result, they are not able to acquire a social security
number (sofi-nummer). This has major implications, given the tightly regulated
way of life in the Netherlands. Without a social security number, one cannot enter
legal employment, open a bank account, or draw easily on various types of gov-
ernment support. Further restrictions were introduced in 1994 with a new identi-
fication law, which obliges people in the Netherlands to be able to identify them-
selves to the authorities. Under the new law, employees must be able to present
legitimate identification papers in the workplace and when conducting bank
transactions. The Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) Act (koppelingswet) came
into force in 1998. This Act creates a link between the Register of Aliens and the
Register of Social Services. An illegal alien is consequently excluded from claim-
ing government allowances, services, benefits, exemptions and licenses. So, only
individuals with Dutch nationality and foreigners residing legally in the Nether-
lands have a right to draw on the collective social services.
Efforts are made not only to make the lives of illegal immigrants difficult but
also to discourage those applying for asylum (and thereby trying to attain legal
status). The asylum application procedure has become ever more tightly control-
led, and obtaining full refugee status has become more difficult. The Aliens Act
2000 is one of the ways that this has been achieved.39 In principle, refugees are
as welcome as ever, but the award of real refugee status is subject to so many
rules that in practice it is very difficult to be considered eligible. Another impor-
tant change in the asylum application procedure relates to the status of minors. A
single minor asylum seeker who will reach adulthood (18 years old) within three
years will no longer be prepared for entry into Dutch society, but for return to
their home country. The underlying view is that an individual who has reached
adulthood should be treated as an adult. The temporary asylum status that this
individual could derive through their minority therefore expires. They will be
required to return to the country they came from.
The final weapon in the post-border combating of human smuggling is
repressive government action. People who benefit from illegal residence or entry
may be subject to criminal prosecution by various government institutions.40
39. While many technical changes have been made in respect of aliens, the regulatory changes
made in respect of asylum seekers are even more complex. For more information on these
changes, refer to the Aliens Law 2000 and (Baudoin et al., 2000).
40. An individual who has been smuggled has not committed a criminal offence. He may only be
prosecuted if guilty of other offences linked with the smuggling. Examples of such offences
would be the improper use or counterfeiting of travel documents (art. 231 Sr.) and forgery (art.
225 Sr.).
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The legislature first created the necessary framework for prosecution. The Neth-
erlands signed the Schengen Agreement, concerning the gradual abolition of
checks at its common borders, in 1990. At that point the Netherlands set itself
the duty of incorporating human smuggling into the Dutch Criminal Code as a
criminal offence. The actual implementation of the Schengen Agreement, and
thereby the criminalization of human smuggling, was completed by the Nether-
lands on 31 December 1993, when article 197a of the Criminal Code came into
force. The actual date of coming into force was therefore set at 1 January 1994.
The punishment due for human smuggling was initially set at one year.
Many investigating officers, however, considered this term of punishment to be
too short (B3, B4, B6, B7, B9). Many involved in investigations were of the opin-
ion that the profits associated with human smuggling outweighed the risks. More
emphatically, it was suggested that human smuggling was many times more
profitable than smuggling in narcotics, which attracted far more punitive sen-
tencing. Other types of criminal organizations were therefore thought to be
attracted into developing their own human smuggling activities (Kwong, 1997:
70; Müller-Schneider, 2000: 148, 149). From this point of view, human smug-
glers should be dealt with more effectively in order to deter other potential crimi-
nals. More severe sentencing would moreover dovetail better with legislation
effective in the other Schengen states.
The sentence was amended for the first time in 1996. The punishment due
was increased from one year to four years. If conducting human smuggling while
exercising an official position or profession, the sentence was increased from 16
months to six years. A new provision was also added to the article: any person
found to have made a career or habit out of human smuggling, or who operates
in a syndicate, may be punished with a maximum sentence of eight years. From a
technical investigation perspective, another important development was that the
four-year sentence, in comparison with the one-year sentence, allowed a wider
range of options for the application of coercive means. Examples of such means
of coercion include taking into custody, arrest with a warrant, preventive custody,
search and seizure powers, and telephone tapping.41
In addition to these formal amendments to the legislation, the new role of
‘National Coordinating Public Prosecutor, responsible for tackling Human
Smuggling, Human Trafficking and Child Pornography’ was created in 1995.
This new role indicated how seriously the combating of human smuggling was
being taken. The role was initiated partly in response to the need for government
to combat human smuggling in an integrated way. It was recognized that up to
that point, the criminal justice application of rules concerning the combating of
illegal migration was typified by fragmentation, and that there was insufficient
co-ordination between the Dutch Public Prosecution Service and the police to
ensure effective prosecutions (Harchaoui, 2002: 3). In addition to the appoint-
ment of a national public prosecutor responsible for human smuggling, various
41. These means of coercion could also be applied under the old legislation (via a detour), for
instance by referring to article 140 Sr. (participating in an organization that has the intention of
committing crimes). Article 197a (human smuggling) was amended once again in 2005, but
this amendment falls outside the consideration of the research period 1993-2003).
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consultation panels were established (these have since been merged or abol-
ished): the Mandators’ Consultative Platform on Human Smuggling (Opdracht-
geversoverleg Mensensmokkel; OGO), the Human Smuggling Co-operative Platform
(Afstemmingsoverleg Mensensmokkel; AOM), the Human Smuggling Co-ordination
Platform (Coördinatie Overleg Mensensmokkel; COM), and the Human Smuggling
Taskforce (Taskforce Mensensmokkel). For an outline of the remits of these consul-
tation groups, see (Faber, 2002).
A number of different organizations are responsible for actual investigations
and criminal prosecution. Several bouts of restructuring within the police service
have caused a number of these organizations to change their names, close down
or be absorbed into a central body. The following key organizations were active
during the period to which this PhD research refers.
First of these organizations is, of course, the Dutch police service. Any team
of detectives in any police district may begin an investigation into human smug-
gling, but a couple of services merit special mention. The Human Smuggling
Information and Analysis Center (Informatie en Analysecentrum Mensensmokkel;
IAM), based within the National Criminal Intelligence Department (Dienst
Nationale Recherche Informatie; DNRI) in Zoetermeer, performed analyses and
presented proposals for investigations into smuggling, though did not carry out
investigations themselves.42 The national officer responsible for human smug-
gling allocated proposals to the appropriate offices of the Public Prosecution Serv-
ice. The proposals could also be executed by the Human Smuggling Unit (Unit
Mensenmokkel; UMS) in Zwolle.43 This was a supra-regional core team that was
specially established in 1998 with a brief to carry out, among other duties, large-
scale investigations into human smuggling. For instance, the team was responsi-
ble for the Fanqie (Chinese for tomato) investigation, the Dutch police investiga-
tion into the Dover affair. Another team worth mentioning is the South-East Asia
Team, which operated from 1997 to 2001 in Rotterdam. This was a core team
within the Rotterdam-Rijnmond District that targeted all types of crime con-
nected with South-East Asia, including human smuggling of Chinese citizens.44
42. The Center was initially established in April 1994 as a temporary project involving the Central
Criminal Intelligence Service (Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst; CRI), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Marechaussee. Its brief was to provide a national co-ordination
and information service in respect of the role played by fake or forged identification documents
in human smuggling (LCIDO, 1996). The service was renamed in 1996 as the ‘Human Smug-
gling Unit’, and again in 1999 as the ‘Human Smuggling Information and Analysis Center’. It
reported to the head of the Services and Migration Unit (Unit Services en Migratie; USM), within
the National Criminal Intelligence Department (Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie; DNRI).
The Human Smuggling Information and Analysis Center was abolished in 2005, and merged
with the National Crime Squad.  
43. The Human Smuggling Unit has since merged with the National Criminal Investigation
Department, which was established in 2004. The National Criminal Investigation Department
has a special focus on combating serious, organized (inter)national crime. Human smuggling
(and human trafficking) are included in these areas of responsibility (KLPD, 2003: 46).
44. The investigatory Van Traa Committee reported that the Dutch police had too little knowledge of
crime in the Asian environment. The South-East Asia Team was therefore founded in Rotter-
dam, to change this situation over a period of four years. After this period ended in 2001, it was
decided that the South-East Asia Team should continue to function, within the Human Smug-
gling Information and Analysis Center in Zoetermeer. 
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The police service is not the only organization responsible for combating
human smuggling. In addition to its ‘Mobile Border Supervision of Aliens’
duties, the Dutch Royal Marechaussee is also actively involved in criminal investi-
gations. In 1994, for example, the Marechaussee set up the Facilitation and
Detection Team at Schiphol airport. This team was originally established in order
to stop Schiphol workers misusing their entry passes. It had been found that
some cleaning staff members had been lending their passes to third parties, in
order to bring people into Schiphol (Bruinsma, 1996b, p. 91). Three other spe-
cialist detective teams are active at Schiphol, carrying out more long-term investi-
gations into human smuggling. The Marechaussee also participates in police
human smuggling investigations by supporting the regional police services via
‘Cross-Border Crime Teams’ (Teams Grensoverschrijdende Criminaliteit; GOC). It
also carries out many human smuggling investigations of its own from year to
year (small and large-scale). The police Human Smuggling Information and
Analysis Center has a parallel body within the Marechaussee, in the shape of the
Migration Crime Office (Bureau Migratie Criminaliteit; BMC; formerly the Infor-
mation Desk for Alien Affairs; Infodesk Vreemdelingenzaken) in Utrecht. This
office also collects and analyses data related to human smuggling, but their infor-
mation is only relevant to matters raised by the Marechaussee organization itself.
The Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service has a similar office inciden-
tally. The ‘Human Smuggling Information Group’ (Mensensmokkel Informatie
Groep; MIG) collects and analyses evidence in the field of human smuggling that
originates from within the Service’s sphere of activities.
The criminal justice approach within the Netherlands is directed not only
towards those who help foreign nationals illegally enter the country (the so-called
smugglers or facilitators). Landlords and employers who profit from illegal aliens
are also tackled. Employers are subject to a particular fine, for every illegal immi-
grant found to be working for them. If a later check finds that an employer has
again taken illegal staff into service, a higher cumulative fine will be applied. The
so-called ‘illegal alien memorandum’ discussed within the Dutch cabinet indi-
cates that this employer’s fine will be increased from an average of 980 euro to
around 3,500 euro per illegal employee (Tweede Kamer, 2004: 19). Such
employer checks are generally carried out by the Labor Inspector (together with
the Aliens Police). Sometimes particular professional groups are the focus of
attention. Whether the target is the textile industry, the hotel and catering trade or
agriculture, controls are carried out for a sustained period of time through a
multidisciplinary collaboration (e.g., between the Labor Inspectorate, Aliens
Police, Inland Revenue and fire department). In addition, the Social Information
and Investigation Service (Sociale Inlichtingen en Opsporings Dienst; SIOD) was
established in 2002 to combat large-scale fraud in the area of Social Affairs and
Employment. This organization has now grown to a staff of around 280 people,
working from a number of offices throughout the Netherlands.
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Samenvatting
De Chinese Mensensmokkel in Transit
Dit proefschrift gaat in op de vraag hoe de mensensmokkel van Chinezen in
Nederland wordt georganiseerd. Daarbij wordt aandacht besteed aan de ken-
merken van de smokkelaars en de wijze waarop zij met elkaar samenwerken. 
De empirische basis van het proefschrift wordt gevormd door 88 rechtbank-
dossiers waarin sprake is van Chinese mensensmokkel. Deze dossiers hebben
betrekking op de periode 1996-2003. In dit tijdsbestek is 178 maal een verdachte
persoon voor de rechter gebracht. Wanneer recidive niet wordt meegeteld, is het
aantal verdachten 172. De dossiers zijn doorgenomen aan de hand van een van
tevoren opgestelde checklist. Historische gegevens over Chinese mensensmokkel
zijn verzameld door de stadsarchieven van Rotterdam, Den Haag en Amsterdam
te raadplegen. Daarnaast zijn ook diverse overheidsfunctionarissen in binnen- en
buitenland en personen uit de Nederlandse Chinese gemeenschap geïnterviewd.
Er zijn geen interviews met smokkelaars gehouden. 
De aldus verzamelde gegevens zijn geïnterpreteerd aan de hand van ver-
schillende perspectieven die in de literatuur over georganiseerde misdaad,
mensensmokkel en migratie aanwezig zijn. Daaruit volgen drie verschillende
theoretische benaderingen van Chinese mensensmokkel. Hierin wordt achter-
eenvolgens de betrokkenheid benadrukt van sterk hiërarchisch criminele organi-
saties, lossere netwerken of sociale banden en familiestructuren. De eerste twee
benaderingen hebben een criminologische invalshoek, de derde een migrato-
rische. Voor elk van deze drie benaderingen is een aantal terugkerende ken-
merken benoemd. Het gaat daarbij of smokkelaars al dan niet in een vast verband
opereren, of er centrale sturing optreedt, of de smokkelaars ook actief zijn op
andere criminele terreinen, of de smokkelaars de migranten exploiteren en wat
het effect van overheidsrepressie op de organisatie van mensensmokkel is. 
De onderzoeksresultaten laten een gedifferentieerd beeld zien. De mensen-
smokkel van Chinezen heeft kenmerken van alle drie de benoemde benaderin-
gen (hiërarchie, netwerk, migratie). 
De hiërarchische benadering sluit aan bij de constatering dat er in Neder-
land vaste smokkelgroepen zijn te onderscheiden. Groepsvorming treedt op door
het illegitieme karakter van de mensensmokkel gekoppeld aan de vaak fictieve,
maar niet geheel irreële angst voor concurrenten. Deze groepsvorming is verder
af te leiden uit het gegeven dat dezelfde verdachten op een continue basis met
elkaar samenwerken, door één persoon worden uitbetaald, geografisch geconcen-
treerd zijn, dezelfde etniciteit gemeen hebben of soms zelfs een gemeenschap-
pelijke familieachtergrond delen. Deze banden duiden op duurzaamheid en
cohesie, niet op flexibiliteit en inwisselbaarheid. Dit verklaart ook waarom in de
opsporingswereld nog voortdurend wordt gesproken over criminele smokkel-
organisatie X of Y, hoewel dit doorgaans in de wetenschappelijke wereld als
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achterhaald wordt bestempeld. Binnen die smokkelgroepen zijn de omgangsvor-
men overigens vaak vrij los. De omvang van de smokkelgroepen blijkt samen te
hangen met het aantal migranten dat over een bepaalde periode kan worden
gesmokkeld. Hoe meer migranten kunnen worden verwerkt, hoe groter de groep
zal zijn. Voor grote groepen blijkt het essentieel om met niet-etnisch Chinese per-
sonen samen te werken. Deze nemen doorgaans het fysieke (clandestiene) trans-
port voor hun rekening. 
Het netwerk karakter komt het duidelijkst naar voren als niet alleen naar
Nederland wordt gekeken, maar naar het gehele smokkeltraject. Niet alleen in
Nederland zijn verschillende smokkelgroepen actief. Ook in het buitenland zijn
verschillende smokkelgroepen te onderscheiden. Het is de samenwerking van
deze diverse groepen over verschillende landen die het mogelijk maakt dat groot-
schalige mensensmokkel optreedt. Het gaat hier echter niet om eenvoudige
ketenstructuren waarbij zich in ieder land een volgende schakel bevindt. Een
smokkelgroep in Nederland neemt namelijk voor verschillende buitenlandse
groepen opdrachten aan: het smokkelen van mensen naar Groot-Brittannië. Wie
succesvol is, verkrijgt een goede naamsbekendheid. Dit komt als vanzelf de klan-
dizie weer ten goede. Het is hierbij belangrijk om er op te wijzen dat de smokkel-
groepen in Nederland voor die diverse buitenlandse organisaties tegelijkertijd
smokkelopdrachten uitvoeren. Daarmee zijn zij niet gebonden aan één groep in
het bijzonder maar zorgt het ‘contractwerk’ feitelijk voor zelfstandigheid. Er is in
het smokkeltraject dan ook geen sprake van centrale sturing of controle, maar
van onderlinge uitbesteding. Overigens moeten de relaties met buitenlandse
smokkelaars ook weer niet slechts als vluchtige contacten worden gezien. Smok-
kelaars zullen vaak de weg van de minste weerstand kiezen en al eerder gebaande
paden blijven volgen. Als een contact voldoet, wordt deze keer op keer aange-
zocht. In die zin kan de samenwerking met externe relaties ook geconsolideerd
raken.
Aangezien de grote smokkelgroepen slechts een gedeelte van het smokkel-
traject uitvoeren, rekenen zij ook slechts een gedeelte van de totale smokkelsom.
Het vervoer vanuit Nederland naar Groot-Brittannië kost doorgaans een paar dui-
zend euro per persoon. Dit levert een Nederlandse smokkelorganisatie die maan-
delijks tientallen mensen kan smokkelen, een aanzienlijke totaalomzet op.
Omdat de totale smokkelroute over diverse deeltrajecten verloopt, kan de uitein-
delijke smokkelsom in de tienduizenden euro’s per persoon oplopen. Hoe dit
geld uiteindelijk bij de organisatoren terechtkomt is onduidelijk.  Uit de dossiers
blijkt in ieder geval niet dat de grotere smokkelgroepen migranten exploiteren
om maandelijkse aflossingen te verkrijgen. Er zijn in de dossiers ook geen ver-
banden met gedwongen roofovervallen, de handel in verdovende middelen of
gedwongen prostitutie aangetroffen. 
Voor het verkrijgen van de smokkelsom wordt doorgaans een andere
methode gebruikt die in deze studie als ‘voorfinanciering’ is betiteld. Bij deze
methode heeft de te smokkelen persoon voor aanvang van de reis al op een of
andere manier de totale reissom geregeld. Dit is niet zo vreemd als op het eerste
gezicht misschien lijkt. Vanuit de migratieliteratuur wordt er op gewezen dat het
niet de allerarmsten zijn die doorgaans vertrekken. Belangrijk is ook dat migratie
De Chinese Mensensmokkel in Transit 165
niet de beslissing is van slechts één individu, maar dat meerdere personen (fami-
lie, vrienden) hier belang bij hebben. Uit de dossiers komt naar voren dat de
migrant op het moment van aankomst in het land van bestemming, zijn familie
of vrienden op de hoogte stelt van zijn behouden aankomst, waarna deze de
smokkelaar uitbetalen. Deze methode heeft voor alle partijen voordelen. De
gesmokkelde is er zeker van dat hij niet wordt opgelicht. Familie en vrienden zien
het als een goede investering aangezien zij (met rente) zullen worden terug-
betaald door de migrant. En de smokkelaar is ook zeker van zijn opbrengsten. In
het bijzonder grootschalige smokkelaars hebben hierbij baat. Voor hen is het te
arbeidsintensief om jaar na jaar maandelijks het loon van gesmokkelde illegalen
af te moeten romen. Bovendien vergroten zulke praktijken het risico op ontdek-
king. Dit verklaart ook waarom in Nederland niet in de dossiers wordt aangetrof-
fen dat smokkelaars de gesmokkelden via gedwongen prostitutie of andere vor-
men van sociaal-economische uitbuiten. De smokkelaar heeft immers zijn geld al
uitbetaald gekregen. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat gesmokkelden nooit worden
uitgebuit. De schuld van de gesmokkelde blijft namelijk wel staan bij hen die
deze smokkelsom hebben voorgeschoten (familie of bekenden). En het gaat nog
steeds om hoge bedragen. De migrant zal deze schuld vervolgens alleen kunnen
aflossen door lange werkdagen te maken. Zodoende worden migranten wel in
uitbuitingssituaties aangetroffen, maar is hier geen directe link met hun smokke-
laars. Een uitbuiting door de smokkelaar wordt doorgaans slechts aangetroffen
bij de kleinere, individueel opererende smokkelaars. De reden hiertoe ligt in het
karakter van migratie. Een individueel opererende smokkelaar zal eerder zijn
eigen familie of bekenden proberen te smokkelen. Hierbij is het onderling ver-
trouwen groter dan wanneer de gesmokkelde een onbekende is. Voorfinanciering
hoeft dan ook niet gebruikt te worden. Gesmokkelde familieleden zullen hun
dankbaarheid tonen door vervolgens voor minder dan het minimum loon in
bijvoorbeeld het restaurant van de smokkelaar te gaan werken. 
Het gebruikte onderzoeksmateriaal laat echter een adequate analyse van
dergelijke constructies nauwelijks toe. Ten eerste gaat het om opsporingsonder-
zoeken, geen sociologische situatieschetsen. Daardoor is er bijvoorbeeld weinig
terug te vinden over de sociale banden tussen gesmokkelden en hun smokkelaars
of werkgevers. Ten tweede worden kleinschalige vormen van smokkel, de vormen
die nu net met een migratieperspectief in verband worden gebracht, meestal niet
voor de rechter gebracht. Kleinschalige zaken hebben een geringe kans op ver-
volging omdat zij door hun incidentele karakter niet alleen lastig om te
ontdekken zijn, maar ook moeilijker strafrechterlijk te bewijzen. 
Voor de beantwoording van de laatste onderzoeksvraag is gekeken of er
interactie bestaat tussen de mate van overheidsrepressie en de structuur van
smokkelorganisaties. Sinds 1994 is mensensmokkel voor het eerst in de Neder-
landse wetgeving strafbaar gesteld en zijn diverse oude en nieuw opgerichte over-
heidsorganisaties zich met de bestrijding van mensensmokkel gaan bezighou-
den. Er werd echter geen duidelijke interactie tussen overheidsbeleid en
smokkelorganisaties ontdekt. Voor de onderzoeksperiode 1996-2003 zijn geen
meetbare veranderingen opgetreden in de organisatie of uitvoering van de men-
sensmokkel. Ook kan niet worden gesteld dat kleinschalige smokkel door groot-
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schalige smokkel is verdrongen. In theorie blijft het weliswaar mogelijk dat stren-
ger overheidsbeleid er toe bijdraagt dat mensensmokkel geprofessionaliseerd
raakt, maar de realiteit wijst uit dat eenvoudige vormen van smokkel (bijvoor-
beeld valselijke visa garantstellingen) nog steeds vrij risicoloos uitvoerbaar zijn.
Dit betekent dat smokkelaars die slechts in het klein opereren, oftewel de smok-
kelaars die vanuit het migratieperspectief handelen, voldoende overlevingskan-
sen hebben. Daarnaast moet het ‘nieuwe’ aan het fenomeen mensen-smokkel
worden gerelativeerd. Al vóór de Tweede Wereldoorlog vond er in georganiseerd
verband Chinese mensensmokkel plaats. Het ontbreekt echter aan adequaat
bronnenmateriaal om deze periode exact te kunnen analyseren. Hoe deze organi-
saties precies waren vormgegeven, kan derhalve achteraf niet worden vastgesteld. 
Kortom, de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek laten zien dat de mensensmokkel
van Chinezen kenmerken heeft van zowel een hiërarchische, netwerk als migra-
tie benadering. Daarbij komt een netwerk benadering voor wat betreft de gehele
smokkelroute het best tot zijn recht. Verschillende groepen werken met elkaar
samen en creëren zodoende een smokkeltraject. Wie uitsluitend de blik op
Nederland richt, zal echter het hiërarchische meer karakter opvallen, dat wil zeg-
gen, vaste groepen waarbinnen een primus inter pares fungeert. Door de aard van
het gebruikte onderzoeksmateriaal, komt de migratie benadering minder uit de
verf. Daarmee hebben de resultaten van dit onderzoek vooral betrekking op de
georganiseerde kant van het mensensmokkelspectrum. Toch is een migratie
perspectief een belangrijk element in de puzzel van Chinese mensensmokkel.
Hiermee is bijvoorbeeld de methode van voorfinanciering goed te verklaren. 
Merk ten slotte op dat de dossiers grotendeels betrekking hebben op uit-
smokkel naar Groot-Brittannië en niet insmokkel naar Nederland. Het zijn dus
zaken waarin Nederland een transitrol speelt. Smokkel waarin Nederland het
einddoel is, zou daarom theoretisch gezien enigszins kunnen afwijken van de
onderzoeksbevindingen. Bovendien geven de dossiers geen informatie over hoe
de gesmokkelden in het buitenland worden behandeld of wat de kenmerken van
hun smokkelaars aldaar zijn. Deze studie zou daarom in een aantal landen gere-
produceerd moeten worden om te bepalen of de Nederlandse situatie (zoals deze
hier beschreven staat) uniek is.
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